SURVEY

Spring 1985
Volume 29 no 1 (124)
£5.00 $10.00

a journal of East & West studies

AND NOW GORBACHOV

Iain Elliot
John R. Thomas
J. L. Porket
Michel Heller
Michael Checinski

BEYOND 1984

Vladimir Bukovsky
Richard Perle

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

The Philippines
Libya
The Soviet Union
Japan

SOCIALIST SURREALISM II

O. L. Smaryl
Vladimir Voinovich

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor: Leopold Labedz
International Advisory Board

Enzo Bettiza ..... *European Parliament*
François Bourricaud ..... *University of Paris*
Zbigniew Brzezinski ..... *Columbia University*
Alan Bullock ..... *University of Oxford*
Maurice Cranston ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Melvin Croan ..... *University of Wisconsin*
Colin Crouch ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
François Duchêne ..... *University of Sussex*
Edwin J. Feulner Jr ..... *The Heritage Foundation, Washington*
Giorgio Galli ..... *Critica Sociale, Milan*
Pierre Hassner ..... *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris*
Masamichi Inoki ..... *Kyoto University*
James Joll ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Karl Kaiser ..... *University of Cologne*
Ivo John Lederer ..... *New York*
Michael Leifer ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
John Wilson Lewis ..... *Stanford University*
Richard Löwenthal ..... *Free University of Berlin*
Alasdair MacIntyre ..... *Boston University*
Donald MacRae ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Mark Mancall ..... *Stanford University*
Ali Mazrui ..... *University of Michigan*
Peter Reddaway ..... *London School of Economics & Political Science*
Soedjatmoko ..... *The United Nations University, Japan*
Theo Sommer ..... *Die Zeit, Hamburg*
Leonard Sussman ..... *Freedom House, New York*

Survey is published under the auspices of the London School of Economics & Political Science

Associate Editor
Gerald Frost

Assistant Editor
Teresa Cherfas

Editorial Assistant
Rebecca Penrose

Editorial Office
Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD (Tel. 01-734 0592)

Subscription Office
59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS (Tel. 01-836 4194)

Annual Subscription
UK £17·00 * Elsewhere £20·00 (including surface postage)
USA $39·00 (air assisted)
* Airmail rates available on request
Per copy UK £5·00 US $10·00 (postage/packing UK 75p US $1·25)

Manuscripts
Articles should be submitted in duplicate to the editorial office. They should be typed in double-spacing and, preferably, conform to the house style of *Survey*.

Copyright © *Survey* 1985 ISSN 0039–6192

Survey magazine is published quarterly by *Survey* Ltd. in association with the

INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE & STRATEGIC STUDIES

Produced in cooperation with Freedom House (New York)

Printed in Great Britain by The Eastern Press Ltd., London and Reading

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spring 1985
Volume 29
no 1 (124)

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

And Now Gorbachov

The Great Reformer ..... *Iain Elliot* 1
Gorbachov for Beginners ..... *Michel Heller* 12
Unemployment in the Midst of Labour Waste ..... *J. L. Porket* 19
Militarization of the Soviet Academy of Sciences ..... *John R. Thomas* 29
The Economics of Defence in the USSR ..... *Michael Checinski* 59

Beyond 1984

Quousque tandem Catilina . . . . *Vladimir Bukovsky* 79
. . .Abutere patientia nostra ..... *Richard Perle* 88

The International Scene

Soviet–Libyan Relations Under Qaddafi ..... *Pedro Ramet* 96
Philippine Communism and the Soviet Union ..... *Leif Rosenberger* 113
The Role of Baptists in Soviet Foreign Policy *Rebecca V. Strode* 146
The Japanese Economy ..... *Karel van Wolferen* 173

Socialist Surrealism II

Two Soviet Encyclopaedias ..... *O. L. Smaryl* 183
The Life and Fate of Vasily Grossman ..... *Vladimir Voinovich* 186

Obituaries

Leopold Tyrmand ..... *L. L.* 190
Edward Crankshaw ..... *L. L.* 192

Our Contributors 193

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE: Some Implications for Europe

by Werner Kaltefleiter

Does the SDI programme signal a return to Fortress America and US isolationism? Or will the deployment of space-borne ballistic missile defence systems help underwrite the US guarantee to its European allies and thus help preserve the political cohesion of the Western Alliance, as its supporters claim? Basing his findings on a number of clearly stated technological scenarios, Werner Kaltefleiter assesses the strategic and political consequences of the SDI for Europe. Professor Kaltefleiter also undertakes the neglected task of examining the implications for Europe of unmatched Soviet advances in the development and deployment of ballistic missile defence.

Price including postage, £4.50 (UK/Europe), $8.00 (USA), £5.00 (Other countries)

B SDI: The Case for the Defence

by Alun Chalfont

In this extremely lucid and trenchantly written study a distinguished military analyst and commentator advances one of the most powerful cases in favour of the Strategic Defence Initiative written from a European perspective. In his view the present NATO strategy of flexible response is based on a series of assumptions which are now dangerously outmoded. If it results in deployment of affordable and effective ballistic missile defence systems, the SDI programme will compensate for the flaws and implausibilities in the present Western defence posture. In his opinion the deployment of a layered ballistic missile defence could add to the credibility of the Western retaliatory threat while at the same time supplementing traditional deterrence by denying Soviet military planners any realistic prospect of achieving their strategic objectives. His conclusion is an optimistic one: a successfully deployed SDI system would reduce the risk of war, enhance the prospect of arms control by reducing the military utility of ICBMs and long-range intermediate missiles, and strengthen the geostrategic position of NATO members in relation to the Warsaw Pact.

Price including postage, £4.50 (UK/Europe), $8.00 (USA), £5.00 (Other countries)

ORDER FORM

Send completed form and payment to:
The Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 13-14 Golden Square, London W1R 3AG
Tel. 01-439 8719 (Subscription/Circulation Dept. 01-278 0146); Telex. 893513 TOMEDE G

Please send me _____copies of A

_____copies of B Total £_____

(Cheques and money orders should be in British or US currency)

NB. The cheapest and easiest way to obtain IEDSS publications is by becoming a subscriber.

☐ Please enrol me as a subscriber

Name and Address _____

_____

_____ Date_____

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

And Now Gorbachov, the Great Reformer

Iain Elliot

"The sense of hopelessness of the Brezhnev and Chernenko years has disappeared. Everybody is now expecting great things from Gorbachov."

Roy Medvedev, quoted in *The Sunday Times*, 16 June 1985.

"Gorbachov represents a complete break with the earlier generation, in personality as well as age. He is a man of exceptional charm with a relaxed, self-deprecating sense of humour. Emotions flicker over a face of unusual sensitivity like summer breezes on a pond."

Dennis Healey, British Labour Party shadow foreign secretary, *Newsweek*, 25 March 1985.

"People have a remarkable capacity for pig-headed credulity. . . . The same treacherous secrecy, the same fog of injustice still hangs in our air, worse than the smoke of city chimneys. For half a century or more the enormous state has towered over us, girded with hoops of steel. The hoops are still there."

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Vol. 3.

ON 2 May 1985, several British newspapers gave front-page prominence to a photograph showing Mikhail Gorbachov's daughter Irina and granddaughter Oksana as they watched him preside over his first May Day parade as leader. Observers noted Mr Gorbachov's smiles from the Lenin Mausoleum and the grey suede boots of his elegant wife Raisa Maksimovna, standing down below by the Kremlin wall. Could it really be that a bright new era was dawning, a Camelot, as the *Guardian* put it, on the banks of the Moskva? Gone for ever were the dull days of the geriatric Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, with their unphotogenic wives. Here at last was a young, dynamic reformer, a man with whom we can do business.

And why not? The Khrushchev years were a distinct improvement on the Stalin terror; now too a change of leader could perhaps open the flood gates of reform. Who could deny the need for more efficient economic management? And relations with the West could certainly stand improvement.

By May Day the new General Secretary had held office for 50 days, and already there was evidence of change more significant than smiles and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suede boots. At the Central Committee plenum on 23 April Gorbachov reorganized the Soviet leadership – not by retiring the remaining septuagenarians, but by promoting to full voting membership of the Politburo two members of the Secretariat, Egor Ligachev, aged 64, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, aged 55. Neither had served their apprenticeship as candidate members; the KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov, also promoted, had been a candidate since 1983. Marshal Sergei Sokolov, who had succeeded the late Dmitri Ustinov as Defence Minister in December, became a candidate member, while Viktor Nikonov, aged 54, was appointed to the Secretariat with responsibility for agriculture.

Then at the plenum on 1 July Grigori Romanov, although only 62, "retired on health grounds," which appeared to confirm rumours that Gorbachov's main rival for the succession had attempted to block him at the last moment by proposing the dull septuagenarian Viktor Grishin as General Secretary, and had therefore been ousted. Eduard Shevardnadze, 57, moved up from candidate to full membership of the Politburo, and at the next day's meeting of the Supreme Soviet it was announced that he had replaced Gromyko as Foreign Minister, although his experience was limited to a few trips abroad and years of fighting corruption in his native Georgia as a police general and later as Party leader. Gorbachov rewarded Andrei Gromyko for his support by proposing him as President, thus retaining his expertise, while bringing foreign policy decisions more directly under the General Secretary's control. The appointment of Lev Zaikov and Boris Yeltsin expanded the number of Central Committee secretaries to 11, but with the ousting of Romanov, only Gorbachov and his supporters Ligachev and Ryzhkov were full members of both Politburo and Secretariat. The new General Secretary was firmly in charge.

THE accession of Gorbachov on 11 March 1985, only a few days after he celebrated his 54th birthday, was hailed in the Western media as if the event somehow matched in its exciting expectation of change the election in 1960 of John F. Kennedy, at 43 the youngest US President ever. In fact Lenin and Stalin were in their forties when they took power, Khrushchev and Brezhnev in their fifties; Andropov and Chernenko were exceptionally old to become General Secretary, rather than Gorbachov being remarkably young. Moreover, he was not exactly a "new leader" as the press eulogies termed him, nor did his emergence as Party boss immediately bring a fresh administration, as would the election of a new US President. Gorbachov joined the Secretariat in 1978; he entered the Politburo as a candidate member the following year, becoming a full member in 1980. He is the product of a system which does not encourage radical innovations or original free thinkers; yet that system allowed a man from a peasant family, who began his career at 15 as an assistant operator of a combine harvester, to reach the top.

Managerial efficiency and loyalty to the current Party line are the qualities most likely to have taken Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachov to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kremlin from the little village of Privolnoe in the southern Russian province of Stavropol. At school and as a teenager his public loyalty had to be to Stalin. He didn't get where he is now by protesting against the Stalinist sycophancy in his school text-books, nor by opposing the post-war repressions which not even remote villages escaped. In fact he was loyal enough to the Stalin regime not only to be a Party member at the early age of 21, but to impress the local Komsomol organizers to such an extent that they recommended him to study for a law degree at Moscow University, from which he graduated in 1955.

Soviet jurisprudence, especially in those years, was not quite the same as in the Western democracies. True, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, was impressed by Gorbachov after talking to him for more than three hours in the course of a Congressional visit to the Kremlin on 10 April 1985: "He appeared to be the type of man who would make an excellent trial lawyer, an outstanding attorney in New York, had he lived there." But O'Neill was not actually referring to Gorbachov's grasp of legal niceties: "He's a master of words and a master in the art of politics and diplomacy. He's hard, he's tough."[1]

LEV Yudovich, a Soviet lawyer now living in West Germany, was a postgraduate at Moscow University when Gorbachov arrived to study law under such spiritual mentors as "the semi-educated conformist hack A. Denisov, whose lectures were little more than a succession of quotes from Stalin's speeches."[2] At a time when Zhdanov was imposing even greater Party control over higher education, the anti-semitic campaign against "cosmopolitanism" was at its height, and Stalin was planning a new wave of terror, Mikhail Gorbachov launched into his Party career. He became a Komsomol organizer, disliked by his fellow-students, says Yudovich, because of "his demonstrative political orthodoxy and the hard line he took during discussions of people's personal affairs."

Another acquaintance of these days was Zdenek Mlynar, later a prominent theoretician in the Czechoslovak Communist Party under Dubcek, and now living in Vienna: "We were more than just fellow-students, we were also good friends."[3] Mlynar says that the young Gorbachov was opposed to Stalin's liquidation of "enemies of the people." But Mlynar himself expresses surprise that Gorbachov voiced such heretical views, especially to a foreigner. Indeed, as a Komsomol official friendly with a foreigner, albeit a communist from a fraternal socialist country, Gorbachov would certainly be expected to write reports on Mlynar. Were such comments *provokatsiya*, rather than a genuine indication of liberal views?

It is claimed that because of his hard work the young peasant

[1] *International Herald Tribune*, 11 April 1985.
[2] *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 13, No. 25, 11 Dec. 1984.
[3] *L'Unità*, 9 April 1985; *Kurier*, Vienna, 20–21 April 1985; *International Herald Tribune*, 22 April 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gorbachov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour. Of course, Mlynar and others may have misremembered, and perhaps Gorbachov actually received some less impressive Komsomol Red Banner award. If, however, the former claims are true, it still does not necessarily follow that Gorbachov escaped from the drudgery of farm life solely by excelling in labour productivity: the Order can likewise be awarded for "important services in the sphere of state and public activity, in strengthening socialist legality and law and order."[4] Under Stalin this frequently had a sinister significance. If Mikhail Gorbachov was really opposed to Stalinist practices, why did he agree when a student to read for a degree in law rather than agriculture or engineering? And why, when General Secretary, did he permit the extraordinary Moscow conference on 27 May which brought together the Minister of Justice, First Deputy Procurator General, and other top legal and Party officials to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the birth of Stalin's Commissar for Justice, the execrable Nikolai Vasilevich Krylenko?

This truly abominable man organized such show trials as the Shakhty affair, at which a 12-year-old joined in the chorus demanding the death sentence for his father, one of 50 Soviet engineers forced to confess to "wrecking activities." Yet *Izvestiya* (14 May 1985) spoke of his "significant contribution to strengthening socialist legality" and his regard for the "scrupulous observance of the law." Moreover, if Gorbachov is opposed to Stalinist excesses, why has he not reversed the trend towards rehabilitating Stalin? The *Izvestiya* biography of Krylenko, for example, did not even hint at the fact that in 1938 he too was arrested and liquidated without trial. That the present leaders of the Soviet legal system should honour the memory of a man like Krylenko while permitting the revival of Stalinist practices in the trials of political prisoners is probably more relevant to a discussion of General Secretary Gorbachov than what Zdenek Mlynar remembers him saying over three decades ago as a law student.[5]

They met again in Stavropol in 1967, when Gorbachov expressed much more orthodox views, criticizing Khrushchev (deposed three years before) for "impetuous subjectivist interference in the economy and the system." Whatever he said to foreign students at university, Gorbachov presumably devoted at least as much effort to cultivating Party officials as he did to his studies, since after he graduated he remained in the university Party committee as a professional Komsomol official. He may have come to the attention of Ivan Kapitonov, at that time First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, then of the Moscow Province Party Committee. In 1965 Kapitonov was given Secretariat responsibility for Party cadres—a very useful contact for an ambitious man.

In 1956 Gorbachov returned to Stavropol, not to practise law, but as First Secretary of the Komsomol Committee. Within a decade he had climbed through the local Party ranks to become head of the town

[4] *Ordena i medali SSSR*, Moscow, 1983, p. 51.
[5] *Izvestiya*, 28 May 1985; *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 14, No. 12.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

committee, and in 1970 was appointed the top Party official of Stavropol territory, a post which brought him full membership of the Central Committee in 1971. He had gained valuable experience in the administration of agriculture in the Stavropol territory, a major grain producing area, and in 1967 was awarded a diploma on completing a correspondence course at Stavropol Agricultural Institute.

For four years Fedor Kulakov was Party leader of Stavropol territory; he was transferred in 1964 to Moscow to take general charge of agriculture, after supporting the Brezhnev *coup* which ousted Khrushchev, and remained in the Secretariat with responsibility for agriculture until his sudden death in July 1978. This was Gorbachov's great opportunity; in November 1978 he moved to the Secretariat in Moscow, at 47 one of the top two dozen Party leaders in the USSR. By then Gorbachov had the support of such valuable patrons as the KGB chief Yuri Andropov, who frequently relaxed at the resort of Mineralnye Vody in the Stavropol territory where he was born and spent his childhood. Probably through Andropov he became a protégé also of the veteran ideologist Mikhail Suslov, another former Stavropol First Secretary. (Although that was during the war before schoolboy Gorbachov was actively involved in politics, Stavropol remained Suslov's territorial base).

BEING in charge of agriculture was not regarded as the best preparation for supreme power in the USSR. Yet this had the advantage of making Gorbachov appear less of a rival for potential successors to the ailing Brezhnev. When Andrei Kirilenko faded from the scene, Konstantin Chernenko remained as Brezhnev's apparent choice. But Andropov skilfully outmanoeuvred them, entering the Secretariat in May 1982 and emerging as General Secretary the following November; he rewarded Gorbachov for his support by making him responsible for economic affairs and personnel. This entailed supervising for Andropov the removal of some of the most corrupt and inefficient of Brezhnev's appointees in the Central Committee and government ministries.

In the USSR, however, corruption and inefficiency are not necessarily sufficient grounds in themselves for dismissing high officials; there is usually a political reason for which the other accusations serve as an excuse. For instance, Army-General Nikolai Shchelokov, Minister of Internal Affairs, was dismissed for corruption within weeks of Andropov taking office. He was a close ally of the Brezhnev–Chernenko faction and as head of the MVD police was long a rival of Andropov, for 15 years KGB chief. It was widely rumoured that he would be sentenced to death and shot, but as Andropov's drive slackened and he was succeeded by Chernenko, Shchelokov seemed likely to survive. However, Chernenko too lost influence through illness, and in November 1984 Shchelokov was stripped of his rank and honours; he died in December, rumoured to have committed suicide. Vitali Fedorchuk, a ruthless career KGB general, selected by Andropov to succeed him as KGB chief in May 1982, took

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over as Minister of Internal Affairs in December 1982 and proceeded to "eliminate shortcomings in the performance of the MVD."[6] Similar political rivalries can be discerned in other high level dismissals, including of course that of Romanov, accused by official rumour-mongers of over-indulgence in hard drinking and young women; he had even broken Catherine the Great's dinner plates.

THE three men who under Gorbachov were to become full members of the Politburo at the April 1985 plenum, first entered the ruling bodies when Andropov was General Secretary and Gorbachov was responsible for economic and personnel matters. Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, born on 28 September 1929, had proved himself managing heavy engineering in the Urals; in 1975 he became First Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering, and four years later was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). Egor Kuzmich Ligachev, born on 29 November 1920, made his career in the Party apparatus of Novosibirsk, then served from 1961 to 1965 in the RSFSR propaganda department before becoming First Secretary of the Tomsk Province Committee. Ryzhkov entered the Central Committee Secretariat in November 1982, Ligachev in December 1983.

At the same December plenum Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, who replaced Fedorchuk as KGB chief in December 1982, was promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo. Chebrikov, born on 27 April 1923, pursued a successful Party career in Dnepropetrovsk (the former Brezhnev fief from which so many of the Brezhnev mafia came) before moving to Moscow in 1967 as Party watchdog in charge of KGB cadres administration. Andropov made skilful use of his KGB power base to ensure his advancement, and Gorbachov rewarded the KGB for its support by returning a Politburo vote to that organization, so crucial to the maintenance of the system.

It was also in December 1983 that Vitali Vorotnikov, the RSFSR premier, and Mikhail Solomentsev, head of the Party control committee, were promoted from candidate to full membership of the Politburo. Chernenko made no major leadership changes, while Gorbachov within weeks of becoming General Secretary was consolidating the reorganization of his team begun under Andropov.

Change at the top depends on a slow process of compromise and consensus. A new General Secretary cannot change the administration at a stroke, nor can he immediately initiate dramatic changes in domestic and foreign policies, in the unlikely event that he should wish to do so. Of the 24 men in Gorbachov's Politburo and Secretariat of July 1985, only eight had not held positions in one of the two top bodies under Brezhnev; death from old age was the main—admittedly compelling—reason for replacement. Of the full Politburo members, however, half had received promotion under either Andropov or Gorbachov because of their proven record of administrative ability.

[6] *Pravda*, 26 Jan. 1983.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OF course the fact that Gorbachov has brought to the fore several Party leaders more skilled than others at making the system function, does not mean that he intends to initiate radical reforms of that system. After all, it has worked well for him and his closest colleagues. Moreover, not all those promoted since Brezhnev died would necessarily support Gorbachov should he wish, for instance, to shift investment from heavy to light industry, from military hardware to consumer goods, as some speculation has it. The military exercise control over heavy tractor production in tank factories and are not interested in transferring resources to produce a sensible range of light tractors, or to supply vital spare parts. In spring 1985 there were the usual widespread complaints that tens of thousands of desperately needed tractors were out of action because of the shortage of spare parts.[7] Gorbachov can be expected to push for agricultural reforms he introduced in the Stavropol territory to be extended elsewhere in the USSR. But what is suitable in the fertile lands of the south may not prove easy to apply in other regions, and any reforming of the Soviet economy faces strongly entrenched opposition in the Party and government bureaucracy.

The generals are aware that to continue their massive build-up of weaponry, especially of advanced and automated systems, economic performance must be improved. The oil, coal, steel, chemical and food industries were among those which produced significantly less in the first quarter of 1985 than in the same period of 1984, not itself a good year.[8] But recognizing the need for improvement is a far cry from being willing to surrender power and resources to other ministries should this prove necessary.

IN his first weeks as General Secretary, Gorbachov presided over an extensive replacement of ministers and local Party secretaries reminiscent of the early days of Andropov's rule. This suggests that preparations for creating a new Central Committee power base were well under way even before the date for the 27th Congress (25 February 1986) was announced at the April plenum. Yet signs that Gorbachov was about to launch radical reforms were less in evidence. True, an editorial in *Pravda* called for Party organizations to tackle certain "key problems":

> They embrace essentially all aspects of our life: intensification of the economy; cardinal acceleration of scientific and technical progress; achievement of the highest world level in labour productivity and the perfecting of management and planning. It is necessary likewise to raise the quality of production, intensify the struggle against mismanagement and wastefulness, and bring all reserves for increasing food production more fully into play. A certain lag which has been permitted in several sectors in the first quarter must be made up and the fulfilment of the 1985 plan ensured.[9]

[7] See for example *Izvestiya*, 18 April 1985; *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 14, No. 9, 1 May 1985.
[8] *Pravda*, 20 April 1985; see too *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 20, May 1985.
[9] *Pravda*, 26 April 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet such appeals were not new, nor was the repeated demand to strengthen discipline. Indeed, *Pravda* went on to point out that "attention to this very acute issue has lessened recently." Were the bureaucrats already beginning to settle into their bad old ways? Certainly there remained members of the Politburo who relied on trusted comrades in the 1981 Central Committee for their support and had no great desire for a thorough house-cleaning.

On 11 June Mikhail Gorbachov made a major speech at a CPSU Central Committee conference on scientific and technical progress, precisely the forum at which to announce any intended reforms. And the General Secretary did indeed stress the need for more intensive economic growth, improved quality of production and better management; he called for "a radical change in the economic situation" and demanded a drastic change in investment policy. But he claimed that the Soviet people had a "firm resolve" to strengthen the USSR's defence power because of the "agressive policy and threats of imperialism" and insisted that it was impermissable to continue to depend on Western goods.

He admitted that it was no longer possible to ensure economic growth by "extensive methods," producing more fuels and raw materials, and employing more labour in industry. The draft guidelines for economic development in the 12th Five-Year Plan and up to the year 2000 had therefore to be revised. He attacked various ministries and accused particular ministers of fiddling their plan targets. But where were the proposals for radical, drastic changes? A new engineering department under the USSR Academy of Sciences; greater use of computers, less waste of resources; in short, no fundamental reforms.

> The main direction in the reorganization of economic management is clear in principle to us: it lies in the deeper and more comprehensive use of the advantages of the socialist economy. We must advance along the line of further strengthening and developing democratic centralism: raising the efficiency of the centralizing principle in management and planning; significantly expanding independence and responsibility in management of enterprises and associations; active use of more flexible forms and methods of leadership, financial autonomy and goods–money ratios and the whole arsenal of economic levers and stimuli—that is the essence in principle of the reorganization.[10]

Gorbachov seemed determined to spread the Andropov experiment in allowing greater managerial independence, but that hardly compares with Khrushchev's scrapping of the ministries in 1957 or the Kosygin reforms of 1965. He spoke of improving the pricing system and of transferring enterprises to a financial system which would encourage them to invest profits in new equipment. Another proposal, extending the "autonomous team" system which pays workers by results, would probably improve labour productivity.

[10] *Pravda*, 12 June 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet at the same time Gorbachov called for tighter Party control over the ministries. Even his direct criticism of named ministers was not new; indeed, at the November 1979 plenum at which Gorbachov was raised to candidate membership of the Politburo, Leonid Brezhnev launched a blistering attack on certain inefficient ministries, including some of those now slated by the new General Secretary. In 1979, Brezhnev criticized the Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, Ivan Pavlovich Kazanets, for "blatant waste" of metal and his "sluggish" approach to technical progress, while in 1985 Gorbachov lambasted him for misuse of funds, "incorrect policy on technology" and failure to fulfil plans.[11] Every General Secretary blames a few inefficient ministers as scapegoats for the system; moreover, by replacing them he can increase the number of his own supporters in the Central Committee.

MIKHAIL Gorbachov has set a new style in leadership, as informal as Khrushchev but less outrageous. Visiting Leningrad in May he held "impromptu meetings" in the streets, even asking dumbfounded workers for advice. His off-the-cuff remarks during his speech in the Smolny Institute on 17 May were not broadcast until four days later, presumably after some Politburo discussion about the advisability of openly admitting shortcomings—for example, that people could have their flat repaired promptly only by paying for a "moonlighter" using stolen materials. He warned Party comrades "not to bank on a quiet life":

> Those who do not intend to adjust and who, moreover, are an obstacle to the solution of these new tasks, simply must get out of the way, and not be a hindrance. We cannot regard the interests of one person as being higher than the interests of society as a whole.[12]

The Party and government resolution "on priority measures to improve the material well-being of badly-off pensioners and families and to improve care for single citizens" might be seen as proof of humanitarian reforming tendencies. But the decree was actually "in accordance with the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress," agreed under Brezhnev, and the increases from November 1985 are not outstandingly generous; the minimum old-age pension for collective farmers, for instance, will be 40 rubles a month (less than £40) and single citizens who do not receive pensions will have their monthly grants raised to 30 rubles a month.[13]

Much more stir was caused by the resolution "on measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism."[14] All the leading officials who have spoken about the evils of drink have stressed that this is "not just another campaign" and certainly the penalties for drink-related offences, including home distilling, were drastically increased. Perhaps in this reform at least Gorbachov will succeed where every previous teetotal

[11] *Pravda*, 28 Nov. 1979; *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 8, No. 24.
[12] *Soviet Analyst*, Vol. 14, No. 11.
[13] *Pravda*, 21 May 1985.
[14] *Pravda*, 17 May 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

measure in Russia has failed. Perhaps. Russians already enjoy a cup of tea; now they can celebrate with it too: "*Gorko! Gorko!*"*

The April plenum left Nikolai Tikhonov to celebrate his 80th birthday on 14 May still holding the office of premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers). Geidar Alievich Aliev, who reached 62 four days earlier, remained in the post of first deputy premier, to which he was appointed under Andropov in November 1982, simultaneously gaining full membership of the Politburo. He came from Azerbaidzhan where he had served as head of the KGB and later as First Secretary of the republic's Party organization.

Viktor Vasilevich Grishin, aged 70, who stood loyally by Chernenko through his last days, was still head of the Moscow Party committee, as he had been since 1967. Grishin it was who on 22 February presented Chernenko's apologies to the electorate when "following the doctors' recommendation" he did not appear to make his speech. Perhaps yielding to pressure from his advisers, Chernenko later disregarded his doctors and bravely stumbled through two brief, but evidently staged, TV appearances: on 24 February when he was shown voting, possibly in a hospital room, and on 28 February when he accepted his credentials as a Supreme Soviet delegate. In less than two weeks he was dead and buried.

Dr Evgeni Chazov, the Kremlin's cardiologist (who in mid-February had hurried home from a peace conference in the United States, assuring journalists that all was well) supervised his third post mortem on a General Secretary in less than three years. President Chernenko died at 19.20 on 10 March 1985 and within 24 hours his successor was announced—a smoother succession than ever before. On 12 March the Soviet press, which had pretended for months that Chernenko was still active, devoted page one to Gorbachov and relegated the deceased president to page two.

WHILE *Pravda* was publishing bogus interviews with the invisible president, or his letter to a Canadian schoolgirl and other such ploys, its editor, Viktor Afanasiev, was revealing to the foreign media that Chernenko was indeed ill and that his "second secretary" was Gorbachov. During his December visit to Britain the heir apparent exuded an air of confidence. He even played truant, missing the visit to the grave of Karl Marx, and on another occasion surprised his hosts by popping into No. 10 Downing Street while Mrs Thatcher was away in Peking. Mr Allan Gormly, the managing director of the British engineering company John Brown, which had benefited greatly from Soviet orders and hoped for further profitable deals, put into words a widespread impression when he described Gorbachov as "good humoured and personable."[15]

No doubt Mikhail Gorbachov is a bundle of fun as he romps with his granddaughter Oksana and buys his wife Raisa new suede boots. But on

[15] *The Times*, 12 March 1985.

* "Bitter! Bitter!" The traditional cry after a vodka toast at a Russian wedding; the happy couple kiss to make the taste sweeter.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

various occasions during his visits to Canada and Britain, he lost his good humour very quickly when asked about human rights or Afghanistan, on which his views were as tough as might be expected from a man with three decades of loyal service to an authoritarian regime. When a Soviet sentry killed a US officer, Major Arthur Nicholson, in East Germany, Moscow justified the shooting in much the same way as when the Korean airliner was destroyed: "The entire responsibility lies fully on the American side."[16]

The foreign policy of the USSR remained unchanged in its fundamental hostility to the West. In his speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism Gorbachov praised Stalin and denounced Western democracies for their links with Hitler in the past and for their aggressive imperialist policies now.[17] At the Ottawa conference to review the observance of the Helsinki Accords on human rights, the Soviet delegation was as unwilling to discuss criticisms as it had been at all previous meetings. There was no sudden breakthrough at Geneva, only Gorbachov's tired old ploy of the Soviet missile freeze. Andrei Gromyko, aged 76, Foreign Minister since 1957, and Boris Ponomarev, aged 80, head of the Central Committee's International Department since 1955, continued to guide the Politburo on foreign affairs. It was Gromyko who had proposed the election of Gorbachov. Neither the new and inexperienced Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, nor the Reagan–Gorbachov meeting planned for Geneva in November could bring a change in the Soviet attitude. The Kremlin needs an external threat to justify shortages and repression at home.

FROM the death of Andropov, Gorbachov appeared established in the position of the Kremlin number two; evidently some deal had been struck with those who supported Chernenko. In April 1984 Gorbachov proposed the aged leader as president, saying that "proceeding from the supreme interests of the state and Soviet society, the General Secretary should concurrently hold the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet."[18] He could expect no less for himself, when President Gromyko finally departs—unless, continuing the arbitrary traditions of the Soviet system, Gorbachov opts to become premier, rather than president.

Gorbachov could be around as long as Brezhnev, and no doubt the West will do business with him as it did with Brezhnev. It is perfectly commendable to hope and work for better relations with the USSR; it is less sensible, however, to expect an improvement simply because an old Kremlin boss has given way to a younger one. Mikhail Gorbachov is indeed a reformer, but his reforming is limited to making the existing system more efficient; he will not try to introduce genuine democratic limits on the power of the ruling clique.

[16] *Pravda*, 27 March 1985.
[17] *Pravda*, 9 May 1985.
[18] *Pravda*, 12 April 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Teeth 'n' Smiles

Gorbachov for Beginners

Michel Heller

Gerontocracy: the Last Post

On 13 February 1984, Konstantin Chernenko, three years his predecessor's senior, was elected new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There were three "legitimate" contenders after the death of Andropov. Apart from Chernenko (b. 1911), there were Mikhail Gorbachov (b. 1931) and Grigori Romanov (b. 1923), both Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries. Romanov joined the Secretariat in 1983. The question remained: whether to prolong the period of transition or whether to open the way to highest power to a new generation of leaders? The second option had its advantages from the point of view of the interests of the state. But it had one enormous drawback: the coming to power of "the young men" inevitably denied power to "the not so young." Chernenko's nomination to the position of General Secretary was proposed by the oldest member of the Politburo, the representative of the Council of Ministers, N. Tikhonov (b. 1905). He was seconded by A. Gromyko (b. 1909), D. Ustinov (b. 1908), D. Kunaev (b. 1912) and V. Grishin (b. 1914).

The election of Chernenko was the natural outcome of the Party's absolute power over the country; if the Party rules over everything, then it is also natural that those who rule over the Party strive to preserve their power until their biological end. In the years when the Party's power was young—in the first decades after the revolution—its leadership was also young. Those who hold the power of the Party in their hands have grown old in the same measure as the Party's power itself.

The Brezhnev Constitution of 1977, which legally strengthened the Party's supreme and individual power in the Soviet Union, laid the basis for the automatic election of the General Secretary by representatives of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: the leader of the Party also becomes the formal head of state, representative of the body which is the country's collective president. After Brezhnev, Andropov was elected representative of the Supreme Soviet (on 11 April 1983), and then Chernenko. Chernenko was the first General Secretary to have no previous experience other than Party work. He became a Komsomol worker in his youth, and was then transferred to the Party *apparat*. During the war he held various positions as Regional Party committee secretary, and thus did not see active service. In 1950 a meeting took place which decided Chernenko's fate. When he was working in the Central Committee *apparat* of the Moldavian CP he met Brezhnev. By this time, Chernenko had completed the Central Committee higher

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

school for Party organizers, and had also received his Diploma from the Pedagogical Institute in Kishinev, where he was the chief Party functionary. From 1950 onwards, Chernenko did not leave Brezhnev's side. When Brezhnev became General Secretary in 1964, his loyal comrade-in-arms' career also moved irrepressibly upwards: head of a Central Committee department; Central Committee secretary; member of the Politburo (from 1978).

His year in power as General Secretary of the Central Committee was marked in the domestic life of the country by the adoption, in April 1984, of a project "of reform of general educational and professional schools"; it was confirmed, having been announced the previous January while Andropov was still alive. The Law concerning "schools in conditions of developed socialism" underlined the immutability of the goal: "The unshakeable foundation of the communist education of school students is the formation in them of a Marxist–Leninist world-view."[1] The practical measures for realizing this goal included lowering the age for entering school from seven to six, and thus strengthening the ideological processing of the children.

The year of Chernenko's rule differed little from previous years: the rhetoric of the "fight against corruption" was preserved in the mass media, but it had ceased to affect even the middle levels of the *apparat*, reaching down into the "popular masses"—the judicial organs fulfil the plan for "corruption" arrests, putting in prison all those on whom they have "information," and above all, those named in denunciations by other people. The brutal hardening of the system, manifested in the sharpening of the criminal code implemented by Andropov, goes hand in hand with the increasing savagery of the prison-camp directors. It began with the practice of daily torture, the inhumane butchery of those under arrest and the special "pressure-cells" into which prisoners are thrown to bear the full force of common criminals. In the second half of 1984 alone, five well-known dissidents were killed (their deaths are widely known) or doctored to death: one was a founding member of the movement for free trade unions in the Soviet Union, Aleksei Nikitin; another was one of the founders of the Ukrainian Helsinki group, the teacher Oleksa Tikhy; another was a member of this group, the political commentator and poet Yuri Litvin; finally, there was the journalist Valeri Marchenko, and the poet Valentin Sokolov, who signed himself Valentin Zeka, because he spent 34 years in the *gulag*.

Chernenko inherited his basic foreign policy goal from his predecessor: this was the battle against the placing of American missiles in Western Europe and against Reagan's re-election. In November 1984, addressing the leaders of youth organizations in the socialist countries, Chernenko stated his position: "If the world situation gives cause for alarm, then the responsibility for this is to be borne completely and utterly by the imperialist reaction at the helm of the USA. For the USA and its allies

[1] *Pravda*, 14 April 1984.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have set themselves the nonsensical goal of achieving military superiority over the socialist states. It is understandable that we cannot permit this. And we will not permit this."[2] Exactly one month later, Chernenko received the "prominent" representative of American business circles Armand Hammer, and "emphasized that the Soviet Union consistently keeps to a course of establishing good and equal relations with the USA . . . for the development of mutually beneficial links in every field, including trade and economics, if only the artificially created obstacles along this path could be dispersed."[3]

Five years have passed since Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. But Afghanistan, the suppression of "Solidarity" in Poland, the shooting down of the South Korean airliner, seem to have been forgotten. Is the next round of "*détente*" beginning?

Waiting for Godot

The iron guard of "old men," the leading kernel of the Politburo, defended its power to the very last breath, but Chernenko ended the epoch of the second generation of Soviet leaders. The third generation has been approaching irrepressibly, for even the Politburo is not able to bestow immortality. The time has now come of general secretaries who were born, raised and who achieved highest power in the Soviet period. Upon them are pinned the hopes of the ineradicable optimists. Above all the West is counting on their liberalism, their democratism, their technocratism. Mikhail Gorbachov's visit to Great Britain in December 1984 was an eloquent demonstration of how easy it is to charm the West. All he had to do was to bring along his wife, who differed little in her outward appearance from Western women, and everything became clear: if Gorbachov does not have a fat wife, then talk of Soviet totalitarianism must be mendacious. In terms of Western perceptions, "Nancy" Gorbachov is politically more effective than Nina Khrushchev ever was.

A New Generation Has Come of Age

A miracle has taken place. Godot has come. The seat of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been taken by a youthful, good-looking, intelligent reformer, a liberal and a democrat to boot. At any rate such is the impression that the reader of newspapers and periodicals (which have appeared in various languages) the television viewer and radio audience could have formed. But, after the hysterical rapture with which Andropov's election was greeted in the West, the joy evoked today by Gorbachov's election is no longer so amusing.

"The Iron Lady," Margaret Thatcher, affirms that "you can do business with him [Gorbachov]"; the Prime Minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney, reckons that "He's clearly in command and I think it augurs

[2] *Pravda*, 6 Nov. 1984.
[3] *Pravda*, 5 Dec. 1984.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

well for the future."[4] The American political scientist Seweryn Bialer has written an article called: "Gorbachov to the Rescue: Big Job, Big Opportunity." One could easily compile a whole book of such quotations. But there is no need, because all this has already been said with inimitable succinctness by Henri Barbousse exactly 50 years ago: "*Il a savé. Il sauvera.*"[5] Thus did this French writer speak of the very first General Secretary, Comrade Stalin. At the time when Barbousse was showing his appreciation to Stalin the saviour, Stalin was all of two years older than the present "youthful General Secretary."

Western commentators are unarguably right about one thing: a new generation of Soviet leaders has taken up power. Two decades separate Chernenko and Gorbachov. This generation gap is neither the fault of the "old boys" nor the redeeming feature of the "youngsters." By its very nature, the Soviet system cannot have young men at the very top. The fact that it is a totalitarian structure, in which the Party holds all power in its hands, makes it inevitable that the top leaders will grow old on the job.

Stalin effected the generational change simply but incisively: he physically liquidated at least one and a half million communists—communists who made the revolution, fought against the white armies, built factories in the First Five-Year Plan. Khrushchev attempted to introduce a principle of rotation into the Party *apparat* at all levels, excluding the post of general secretary. Not only was Khrushchev kicked out in disgrace, but his name was erased from Soviet history—for sacrilege.

The Brezhnev era was the first "normalized" period in Soviet history. It is no accident that the Brezhnev years gave birth to the expression "mature socialism." Socialism, and the Soviet system, had reached cruising speed. But history, whose laws, they assure us, are only accessible to Marxist–Leninists, has played a dirty trick on them. Neither Andropov nor Chernenko suffered from a fatal illness when they were elected to the post of general secretary. Yet when, after Chernenko's death, the Politburo found itself faced with a dilemma: either to elect another "old boy" and have to attend another funeral in a few months' time, or to choose a "youthful" leader, Mikhail Gorbachov was elected General Secretary. The generational changeover took place swiftly, by unanimous agreement (how else?) of the "old boys." The representative of the "old boys" (who constitute a majority in the Politburo), Andrei Gromyko, proposed Gorbachov's nomination.

Gromyko's speech appeared in *Kommunist* (No. 5, March 1985). Its full text was published in a pamphlet stamped "for official use," i.e. not for sale or distribution among Party activists. It amounted to a symbolic handing over of the torch: Stalin's appointee, Andrei Gromyko, who made his career in the wake of the liquidation of the first generation, entrusted the "sainted flame" to Mikhail Gorbachov. The veteran Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister, not given to literary oratory in his speeches, on

[4] *Time* magazine, 25 March 1985.
[5] *International Herald Tribune*, 20 March 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this occasion found magnificent hues with which to paint the portrait of the new General Secretary: "He has a pleasant smile, but he has teeth of iron," a sentence which was omitted from *Kommunist*.

Sixty years ago, the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, who was exiled to the West with dozens of other philosophers, historians and writers at Lenin's instigation, predicted what the new Soviet youth would be like. Berdyaev wrote that the sons and grandsons of those who made the revolution "will quickly come to resemble the solid, middle-class 'masters of life.' These men will fight their way to their first jobs by means of the Cheka, once it has achieved an unprecedented number of assassinations . . . The most evil figure in Russia is not that of the old communist, doomed to die, but that of this new young man . . ." The philosopher even used the phrase (in 1924): "this new anthropological type . . ."

THE new General Secretary's biography, as is customary in the Soviet Union, contains some mysteries. He was born on 2 March 1931 in Stavropol territory, in South Russia at the foothills of the Caucasus. The year of his birth was also the year when collectivization reached its highest peak, likewise "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class"; it was the beginning of the terrible famine, which the state organized in order to break the peasantry forever. Collectivization was particularly intense in the Caucasian regions—which included Stavropol territory—and persecutions were especially severe. Consequently, the famine here also took on terrible forms.

It is not known who Mikhail Gorbachov's parents were. It is only known that they were not among the victims of collectivization, for in 1950 their son was accepted by Moscow University to study in the Faculty of Law. It is not known at which secondary school Mikhail was a pupil, but even if he went to one in Stavropol and not in his native village, it is difficult to explain how a youth from the provinces made it through the very heavy competition.

Furthermore, in 1950 they gave preference to former front line soldiers and then to pupils who had been awarded a gold medal. One might suppose that Mikhail Gorbachov was in possession of outstanding academic capabilities. But he did not reveal them either during his studies, as his fellow-students who knew him at that time testify, or subsequently, for he never worked in his chosen profession.

Western journalists observe with glee that the future General Secretary's first job was "driving a tractor." In the official biography it says: "from 1946–1950 he was an assistant combine harvester operator." This is meant to be evidence of his worker origins. But "assistant combine harvester operator" is not even a tractor driver; it is the youth who tosses the wheatsheafs into the machine. No doubt this is the work which Mikhail did in the summer holidays. For it is obvious that in order to go to Moscow University he would have had to have completed his schooling in 1950.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At university in 1952, Gorbachov entered the Party; practically speaking this means that he did so at the first opportunity. He immediately became a Komsomol activist. He received his Diploma of Law in 1955—after Stalin's death but before the "exposure of the cult of personality." Mikhail Gorbachov was a student in the years when the greatest—after Stalin, that is—authority in legal scholarship was Andrei Vyshinsky, the lamentably famous public prosecutor in the Moscow Trials, author of text-books in which is expounded the basic principle of Soviet justice: the confession of the accused is of the essence and is sufficient evidence of his guilt.

Once qualified as a lawyer, Mikhail Gorbachov left Moscow and returned to Stavropol. It is not known why he turned down the possibility of a career in the capital. But we do know—the official biography tells us—that "since 1955, M. Gorbachov has been involved in Komsomol and Party work."

The characteristic feature of Mikhail Gorbachov's career is the unity of place: over a period of 23 years he had prominent positions in the Komsomol, and then in the Party *apparat* of Stavropol territory. From 1970, he was First Secretary of the Regional (*krai*) Party committee, which made him the absolute boss over a territory of 80,000 kilometres, with a population in excess of two and a half million.

In 1978 came a decisive turning point in Gorbachov's life: he was elected a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Once in Moscow everything happened unusually rapidly: he became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979, and a full member in 1980. He entered the most exclusive club in the world, "Suite No. 1," where the "Big Boys" hang out.

There is nothing mysterious about Gorbachov's summons to Moscow and his election as a Central Committee secretary. Similar promotions in the Soviet system are well known. Thus, for example, did the career of Gennadi Voronov begin in 1961, when he became a Central Committee secretary after his "model" career in Orenburg. Khrushchev pushed for Voronov. It was Suslov, working in Stavropol in 1939–44 who pushed for Gorbachov. Suslov's recommendation was accepted by Brezhnev.

Gorbachov attracts attention because once he had begun to work in Moscow, he managed to avoid all the reefs on which his predecessors had foundered, in particular Voronov. He succeeded in making this his goal. It was not easy. Like Voronov, Gorbachov was called to Moscow to take charge of agriculture. Stavropol territory is one of the largest grain areas in the USSR. A good harvest gave Gorbachov the reputation of being a "specialist." The bad harvest in the countryside in the years when he was in charge of all agriculture, the hopeless crisis in which he found himself, were not counted against him.

One may suggest that Gorbachov not only held his ground, but steadfastly advanced forward, because he was able to make use of both his "pleasant smile" and his "teeth of iron."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MIKHAIL Gorbachov is representative of the third generation of Soviet leaders. It is a new generation because not only were its representatives, including the General Secretary himself, born under Soviet power, but because, above all, they clambered to the highest rungs of their careers when the Soviet Union became a superpower. They did not know the country that fought for its existence, or the Party *apparat* which trembled in fear at the arrests made during the Terror. It is a generation of leaders who believe in their power, and regard it as their inalienable property.

All the foreign guests who visited Moscow in order to use the occasion of Chernenko's funeral to shake Gorbachov's hand, stress in unison "the authority which emanates from him [Gorbachov]," his self-assurance. It is not difficult to understand why the General Secretary's authority and self-assurance should strike democratic leaders who are in power only from one election to the next. Thirty years of Party work have given Mikhail Gorbachov the experience of extensive and limitless power, which Western leaders do not even begin to understand.

Once again, as when Andropov made his meteoric appearance, Western experts are compiling an agenda for the new General Secretary, making recommendations, telling him what ought to occupy his time, which of the Soviet system's shortcomings to correct. One need be in no doubt—70 years of Soviet history have convincingly demonstrated this—that Mikhail Gorbachov will not take up this advice and will disregard their recommendations. One need be in no doubt that he will learn of the West's readiness to help him in everything for which there may be a need in the USSR.

The future will show, as the past has shown, that the Soviet system does not surrender to reform, because every attempt at serious change leads to a weakening of the Party's power.

Gorbachov spent 30 years getting to the top, and for 30 years the Party worked on him, shaped him. There is no doubt that he will consider his major duty to be the strengthening, broadening and consolidation of the Party's power. He has already made great strides in consolidating his own power. At a Central Committee plenum on 1 July 1985, Gorbachov's former rival Grigori Romanov "retired" from his posts, ostensibly "for health reasons," and Eduard Shevardnadze, the 57-year-old Georgian Party leader and Gorbachov supporter, was promoted from candidate to full Politburo membership in his place. At a Supreme Soviet session on the following day, Gorbachov named Gromyko as President of the Supreme Soviet and Eduard Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Thus, Gromyko, who proposed Gorbachov as the new Party secretary, receives the highest accolade, Romanov, the rival for leadership, is eliminated, and Gorbachov, his power asserted in record time, will be able to impose his policies, the contents of the new Party programme, and the composition of the Central Committee as the undisputed leader at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986.

Translated by Teresa Cherfas

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unemployment in the Midst of Labour Waste

J. L. Porket

THE thesis of this article is that, contrary to Soviet ideological statements, unemployment is to be found not only under market capitalism as established in the developed industrial societies of the West, but also under command socialism as established in the Soviet Union and Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. In this respect, the two types of economic system are similar. The difference between them lies in the fact that different forms of unemployment exist in each. Under the former open (registered and unregistered) unemployment prevails. In contrast, under the latter hidden unemployment prevails, combined (particularly in the case of frictional unemployment) with open but unregistered unemployment.

In the case of the Soviet Union, on which this article concentrates, the current labour situation is contradictory. On the one hand, there exists a shortage of labour at the national level, stemming from extensive economic development, a high labour force participation rate of men and women alike, the ageing of the population, hoarding of labour at the enterprise level, an insufficient and improper use of working time, a low degree of mechanization, etc. On the other hand, there exists overmanning at the enterprise level (an important dimension of hidden unemployment) and underutilization of education.[1]

Soviet Views on Unemployment

The official Soviet ideology contends that unemployment is an endemic feature of capitalism.[2] In contrast, this ideology boasts, socialism abolishes unemployment entirely, once and for all: there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, the right to work is guaranteed constitutionally as well as ensured in real terms, and a shortage of labour is to be found at the national level.

At the same time, however, Soviet sources complain of high rates of labour turnover, an insufficient and improper use of working time, and a waste of education. They concede the existence of overmanning at the enterprise level and of labour-surplus areas; they emphasize the need to release and redeploy hidden labour reserves; and they opine that labour is utilized irrationally.

Consequently, non-ideological statements clearly contradict ideological ones. Without mentioning the word itself they imply beyond doubt that there is unemployment in the Soviet Union, albeit without the dole,

[1] See in this connection J. L. Porket, "The Shortage, Use and Reserves of Labour in the Soviet Union," in *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, 1984, No. 1, pp. 8–24.

[2] As evidence, Soviet statistical year-books and other Soviet publications like to quote the number of registered unemployed in the West. See e.g. *Vestnik statistiki*, 1983, No. 9, p. 57.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as unemployment benefits are not available, and that neither the constitutional right to work nor a shortage of labour at the national level eliminate it totally and inevitably.

Outside the Soviet Union, for one reason or another, at least some people appear to believe that the country has no unemployment.[3] This simplistic view is not shared by Western analysts of Soviet affairs, however. They are perfectly aware of the various dimensions of unemployment in the Soviet Union, and have researched several of them thoroughly. Yet, there seems to be no systematic and comprehensive treatment of unemployment in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Economic System

The Soviet economic system is a variant of command socialism. Although since its introduction in the early 1930s it has been undergoing changes, these changes have not amounted to systemic ones. That is to say, its nature has remained intact.

Under it, most of the means of production are socially owned, and social ownership of the means of production has two basic forms, namely, state ownership and cooperative ownership. Simultaneously, an administrative centre (itself an agent of the Party leadership) attempts to direct the allocation of scarce resources and the distribution of income through all-embracing and detailed planning. However, the market mechanism is used to distribute the labour force among planned jobs and the planned supply of consumer goods among households. Consequently, job-seekers are to a considerable degree free to choose their place of employment, and households exercise consumer choice in the expenditures of their money incomes on available goods at the officially set prices.

Being organized hierarchically, the system implies a conflict between vertical commands and horizontal flows of real inputs and outputs. Consequently, since central planning and management is all-embracing and detailed and since economic processes are interdependent, the success of the central plan is highly sensitive to errors in both its formulation and execution.

Another inherent defect of the system is that while its capability to mobilize the available resources (i.e. land, labour and capital) is high, its capability to utilize the mobilized resources efficiently is low. As a result of this in-built tendency towards inefficiency, its difficulties inevitably mount up once the available resources are mobilised and, due to their ensuing scarcity, the need to substitute intensive for extensive economic development emerges.

However, several factors attest that the system is not highly effective either. One of these is the existence of the second economy. It originates

[3] In 1977, when in Moscow to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the October revolution, Alex Kitson stated that " It is pleasant to be in a country where the situation is so different from that in our own country—where there is no unemployment and one can see a steady and consistent rise in the standard of living of common workers." (Stephen Fay, " Profile of a union hard man," in *The Sunday Times*, 8 Nov. 1981, p. 13.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the first place from chronic shortages affecting consumers and enterprises alike. Thus, its main function is to supply those consumer goods and services desired or needed by consumers and those materials, components and equipment needed by enterprises which the official economy fails to supply.

If the second economy and other factors attest to flaws in the effectiveness of central planning and management, state subsidies[4] attest to its low efficiency. They arise from the substitution of officially set prices (the role of which is neither to allocate scarce resources nor to express consumers' preferences) for market-determined ones.

Since prices are officially set and nominal wages grow, the result is repressed inflation (a situation in which as a result of central regulation prices cannot increase despite shortages of goods and services). In addition, nor is open inflation (a rise in the general level of prices) unknown.

Open Unemployment

It is against this background that the question of whether there is unemployment in the Soviet Union must be seen. Officially, unemployment was proclaimed as having been liquidated on 9 October 1930. Actually, on that day it was merely the payment of unemployment benefits that was stopped. Expressed differently, registered (and only registered) unemployment disappeared.

On the other hand, open but unregistered unemployment has not disappeared. Its commonest sort is temporary unemployment between jobs, connected with labour turnover.

Labour turnover, one of the perennial problems of the Soviet economy, has always worried the Soviet regime. According to a recent estimate, about one-fifth of white-collar and blue-collar workers change their jobs annually,[5] and the average period between jobs is usually put at 25–30 days.

Consequently, frictional unemployment arising from labour turnover alone seems to range between 1 and 2 per cent of all white-collar and blue-collar workers. In this connection it should be recalled that the relatively short average period between jobs is influenced by the legal concept of uninterrupted service, which has an impact on the rate of some social security benefits and on the length of annual leave.

However, frictional unemployment does not include exclusively those who are between jobs after quitting or being dismissed. It also includes those who want to enter the labour force for the first time, as well as those who wish to re-enter it after a period of non-employment. Thus, inevitably, the problem of open but unregistered unemployment among school-leavers and young people in general comes to the fore.

According to one Western source, for instance, the privileges enjoyed

[4] Subsidies on meat, dairy products and housing alone amounted to 11·2 per cent of total budgetary expenditure in 1979.

[5] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1981, No. 5, p. 34.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by workers aged under 18 (shorter working hours, longer annual holidays, day release) do not make it easier for them to find jobs. In 1957, it proved necessary to establish compulsory quotas (10 per cent of the personnel) in order to induce employers to hire young people. Even so, according to Soviet statistics 25·2 per cent of young people aged between 16 and 17 and 13·9 per cent of young people aged between 18 and 19 were unemployed in medium-sized towns in 1965, compared with 1·7 per cent for other age groups.[6]

It has been emphasized, too, that every year in each town and locality thousands of boys and girls, having failed to gain admission to a higher educational institution, remain outside social production for up to six months on average.[7] It may be assumed that the main reasons are either a lack of desired vacancies, or a lack of any vacancies, or an unwillingness to become a worker or collective farmer.

Moreover, there is the special problem of young people in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.[8] In contrast to the labour-deficit Slavic areas, these non-Slavic areas are labour-surplus ones. Two factors play a role here. First, the non-Slavic areas have considerably higher birth rates than the Slavic ones. In the 1980s and the 1990s, nearly all increments to the Soviet population of working age will come from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Secondly, migration from the non-Slavic areas to the Slavic ones is highly unlikely, due to differences in language and culture. The indigenous rural inhabitants of Central Asia are unwilling to migrate even to nearby cities, which suffer from a shortage of skilled labour.

Consequently, a possibility of large-scale unregistered unemployment among young people exists in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. To avoid it, young people are sometimes encouraged to go to work on the local collective farms, even though those who already are collective farmers do not have enough to do. Otherwise expressed, unregistered unemployment (which is open by nature) is turned into overmanning.

Hidden Unemployment

Hidden unemployment denotes a situation in which persons have a paid job but are underutilized.[9] More specifically, it includes those cases when persons employed part-time desire to be employed full-time; those cases when employed persons are wasting their qualifications against their wish, although these qualifications are not outdated by social standards; and those cases when there are too many employed persons relative to the tasks to be undertaken under given conditions with the available technology, i.e. overmanning.

[6] Basile Kerblay, *Modern Soviet Society* (London, Methuen, 1983), pp. 166–167.

[7] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1981, No. 9, p. 63.

[8] Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while the Transcaucasus consists of Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia.

[9] Thus, the present author does not accept the view of some Western economists that hidden unemployment consists of discouraged workers, i.e. of jobless workers who regard the search for a job as hopeless. In his opinion, the so-called discouraged workers belong to the non-employed, not to the openly unemployed.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The first dimension of hidden unemployment (part-time employment although a full-time one is desired) is unknown in the Soviet Union because, despite the regime's repeated promises, part-time employment is very rare. In fact, as social surveys reveal, many employed women would prefer to work part-time instead of full-time, and not a few retired workers would be willing to take up a job if opportunities for part-time employment were available.[10]

In contrast, the second dimension of hidden unemployment (involuntary employment below skill level) is not absent. In Estonia, for example, 17·6 per cent of the leavers of secondary specialized schools who had completed their full-time studies in 1975–77, occupied blue-collar worker jobs not requiring secondary specialized education.[11]

Not surprisingly, a quantitative estimate of this dimension of hidden unemployment for the country as a whole is difficult to make. Data on the waste of qualifications usually stem from social surveys which are not representative. And the social surveys in hand do not always distinguish between a waste of qualifications by choice and that against one's wish.

The third dimension of hidden unemployment (overmanning) is far from unknown. Three sets of factors contribute to it: political (the regime's ideological commitment to full employment), systemic (the nature of command socialism), and the vested interests of administrators (managers, the non-managerial personnel, trade union and Party functionaries) at the enterprise level.

More specifically, Soviet enterprise directors tend to create a labour reserve in the enterprise in order to be able to cope with the vagaries of the material-technical supply system, the fulfilment of the plan at the end of a given plan period,[12] upward revisions of output targets, tasks unconnected with the goals of the enterprise,[13] and labour turnover. On top of that, due to the political and legal constraints against unemployment, their powers to dismiss bad and/or surplus workers are severely curtailed. Besides, they lack an economic interest in reducing the size of the enterprise personnel.

This chronic and general overmanning has a number of serious consequences. *Inter alia*, it contributes to slow and undemanding work rhythms, slack work discipline, low productivity, high production costs, inefficiency, and divorce of rewards from performance. It has an adverse impact on work habits and attitudes towards work, and enables moonlighting during working hours. And it negatively affects the standard of living of the population, helping to bring about low average wages, hidden and repressed inflation, and shortages of consumer goods and services.

[10] J. L. Porket, " Income Maintenance for the Soviet Aged," in *Ageing and Society*, Vol. 3, 1983, Part 3, pp. 313–315.

[11] *Sotsialisticheskii trud*, 1980, No. 7, p. 66.

[12] The available evidence shows that factories turn out some 50 to 70 per cent of their monthly production in the last decade of a month.

[13] The tasks include, for example, helping to bring in the harvest, repairing roads, helping to build a kindergarten, marching in a parade, and the like.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since wages are insufficiently linked to performance,[14] they contain a concealed social element[15] which violates the officially proclaimed principle of " to each according to his work." Simultaneously, most workers seem to find nothing humiliating in drawing pay for work not done. They try to get as much as possible with the minimum of effort and view the enterprise as an institution for providing social assistance, and this behaviour is tolerated, supported and even enforced by the informal culture of the enterprise.[16]

Here again, an accurate estimate of the extent of overmanning is impossible to make. Nevertheless, according to one Soviet source overmanning in Soviet enterprises frequently reaches 15–20 per cent of the enterprise personnel,[17] and according to another Soviet source the labour reserves hidden in plants and factories amount to 10–15 per cent.[18]

That these high figures are not exaggerated, follows from other pieces of available evidence. Thus, it was reported that in a great number of industrial enterprises the losses of working time reached 15–20 per cent of the shift. Simultaneously it was admitted, though, that the actual magnitude of the losses of working time was higher, because a large part of them was not statistically recorded.[19]

Further, it is generally conceded that work discipline is mostly quite slack and that workers spend much of their working time socializing, shopping, arranging their personal affairs, moonlighting, and the like.[20] In addition, many social organizations hold meetings during working hours, as well as seminars, gatherings, sports competitions, amateur performances, and other activities.[21]

Lastly, in 1974 it was calculated that if the impact of alcoholism on work processes was eliminated completely, labour productivity would increase by 10 per cent,[22] which partly explains the increased drive against alcoholism under Gorbachov.

Employment Policies

Since the Soviet regime is committed to a policy of full employment, it

[14] L. I. Brezhnev admitted at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981 that production and the people's psychology were adversely affected by all sorts of levelling and instances of paying wages solely for appearing at work and not for its results, and the granting of undeserved bonuses.

[15] It goes without saying that this concealed social element is not identical with any of the legally recognized social benefits.

[16] The informal culture of the enterprise tends to be shared by managers, the other white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and the trade union and Party functionaries. Managers, for instance, have been accused of frequently doing everything possible in order to attract new workers into the enterprise, promising higher earnings, soft output norms, slack work discipline, and opportunities for moonlighting, with some of them even directly violating the legal and moral norms of Soviet society for that purpose. (*Sotsialisticheskii trud*, 1980, No. 7, p. 104.) Undoubtedly, this could not occur without at least tacit approval on the part of the trade union and Party functionaries.

[17] *Sotsialisticheskii trud*, 1980, No. 1, p. 71.

[18] A. Ya. Kvasha, *Demograficheskaya politika v SSSR* (" Finansy i statistika," Moskva, 1981), p. 141.

[19] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1981, No. 9, p. 59, and *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya*, 1981, No. 3, p. 17. The estimate quoted in the text does not include absenteeism, i.e. those cases when workers fail to report for work at the time they are scheduled to work.

[20] See *inter alia*: *Ekonomicheskie Nauki*, 1983, No. 9, p. 41.

[21] *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya*, 1981, No. 2, pp. 82–83.

[22] *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1983, No. 8, p. 19.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has always tried to provide a paid job for every able-bodied citizen of working age. In effect, it has maintained an economically irrational policy characterized by considerable underutilization of the labour force employed.

The underutilization has been recognized by a number of Soviet scholars and, in connection with the economic reforms of the mid-1960s, some Soviet economists even advocated the introduction of open unemployment as a means of increasing the effectiveness of the socialist economy. Early in 1981 the proposal reappeared in the Soviet press once again.[23]

However, the regime has not been willing to resort to such a step. Instead of allowing open unemployment to appear on a larger scale, the so-called Shchekino system was promulgated in 1967. Its essence was to raise labour productivity by shedding surplus workers and using the wage funds thus saved to raise the wages of the remaining ones.

Over the years, this system has had its ups and downs. On the whole, it has not been widely implemented,[24] particularly not *in toto*. Quite frequently, only some of its elements have been applied.

Besides, in the majority of cases the workers made redundant had been absorbed within the same enterprise or association, which would suggest that for the most part the system had been applied in expanding enterprises and amounted to an intra-organizational reassignment of the personnel.

Without doubt, a general and consistent implementation of the Shchekino system would meet obstacles and create problems. To begin with, if the above-mentioned reasons for hoarding labour at the enterprise level did not disappear, enterprise directors would be reluctant to dispose of their labour reserves. Simultaneously, they would persevere in their attempts to enlarge the planned size of the enterprise personnel, even if later some of the allocated positions remained unoccupied.

Secondly, if a redeployment of labour involved territorial migration and thus the necessity of changing one's residence, it would inevitably raise at least three related problems: that of adequate (i.e. satisfying the expectations of the migrant) accommodation in the new place of work, that of increased labour turnover among the migrants' spouses, and that of suitable vacancies for them.

Finally, in the Soviet Union popular support depends at least partly on the regime's ability to guarantee job security for the individual. But the Shchekino system could cast doubts on the regime's willingness to do so, because it undermines job security as well as slow and undemand-

[23] In the Soviet Union, workers can be made redundant only if a suitable alternative job is offered to them by their present employer. The idea put forward by the stream of scholars mentioned in the text was that the responsibility for the placement of the workers made redundant would be transferred from the enterprises shedding surplus workers to the local authorities, and that, while without a job, the workers made redundant would be paid from state (not enterprise) funds.

[24] In practice, one of the factors inhibiting the adoption of the Shchekino system has been the behaviour of superior organs: they have been changing the original terms of the system, and have not maintained the stability of the wage fund and of the plan targets.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing work rhythms. That is to say, it could produce resentment on the part of workers and have an adverse impact on the regime's legitimacy.

Besides the Shchekino system, promulgated in 1967, the establishment of labour exchanges started in the late 1960s. They were expected to reallocate labour resources among enterprises, to shorten the time between jobs, and to reduce labour turnover.

Since their establishment, about four-fifths of white-collar and blue-collar workers changing their jobs have found new employment on their own, without organized assistance. Thus, the labour exchanges appear to have played only a limited role in the Soviet labour market.

The available evidence suggests, too, that the labour exchanges have not succeeded in reducing labour turnover.[25] However, they have succeeded in shortening the time between jobs, according to a Soviet source of 1981, by 10 days on average, albeit merely in those cases when approached.

In addition to the two measures just discussed, over the years various attempts have constantly been made to tighten work discipline, reduce absenteeism, and increase labour productivity. However, they have usually failed. As long as overmanning, the uneven supply of materials, limited material incentives for work, and the like continue to persist, it is highly probable that the current drive will fail as well.

Labour Shortage

While labour-surplus areas do exist, in the country as a whole there is a shortage of labour. However, the shortage must be understood as no more and no less than the difference between the available labour supplies and the effective demand that is incorporated in enterprise plans and backed up with funds.

Not surprisingly, then, a number of the formal positions allocated to enterprises from above remain unoccupied. And if we were to ask whether enterprises really need additional workers, not only the existence of overmanning but also the tendency on the part of Soviet enterprises to overstate their needs and understate their capabilities would have to be taken into consideration, simultaneously bearing in mind the dependence of both on systemic factors. Labour shortage defined in this sense inevitably raises the question of open labour reserves. In this respect, the situation is rather bleak.

Over the years, the regime has succeeded in mobilizing both urban women and the agricultural population for participation in non-agricultural branches. But by the beginning of the 1970s agricultural and female labour reserves were nearly exhausted. Since then, the main source of manpower has been (and in the coming decades will be) young people entering the labour force for the first time. However, in the 1980s and the 1990s the increments to the working-age population will be

[25] Since the labour exchanges have not succeeded in lessening labour turnover arising from voluntary quittings, it was promised recently that long-term loyalty to the same employer would be rewarded by a higher old-age pension.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerably below those in the 1970s. Moreover, as already mentioned above, nearly all increments to the Soviet population of working age will come from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

The additional source of manpower can also be old-age pensioners. If in 1970 about 19 per cent of all retired white-collar and blue-collar workers had a paid job, in 1980 about 28 per cent did.[26] Faced with a shortage of labour and an ageing population, the regime will undoubtedly continue to encourage able-bodied individuals either to postpone their retirement or to carry on working after their retirement.

In order to reduce or eliminate the perceived shortage of labour, some Soviet scholars have been debating how to enlarge the size of the civilian labour force. Their suggestions have included proposals to induce employed women, particularly Slavic ones, to bear more children; to reduce the minimum age for work-force entrants from 16 to 15 years; and to raise the retirement age from 60 to 65 years in the case of men and from 55 to 60 in the case of women.

However, other Soviet scholars have stressed that, in order to reduce or eliminate the perceived shortage of labour, a better utilization of the already employed manpower resources is necessary. They have been advocating measures to reduce seasonal unemployment in agriculture; to increase the relatively low level of mechanization and automation; to undertake upward revisions of output norms; to restrict personnel growth in enterprises already in operation; to restrict the further growth of the administrative-managerial apparatus (*apparat upravleniya*); to lessen labour turnover arising from voluntary quitting; to reduce losses of working time; and to transfer small establishments (restaurants, cafés and the like) into private hands.

SINCE the second half of the 1960s, Soviet scholars have held two opposing views concerning the country's manpower resources. One view implies emphasis on high birth rates and increments to the currently employed population, whether of working or retirement age. It stresses the shortage of labour in the context of its accepted premise of extensive economic development.

According to the other view there is no shortage of labour: labour resources are completely adequate, but are utilized irrationally. This view implies disregard of demographic factors and increments to the currently employed population, and advocacy of intensive economic development.

If the regime followed the first view and confined itself exclusively to pro-natalist measures, the problem of labour shortage would remain unsolved. Pro-natalist measures (such as those announced in 1981) do not necessarily succeed in inducing employed women to bear more children. On top of that, any changes in fertility take between 15 and 20 years to have an impact on the size of the labour force.

[26] J. L. Porket, " Income Maintenance for the Soviet Aged," op. cit. p. 310.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the other hand, not going beyond pro-natalist measures would have several advantages. At the national level, there would continue to be more vacancies than job-seekers; in enterprises, the established ways of life would not be disturbed; and there would be no need for systemic changes.

Not surprisingly, a totally different situation would arise if the regime followed the second view. Its consistent implementation would mean overall mobilization of hidden labour reserves, i.e. release and redeployment of workers on a larger scale, territorial migration, stricter work discipline, upward revisions of output norms, higher labour productivity, and tying of nominal wages more closely to productivity. All this, if attempted within the framework of directive economic management, would call for an increase in the use of administrative methods and would also adversely affect the second economy[27] as well as the regime's legitimacy.

Besides, directive economic management is not conducive to a rational utilization of labour resources. As already mentioned above, it can be effective but not efficient. Consequently, in the final analysis a consistent implementation of the second view would require directive economic management to be dismantled, so that the regime would lose control over the economy. These problems and dilemmas are facing Gorbachov no less than his predecessors.

In practice, the regime is likely to carry on with some pro-natalist measures in the hope of boosting fertility, and to take no more than limited, cautious and unhurried steps aimed at enlarging the size of the civilian labour force on the one hand, and at mobilizing hidden labour reserves and utilizing labour resources more rationally on the other.

Expressed differently, it is highly probable that also under Gorbachov the regime will try to avoid any measures that, in its opinion, could stir up a hornet's nest and/or lead to a change of the established economic system. As a result, the officially intended transition from extensive to intensive economic development can hardly be expected to occur in any far-reaching sense.

[27] A more rational utilization of labour resources within the official economy would most probably reduce the time and energy devoted to the second economy, and thus lessen its output. But would the former be able to fill the gap? That is to say, would it be able to supply those goods and services which, at present, the second economy supplies?

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Militarization of the Soviet Academy of Sciences*

John R. Thomas

> *"The Leninist approach to the Academy of Sciences determined its subsequent development. After 50 years of Soviet rule, the Academy was converted from an association of scientists, which it was before the revolution, into the largest centre of Soviet science. . . . It . . . leads the world on many problems, having most important significance . . . for increasing the defence might of our Motherland."*
>
> **M. V. Keldysh**, Former President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in *Lenin i Sovremennaya Nauka*, (Lenin and Contemporary Science), Moscow 1970, p. 18.

THE USSR Academy of Sciences, the largest research and development (R&D) network in the world, is more deeply involved in military-related work—and has been for a longer time—than is commonly believed in the West. What is equally important, the Academy's scientific–technical capabilities are likely to be even more involved in such work in the future, as a result of the perception of Soviet political and military leaders (a perception shared by the Academy's own leaders) of the strategic challenges and geopolitical requirements confronting the USSR, in particular those posed by the US.

The Soviet Regime's Transformation of the Russian Academy

The current militarization of the Academy (detailed below) stems from, and is reinforced by, its traditional role in the Soviet S&T system, and any future increase in its role in military R&D will be the logical extension of such tradition. Indeed, the Academy's deep involvement in military-related work at present cannot be understood without reference to its historical evolution. Only by such reference can one appreciate the full extent of the Academy's transformation and militarization under Soviet rule, and the likelihood of still further change in that direction in the future.

Shortly after seizing power in 1917, Soviet leaders began to expect and count on the Academy to help in the development of the USSR's industry, which also subsumed the development of Soviet military capabilities. These expectations were fully in tune with the original role intended for the Academy by its founder Peter the Great. He created the

* The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the US State Department.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Imperial Academy of Sciences (later known as the Russian Academy) in 1724 with the explicit objective of its helping to modernize Russia both industrially and militarily.[1]

The Academy's contribution was intended to advance Peter's larger objective of a modernized Russia able to play a major role in European affairs, much as the Soviet leaders have striven to develop an industrially and militarily advanced USSR able to affect the global scene as a *Velikaya Derzhava* (a tsarist term meaning Great Power, subsequently used by Soviet leaders to describe the USSR).

Frustrating Peter's ambitions for it to have a larger involvement in nation-building, the Imperial Academy under his tsarist successors regressed into a highly academic and elitist institution on the model of the West European academies, viz. it did basic research in many non-physical study areas (e.g. philosophy and archaeology) with little or no immediate industrial or military application. The Academy's wide deviation from Peter's original intent can be illustrated by its role during the final days of the tsarist empire: the Academy contributed next to nothing to Russia's war effort in the First World War. For example, after the war broke out, its major activities featured the establishment of a Permanent Commission for the Study of Russia's Natural Resources and the organization of a workshop which helped to produce clinical thermometers.[2]

On seizing power in 1917, the Bolshevik leaders renewed Peter the Great's goals to involve the Academy in industrializing backward Russia and in developing the country's military capabilities to support a larger national role in the world. In the process, the Academy under Soviet rule has had its historically academic character radically transformed.

LENIN began the process by pushing the Academy to contribute to Soviet industrial and military development with some balance between the basic research orientation it acquired during the tsarist days and his perceived need for its involvement in applied research and development, including military. The latter was urgently needed to restore Russia's economy, shattered by the First World War and the Civil War, and to give the new Soviet state the military weapons it needed to survive in a hostile " capitalist world " as the first and, at the time, the only " socialist state. " But he protected the Academy from zealots who sought to convert it totally to " practical and useful " industrial and military application.

For example, he directed that the Academy be treated " scrupulously and carefully and only gradually, without injuring its organs, introduce it

[1] Towards that end, Peter spent time in Western Europe, learning about Western science and technology, including military technology. For example, in the Netherlands he learned how to build ships. Among other achievements, he can therefore rightly be called the father of the Russian Navy as well as the founder of the Academy.

[2] *Soviet Science 1917–70*, p. 16. Compared with this puny effort, the USSR Academy played a major role in the Second World War, ranging from the development of tanks and aircraft to radar and atomic bombs.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . into the new building of Communism. "[3] To this end, he ordered the People's Commissariat of Education to desist from a planned drastic reorganization of the Academy.[4] Instead, he directed that the Academy be instructed to form commissions of specialists to prepare a plan for the reorganization of industry and economic development.[5]

However, pursuing accelerated industrial development, Stalin brushed aside Lenin's balanced approach between basic and applied research in favour of the forced " industrialization " of the Academy. This laid the basis for the Academy's subsequent heavy involvement in military work: by forcing engineering and technical capabilities on the Academy for civilian production, the regime was also able to draw on these capabilities for meeting military needs. Stalin justified his approach by citing the urgent need to modernize the Soviet Union and develop its defence capabilities quickly in order to avoid a repetition of Russia's past military defeats.[6]

To involve the Academy in the USSR's industrialization and rearming, Stalin introduced fundamental changes designed to politicize, " industrialize " and militarize the Academy. Thus, in 1931 the professional composition of the Academy was radically altered by adding a technical-engineering section and relevant personnel who, together with the applied physical scientists, soon came to outnumber and dominate the traditional basic researchers and scientists in other disciplines. Included in the new technical section of the Academy were such areas as energetics, metallurgy, mechanics and mechanical engineering and transport. And among the new Academy members were those who subsequently played a major role in military-related development and Academy leadership. For example, Academician S. I. Vavilov, who was an elected member in 1932, later headed the Soviet military optics programme, served within the Academy as the representative of the all-powerful State Defence Committee (the highest policy body during the Second World War, headed by Stalin), and was elected Academy President in 1945, serving until his death in 1951.[7] In the words of a Soviet spokesman these developments (the decree of 21 August 1931 adding the Technical Section, and the relevant Academy elections in 1932 and thereafter) were the most important in the reconstruction of the Academy to include not only theoretical science but technical disciplines. They helped, in his words, to convert the Academy from an association into " the genuine headquarters of Soviet science."[8]

At the same time, Stalin increased political control by adding Party

[3] As cited in *Soviet Science 1917–70*, p. 17.

[4] Ibid.

[5] V. I. Lenin, *KPSU o Razvitii Nauki* (The CPSU on the Development of Science) (Politizdat, Moscow, 1981), p. 100.

[6] See his report on the results of the First Five-Year Plan in January 1933. (Joseph Stalin, *Sochineniya* [Collected Works], Politzdat, Moscow, 1951, Vol. 13, p. 173.)

[7] *Sergei Ivanovich Vavilov* (Nauka, Moscow, 1979), pp. 3–10.

[8] V. D. Esakov, *Sovetskaya Nauka v Gody Pervoi Pyatiletki* (Soviet Science in the Years of the First Five-Year Plan) (Nauka, Moscow, 1971), pp. 203–4. It should be noted that the Russian term for headquarters (*shtab*) has traditionally a military connotation.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members to the Academy's rolls (there were none before 1929[9]); this enabled the Party to control many Academy members not only through the Academy's formal hierarchical, organizational lines but also through local Party cells. Stalin also expanded the governmental administrative hold over the Academy. In 1933, the Academy was placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars (the forerunner of the present Council of Ministers); the Academy had earlier been under the Commissariat of Enlightenment (later renamed the Ministry of Education). And in 1934 Stalin further tightened the regime's administrative control by moving the Academy's headquarters from Leningrad to Moscow, i.e. physically closer to the power centre from which the Academy could be supervised. Later, Stalin altered the professional composition of the Academy still further by forcing special elections on the Academy in 1942 in " strictly specified specialities. "[10] This increased the number of members with physical and engineering sciences and with technology disciplines that were in the main military-related.[11]

The changes that Stalin wrought in the Academy's composition and character were fundamental: it became heavily oriented towards applied research and technology, with deep involvement in military work. The number of research institutes grew spectacularly from eight in 1928 (on the eve of the First Five-Year Plan) to 25 by 1934.[12] The increase was chiefly in the applied S&T areas; the involvement of the Academy in military work was reflected by the fact that even in peacetime—up until the Nazi attack in 1941—its research institutes were working on 200 military programmes.[13] After war broke out, the Academy was involved in 150 programmes;[14] since 1962, the beginning of the current Soviet military build-up, it has been involved in many comparable military programmes.[15]

Obviously, Stalin's transformation of the Academy was demonstrated above all by its activities in the Second World War, during which it developed technology, ranging from conventional arms (aviation, artillery, rocket launchers, tanks) to more exotic systems (radar and nuclear

[9] Loren Graham, *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–32* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1967), p. 31.

[10] Komkov et al. pp. 384–85.

[11] Among those elected were aircraft designers Ilyushin and Yakovlev, and Kurchatov, the leader of the group that developed the Soviet A-bomb.

[12] *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, third edition.

[13] Komkov et al. p. 341.

[14] Ibid. p. 353. This decrease in programmes from 200 to 150 was due to disruption caused by evacuation of Academy facilities and personnel in the face of the Nazi invasion, and not by change of emphasis.

[15] Many of the 200 military programmes in the 1930s and those in the recent era covered the same weapons systems areas, e.g. aircraft, tanks or radar, and optics. To be sure, the systems currently addressed are at a more advanced technological level and some did not exist in the 1930s, e.g. missiles. But even regarding the latter, Soviet scientists and technologists were already working on rocket technology as evidenced by their very successful and famed *Katyushas* in the Second World War. These could be viewed as the forerunners of the post-war and current Soviet missiles.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons.[16]) Indeed, the Academy was credited with solving defence problems, previously considered not solvable.[17]

BUT the militarization of the Academy continued after the Second World War. In fact, the Academy never became disengaged from large-scale military work. According to Academy leaders, it was given the task of breaking the US nuclear monopoly by developing Soviet nuclear weapons in record time and of doing so with its own resources.[18] This it did with great speed by developing the Soviet A-bomb in 1949, some 15 years ahead of Western estimates.[19] Similarly, Academy members (led by Academician Sakharov) and facilities helped to develop the Soviet H-bomb in the early 1950s, again ahead of Western expectations. (The Soviets even claim that they developed their bomb ahead of the US.[20]) Shortly thereafter (in 1957), the Academy members (led by Academician Korolev) helped to develop the ICBM and put the first satellite into space. Regarding *Sputnik*, it was indisputable that the Soviet Union clearly scored a breakthrough ahead of the US.

The rapid post-Second World War Soviet successes indicated the tremendous S&T resources that were being devoted to Soviet military programmes, including those of the Academy and its organizational style: numerous *ad hoc* defence commissions, formed during the war to link Academy and military personnel in various weapons areas,[21] were adopted as models for *standing* weapons advisory councils formed to meet the post-war US " threat." The most illustrative example was the organization of the Permanent Commission on Nuclear Research by the Academy's Presidium under the initial chairmanship of S. I. Vavilov, the Academy President from 1945 to 1951. This council planned and coordinated the development of A- and H-bombs.[22] The Academy's work on nuclear weapons, ICBMs, and the adaptation of wartime science and technology planning and coordination organizations facilitated the Academy's " natural fit " in the massive Soviet military build-up, initiated after the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis.

Indeed, Khrushchev, who was responsible for initiating this build-up (contrary to the assumption of some Western observers that it was Brezhnev), extended the Stalinist process of reshaping the Academy by imposing further drastic measures. In 1961, motivated by his dissatisfaction with the Academy's contribution to the Soviet economy,

[16] " Nauka i Nauchnye Uchrezhdenie," *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (Vol. L, Moscow, 1957), pp. 430–510.

[17] Ibid.

[18] A. P. Aleksandrov, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 6, 1982, and M. V. Keldysh in *Nauka Soyuza SSR* (Science of the USSR) (Nauka, Moscow, 1972), p. 24.

[19] As one Soviet historian put it: " Academy scientists helped liquidate the US atomic monopoly in two years after they mastered atomic energy in 1947 " (Komkov et al. pp. 394–95.)

[20] Yu. V. Sivintsev, *I. V. Kurchatov i Yadernaya Energetika* (I. V. Kurchatov and Nuclear Energy) (Atomizdat, Moscow, 1980), pp. 22 and 79. To underscore the Soviet achievement, this scientist claims that while the Soviets on 12 August 1953 exploded an H-bomb, the US six months later was only able to set off a device, and not an air-deliverable weapon.

[21] Komkov et al. p. 347.

[22] Yu. V. Sivintsev, op. cit. p. 11.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he set up the State Committee for the Coordination of Science and Technology (renamed in 1965 to the present State Committee for S&T). This step broke the Academy's virtual monopoly over the development and guidance of Soviet science and over contacts with foreign S&T communities. (Such contacts are highly prized in the USSR in terms of prestige, among other things, as was evident during the US–Soviet S&T exchanges in the " *détente* " period of the 1970s.)

At the same time, Khrushchev ordered further evisceration of the Academy by removing many of its applied research institutes and placing them under the jurisdiction of production ministries. This put the Academy under new competitive pressure for funds and personnel, the like of which it had not experienced before.[23]

UNDER Brezhnev, the Soviet regime continued to remould the Academy by further limiting its freedom of action, particularly through the purse-strings. For example, instead of receiving all of its funds from the state budget and thus being assured of an uninterrupted money-flow to carry on more of the basic research which it preferred, the Academy was cut back in the early 1970s to 85 per cent of budget financing, and thereafter was forced " to forage " for the balance of its funds from contracts.[24] It had to obtain such funds from production ministries, including defence organizations. As a result, the latter can, and do, dictate many of the S&T problems on which the Academy research institutes work; they thereby bend the Academy more to applied and less to basic research.

Then, too, direct political pressure was applied in the Brezhnev era to influence the make-up of the Academy's leadership, and therefore the direction of its S&T. For example, Party secretary and chief ideologue Mikhail Suslov, in an unprecedented appearance at the 1975 annual meeting, delivered the Party's wishes for the election of the aged and ailing physicist Aleksandrov, a weapons specialist whose military work dates back to the Second World War. Suslov's blatant pressure resulted in the selection of the then 71-year-old Aleksandrov despite the reservations of many Academy members regarding his age and state of health.

[23] Some Western observers, e.g. Loren Graham, interpreted the 1961 divestiture as leaving the Academy with only basic research that it wanted all along. This explanation cannot hold up in either bureaucratic or substantive terms: the Academy was not happy to lose almost half of its " empire " and, since it was already heavily involved in applied research, it lost essential resources and not just those it wanted to be rid of. Then, too, the dividing line between basic and applied is very thin. The Lebedev Institute's work in lasers well illustrates how an Academy Institute's work can cover the entire R&D spectrum from basic to experimental and applied, and from civilian to military use. Its scientists, beginning with its Nobel prize-winners, Academicians Basov and Prokhorov, have been engaged in work within such a wide spectrum, serving as project directors or consultants on military as well as civilian tasks. Therefore, when the Academy lost the Kurchatov Institute (which has a similar mix of basic and applied, civilian and military work) it lost a real asset and not an unwanted capability. In any case the Academy later regained many of the institutes it " lost " in the early 1960s.

[24] One US estimate noted that by the mid-1970s, contract research " accounted for 12% of the overall resources of the USSR academy excluding capital construction. " Thane Gustafson, *Selling the Russians the Rope? Soviet Technology Policy and US Export Controls* (Rand Corp. R-2649-ARPA, April 1982), p. 65.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some members were reluctant to perpetuate the election of Academy leaders with both military-related disciplines and direct weapons research background. At the very least, before the election there was some sentiment for selecting younger men such as Academicians Ovchinnikov, Khokhlov, or Millionshchikov. But all this was overcome by the Party's intervention in support of Aleksandrov.

Simultaneous with the foregoing intervention, the Party, to make the Academy still more pliable in meeting industrial and military policy goals, has tightened the screws by requiring that henceforth all research institute directors must be Party members. (Until recently, many prominent academicians, who were also institute directors, were not Party members.) This requirement will now make scientific leaders subject to Party discipline (through local cells) in addition to the usual administrative subordination of the Academy.

IN sum, the " industrialization " of the Academy under Soviet rule has transformed it into a science establishment involved overwhelmingly in applied research, and very much in military R&D. This development has overcome its traditionally academic orientation and has transformed the character it had under the tsars. The transformation has weakened its preference for classic basic research and for non-political and non-military involvement, though such sentiment survives even today among some Soviet scientists, particularly those old enough to have been trained and/or to have had research experience in the West. A prominent example was the late Academician Peter Kapitsa who worked in England in the 1920s and whom Stalin placed under house arrest when he refused to work on the A-bomb.[25]

Selected Topics of the Academy's Current Military Involvement

The militarization of the Academy[26] can be currently illustrated by reference to some key aspects of its involvement, such as military and military-related programmes, funding, organizational, leadership and personnel links with the Soviet military, and the involvement of republic Academies. The extent of the Academy's current involvement in military-related work is emphasized by the accelerated pace and trends in all these categories, following the Soviet military build-up after the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis. The relevant categories can be summarized as follows:

Military and Military-related Programmes. Even before Soviet involvement in the Second World War, the Academy was working on military programmes ranging from conventional arms (tanks, aircraft, artillery) to exotic—for that time—weapons such as space and *Katyusha* rockets, the

[25] A. Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 109–10.

[26] As defined herein: direct or indirect involvement of Academy research institutes and personnel in military or military-related work.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forerunner of today's missile technology.[27] During the Second World War, it was also involved in such programmes;[28] given its well-known direct role in nuclear, missile and space programmes in the immediate post-war period, the Academy has probably been involved at the same or a greater level since then.[29] This is illustrated by its role in the space programme which has been under military jurisdiction from the very outset of the Soviet programme, unlike the US space effort which is directed by NASA, a civilian agency.[30]

In addition to major weapons development, many of the Academy's 250 institutes and 300,000 scientists have also been heavily involved in nominally civilian programmes, many of which, however, have dual use and purpose, i.e. both civilian and military applications. This is reflected in the Academy's sizeable role in the USSR's current 170 national-level inter-branch programmes. These were jointly formulated in the late 1970s for the coming decade by GKNT, Gosplan, the Academy, and the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Education. By 1981, the Academy was involved in implementation work on 110 of the 170 programmes, including 32 " target-complex " (broad-scope) programmes and 78 S&T (specific) programmes.[31]

Many of the latter S&T programmes are probably related to the Soviet military programmes, particularly those of the 78 that have dual-use application such as space, powder metallurgy and fibre optics. The Academy's involvement in these dual purpose programmes can be inferred since many of its 250 research institutes are involved and perform the most advanced work in the USSR in each of these S&T areas, e.g. the Academy's Space Institute in Soviet space R&D, the Baikov Institute in powder metallurgy, and the Lebedev Physics Institute in fibre optics and lasers.[32]

Indeed, the Soviets explicitly admit that many of their research institutes (NIIs) have been and are involved simultaneously in both applied and basic research, and in both military and civilian work, as illustrated by one of the Academy's oldest R&D facilities—the Ioffe Physics Institute. This institute, the major Soviet physics centre before the Second World War, was and is heavily involved in theoretic nuclear physics and, on the applied side, in helping to develop the USSR's nuclear weapons.[33] In fact, the Ioffe Institute had and has on its staff many of the

[27] Komkov et al. op. cit. p. 341.

[28] The number in 1941, the first year of the war, was at least 150, (Komkov et al. p. 353); the number undoubtedly went up as the war continued and military requirements grew.

[29] The Academy's increasing role in defence and space technological innovation is noted in David Buchan's *Western Security and Economic Strategy Towards the East* (IISS Adelphi Paper, No. 192, London, Autumn 1984), p. 8.

[30] For cosmetic purposes, the Soviets set up Intercosmos; it has no operating and launching capabilities, but is used by the Soviet regime to deal with foreigners.

[31] G. Skryabin, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk* (Herald of the Academy of Sciences, referred to herafter as *Vestnik AN*), No. 6, 1982, p. 18. Skryabin is the Academy's Scientific Secretary and chief day-to-day official, and *Vestnik* is its central organ.

[32] Ibid. p. 19 and Holloway, op. cit. pp. 144–45.

[33] See Yu. Sivintsev, *I. P. Kurchatov i Yadernaya Energetika* (I. P. Kurchatov and Nuclear Energy) (Atomizdat, Moscow, 1980), pp. 19, 23 and 55.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet physicists who were responsible for developing the first Soviet nuclear weapons. The most prominent of these was the late Academician Kurchatov who headed the scientific team that included Ioffe Institute scientists and which produced the Soviet A-bomb.[34]

Organizational Links. On the organizational side, new links and changes since the 1960s have tied the Academy institutionally even closer than before to military-related work. These links are centred on the Academy's Section on Applied Problems (SPP).

The SPP serves as the administrative interface between the Academy and USSR's military-industrial establishment. Its main task undoubtedly is to keep abreast of current research and identify technology that can support military interests or be applied to weapons systems; and then help obtain funding for the Academy to work on military-related projects.[35] Given the Academy's involvement in long-term R&D on advanced technologies, the SPP is probably also involved in long-range weapons forecasts and in providing inputs for defining future Soviet weapons needs.[36] The SPP's and Academy's role as a whole in this connection can be inferred from the fact that many Academy members serve on advisory commissions to defence and military production ministries.

Leadership Links. At the very top, the Academy's militarization is illustrated by the direct connection of its presidency with the military. This link extends back to almost 40 years of Soviet history and contrasts sharply with the earlier situation. Thus, before the Second World War, this post was occupied by scientists with life- or non-military-related science disciplines (e.g. botany and geology). Since then, the Academy's presidency has been and is in the hands of scientists with disciplines directly related to weapons R&D (chemistry, electronics and applied mathematics, and physics). More than that, all the Academy presidents since 1945—Vavilov, Nesmeyanov, Keldysh, Kotelnikov and Aleksandrov—have themselves been directly involved in weapons R&D.[37] The continuity of the relationship between the Academy presidents and the military is currently underlined by the fact that Aleksandrov was one of the few civilians present at the extraordinary conference of top military commanders on 27 October 1982 addressed by Party Secretary Brezhnev. At this unusual high-level gathering, Brezhnev indicated that the

[34] See *Voenny Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'* (Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1983, p. 387.

[35] The SPP has existed, at least under its present name, since 1969, if not before. It is shown in a table of organization for the Academy, appearing in the third edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* published that year. The SPP does not appear in the tables in the two previous editions published in 1931 and 1957.

[36] See Holloway, op. cit. p. 140.

[37] In fact, the current President's (Aleksandrov) involvement dates back to the Second World War. At that time, he was involved in developing anti-mine devices for the Soviet Navy (Komkov et al. p. 348). See also, *Voenny Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'*, op. cit. p. 27. His immediate predecessors, Academicians Keldysh and Kotelnikov, were similarly involved in the Second World War and since then, the former in developing high-speed jet aviation, and the latter in radio communications (see *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya*, op. cit. Vol. 4, pp. 137, 407).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political and military leaders expected Soviet scientists to maintain Soviet weapons up-to-date and not to allow the USSR to lag behind the West.[38]

This post-war domination of the Academy's leadership by "weaponeers," i.e. by those with military-related, "hard" science disciplines and with direct involvement in weapons R&D, is likely to continue in the future. Among the widely-speculated future replacements for the 80-year-old Aleksandrov (who was re-elected this year), Academician Velikhov is high on the list. His selection would be a logical step in the further militarization of the Academy. As the 50-year-old protégé of Aleksandrov and his deputy at the Kurchatov Nuclear Energy Institute, Velikhov has been the only occupant of the key Academy post of Vice-President for S&T since its creation in 1977; this post was established to provide a focal point for improved coordination of the Academy's R&D with production activities, including meeting military requirements. His coordination effort is significantly helped by the fact that Velikhov himself has worked extensively on and directed military-related energy programmes.

Individual Links. In addition to organizational and top-level ties, the Academy is also linked to the military through the activities and links of its individual members. These cover a wide range. Thus Academy members and scientists hold active-duty military rank (many at general officer level), work directly on military-related R&D projects, lead institutes and/or laboratories that work on such projects, even though these facilities are represented publicly as involved in civilian-use S&T programmes, serve on committees implementing and guiding overall military R&D and production such as the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), the highest level link between the Party, government and military complex, serve on advisory councils in weapons-related S&T areas, e.g. cybernetics, micro-electronics, laser materials, and serve as individual consultants to military-related government and ministry bodies. Many academicians and senior Academy scientists have all or nearly all these links, and/or are involved in all or nearly all these military-related activities. Examples include such leading academicians as Prokhorov and Basov (the USSR's joint winners of the Nobel Prize in Physics), Zhavoronkov, Vadim Trapeznikov, Berg (retired admiral), and Major-General Pospelov.[39]

The impact of Academy members and scientists on, and links with, Soviet military R&D does not end with their retirement. Indeed, the influence of many extends far beyond active duty. Thus, many retired academicians and senior scientists serve as members of the Academy's research councils which pass on research project proposals from the

[38] Aleksandrov's close ties with the new political and military leadership were subsequently confirmed at Brezhnev's funeral several weeks later: he was one of only four (together with the new General Secretary Andropov, Defence Minister Ustinov, and a Moscow "worker") to present a eulogy in Red Square. Aleksandrov was again re-elected as President of the Academy on 14 March 1985.

[39] The VPK's role and Academy members and staff links are noted in Holloway, pp. 111 and 140.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Academy's institutes. In this capacity, they undoubtedly can and do veto " useless " projects, including those which they consider lacking in military utility or application.[40] This arrangement provides still another mechanism for the Academy's responsiveness to current political/military needs. It also illustrates how many Academy members, after helping to develop Second World War and early post-Second World War weapons, have stayed on to provide the continuity of the Academy's militarization from the 1930s and the war years into the current era. More important, the service of Academy members in military-related tasks long after nominal retirement ensures that there is no break in, or lack of attention to, meeting future military requirements from current R&D effort.

Involvement of Republic Academies. The extent of militarization of the entire Soviet Academy network is further reflected in the increasing involvement in military-related work of many of the 370 research institutes and 50,000 scientists belonging to the 14 republic Academies and subordinate to the central USSR Academy.

Normally, the Soviet authorities would prefer to keep the republic Academies out of such work because, with few exceptions, their scientists are considered to have lesser capabilities and skills, their facilities are not as well equipped as the central Academy research institutes (NIIs), and the non-Slavic personnel in general is viewed as less politically reliable than that of the central NIIs, most of which are directed and staffed by Great Russians. Of course, " the centre " has formed these negative judgments by ignoring the fact that both political and S&T authorities in Moscow are responsible for the measures that create the deficiencies of the republic Academies' personnel and facilities. For example, most non-Slav minorities do not have access to the best educational institutions of the USSR; republic Academy facilities do not get first crack at the new or latest equipment; and, with few exceptions, non-Russian scientists are not allowed the same degree of contacts with, and the resulting stimulation from, the advanced foreign scientific communities. The latter limitation applied even during the politically favourable " *détente* " period of the 1970s when normal restrictions on such contacts with foreigners were eased somewhat.[41]

Despite the situation and the attitudes of the central authorities noted above, republic Academy NIIs have been increasingly drawn into military R&D. For example, in the strategic weapons area, the most

[40] The role of many academicians is enhanced by the fact that they simultaneously hold military ranks. (The eight-volume *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya* [Soviet Military Encyclopaedia]. Voenizdat, Moscow, 1976–79, lists many of these dual holders.)

[41] The present author, having dealt with USSR and republic Academies' personnel during most of the 1970s, can testify from personal experience about the above-noted attitudes of, and state of relations between, the central and republic personnel. For example, he participated in negotiations for joint projects involving US researchers and Ukrainian republic NIIs in Kiev; after agreements were worked out with local institutes, the projects were taken over, on the Soviet side by central NIIs, to the dismay and anger of the local, non-Russian scientists.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prominent example is the Cybernetics Institute of the Ukranian Academy of Sciences, which was headed, until his recent death, by Academician Glushkov and which has worked on strategic missile guidance systems.

By now, many republic NIIs are doing military related work routinely. Thus, many NIIs of the Georgian Republic are engaged in science areas with military application, such as physics, cybernetics and metallurgy. A sizeable part of this republic's military R&D effort is carried on by its Physics Institute in Tbilisi, the republic's largest research facility with over 1,000 employees.

The large-scale, routine involvement of republic Academies in military R&D is underscored by the fact that many of their research institutes hosted foreign visitors in the 1970s—even though these facilities were involved in military work—something that would have been unheard of in earlier years. But so widespread is the role of the republic Academy NIIs in military work that the Soviets could not avoid " opening " these facilities to foreigners when they were pressed to do so for political and prestige reasons, viz. to show off such NIIs as the Georgian Physics Institute and the Cybernetics and Paton Institutes in Kiev, among others, during the "*détente*" period as examples of S&T achievements by non-Russian minorities under Soviet rule.[42]

The USSR's Modernization Drive

The Academy's massive involvement in military-related work to date cannot be understood without reference to the larger context of the USSR's industrial modernization and foreign policy objectives.

The Soviet Union is a fully modernized state if measured in physical terms, e.g. the number of literate people, the size of its educational establishment, the number of scientists and technologists, and by industrial-military indicators such as output of steel, energy resources (oil, gas, electricity), tractors, machine tools, aircraft, tanks, nuclear weapons, missiles and space systems. For its large-scale modernization, even if it lacks comparable efficiency, the USSR is indebted to Stalin; he was determined rapidly to transform a rural Russia into an advanced industrial state because of the danger he perceived to the USSR's existence. As he put it in early 1931:

[42] Together with other foreigners, the author had the opportunity to visit these and other S&T facilities in that area and to have informal discussions with Soviet personnel. Thus, the visit to the Georgian NII occurred during his service and two-month stay in Tbilisi as Director of the USIA-sponsored US R&D exhibition in the USSR. During exhibit service of over six months in the USSR in 1972, and subsequently through 1978 as Soviet Programme Director at NSF involved in the implementation of the bilateral US–Soviet S&T Cooperation Agreement, the author also visited many other USSR and republic Academies' NIIs and Soviet industrial plants and facilities, and had numerous formal and informal contacts and discussions with Soviet S&T personnel. This included Academy personnel at all levels: Academy presidents and senior academicians serving in other high-level capacities, e.g. GKNT officials; Academy Presidium members and heads of AN depts.; and working scientists in numerous USSR and republic Academy Institutes and facilities around the USSR. This experience heightened his awareness of how heavily the Academy has been involved in military or military-related R&D.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> To slow down the tempo [of industrialization] means to fall behind. But the backward get beaten. And we don't want to be beaten. . . . The history of old Russia was, among other things, one of being continually beaten because of backwardness. . . . Such is always the law of exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. This is the capitalist law of the wolves. If you lag behind, if you are weak, then you are wrong and you can then be beaten and enslaved. If you are strong, then you are right and need to be treated with wariness. This is why we can no longer lag behind.[43]

Less noted, however, was Stalin's determination not only to drag Russia from industrial and military backwardness but to develop its production capabilities to a level that could, by extension, enable the USSR to acquire military superiority over the capitalist world. In fact, he declared that the Soviet system could not endure unless it ultimately outstripped the industrial capabilities of the Western states.[44]

The Nazi attack in 1941 prevented Stalin from achieving his goal: it placed the Soviet Union's very existence in question before the intended industrialization and rearming plans could be fully implemented. But his successors are implementing such a policy. It is driving the USSR's military modernization and is heavily taxing the Academy's capabilities, not out of sheer survival and solely defensive needs but in active pursuit of influence far beyond Soviet borders. Post-Stalin foreign policy accounts for a military modernization that has produced Soviet arms capabilities equal to or, in some areas, exceeding those of the US.

One dramatic measure of how the Soviets closed the military gap with the US, aided significantly by the Academy's effort, is represented by strategic weapons delivery systems: a US lead of 1,000 land-based ICBMs over 200 for the USSR in 1962 (at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis) was changed by the late 1970s to a Soviet lead of some 1,550 missiles over 1,054 for the US. Similarly, the Soviets reversed the situation in sea-based strategic missile systems: for example, in 1970 the US had 656 to 289 for the USSR; by 1977, the USSR had a 3:2 lead over the US inventory of 656 (which basically remained unchanged in the interim). To underscore the Soviet military achievement, it should be noted that for the first time in its history, Russia/USSR has a sizeable oceanic navy, a fact that would have gladdened Peter the Great's heart.

The strategic parity with the US achieved by the Soviet Union has given substance, just in military terms, to Stalin's slogan of the 1930s: the Soviet need " to overtake and surpass " the US, " the leader of the capitalist world ": it has provided the military muscle for the USSR's expansive foreign policy.

[43] J. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works) (State Political Publishing House, Moscow, 1951), Vol. 13, pp. 38–39.

[44] See his report on the results of the First Five-Year Plan to a Central Committee plenum in January 1933. Ibid. p. 173.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Strategic Background

The beginning of the transformation of the Soviet Union from an insular landlocked nation to a worldwide competitor of the US, can be dated to the mid-1950s. It was then that the Soviet leadership openly asserted global aspirations and Khrushchev declared the USSR to be a Great Power with worldwide interests without whose participation no problem on earth could be successfully resolved. The post-Khrushchevian leadership reaffirmed these views with even greater vigour; Gromyko put it most explicitly:

> The Soviet Union is a great power situated on two continents—Europe and Asia—but the range of our country's international interests is determined not by its geographical positions alone . . .[45]

The expansive character of Soviet foreign policy was enshrined in the 1977 Soviet Constitution. Unlike its 1936 predecessor (the so-called Stalin Constitution), the new basic charter proclaimed that Soviet foreign policy is " directed towards ensuring favourable international conditions for . . . strengthening the position of world socialism, the support of the struggle of peoples for national liberation. . . . "[46]

To underscore the significance of this change, Brezhnev, in a report to the Party's Central Committee in May 1977, focused on what he called " the key principal issues underlaying the new Constitution. " In this connection, he noted pointedly that for the first time a Soviet constitution features a special foreign policy clause. This was inserted because of " radical changes in the international position of the Soviet Union, " and thereby " in the social–political profile of the world. " He explained further:

> The capitalist encirclement of the USSR has been ended. Socialism has been converted into a world system . . . The position of world capitalism has been substantially weakened.[47]

In effect the new Soviet Constitution was used as a formal headstone to mark the USSR's activist policy abroad and the strategic changes it has wrought.

Having received a cue from their political chiefs, the Soviets' military leaders expanded their definition of the mission of the Soviet armed forces to cover the greater scope of Soviet interests. According to Marshal Grechko, the late Soviet Defence Minister, the USSR Armed Forces serve to defend the extensive gains of the socialist commonwealth now that " under the impact of the growth of the international authority of the USSR fundamental changes in the world have occurred . . ." and

[45] A. A. Gromyko, *Consistent Policy of Peace*, Report to the USSR Supreme Soviet on 27 June 1968 (Novosti Press, Moscow, 1968), pp. 37–38.

[46] *Konstitutsiya SSSR* (Constitution of the USSR) (Izvestiya Publishing House, Moscow, 1977), p. 14.

[47] L. I. Brezhnev, *O Proekte Konstitutsii SSSR* (On the Draft of the Constitution of the USSR) (Political Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1977), pp. 4 and 12.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

" capitalism has ceased to be the indivisibly dominant force in the world. "[48]

General Epishev, the chief political officer of the Soviet Army, extended Grechko's appraisal by indicating that " the international tasks and obligations of the Soviet Armed Forces have widened and deepened and their responsibility for fulfilment [of these tasks and obligations] has increased. "[49]

In the oceanic policy context, Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet Naval Commander, further underscored the global reach of Soviet foreign policy by noting the consequences for his command: the USSR has created a new type of armed forces—an oceanic navy which, " with its long-range capabilities, guards Soviet state interests on the world's seas and oceans. "[50]

Just as the new Constitution marks the post-Stalin changes in Soviet foreign policy, so it formally recognizes and enshrines the role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Thus, Brezhnev noted that specific reference to their mission appears for the first time in the new Soviet Constitution.[51]

Pursuing new global aspirations and missions in line with its expansive foreign policy, the USSR has leapfrogged into distant areas. Soviet material aid and military and technical personnel have been sent to many areas of the world which had never before seen a Soviet presence.

The foreign policy of Stalin's successors has not only intensified the strategic challenge to the US, it has also triggered the USSR's effort to project its influence to countries far beyond its immediate periphery.

The Academy's Role in Solving Soviet Strategic Problems

The transformation of the Academy to meet wider Soviet strategic needs has been best summarized by one of its former presidents:

> The Leninist approach to the Academy of Sciences determined its subsequent development. After 50 years of Soviet rule, the Academy was converted from an association of scientists, which it was before the revolution, into the largest centre of Soviet science. . . . It . . . leads the work on many problems, having most important significance . . . for increasing the defence might of our Motherland.[52]

More specifically, the Academy was predominant in meeting the USSR's main post-Second World War strategic challenge from the US: the

[48] A. A. Grechko, *Vooruzhennye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva* (Armed Forces of the Soviet State) (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1975), p. 96.

[49] A. A. Epishev, *Partiya i Armiya* (The Party and the Army) (Political Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1977), p. 5.

[50] *Boevoi Put' Sovetskogo Voennomorskogo Flota* (The Fighting Course of the Soviet Navy) (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1974), pp. 5–6. Further to highlight change, this work traces the transformation of the Soviet fleet from a defensive to an offensive arm of the USSR; it notes that for the first time in its history, the Soviet fleet has long-range, strategic capabilities which can fundamentally affect the outcome on oceanic and continental war fronts.

[51] Brezhnev, *O Proekte . . .*, op. cit. p. 12.

[52] M. V. Keldysh, *Lenin i Sovremennaya Nauka*, (Lenin and Contemporary Science) (Moscow 1970), p. 18.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Academy was responsible for breaking the US nuclear monopoly, an effort led by Academician Kurchatov and the Academy's research institutes. As President Keldysh put it:

> The concentration of scientific forces and material resources allowed Soviet science and technology to solve the atomic problem in a short time. . . . The development of atomic weapons in the Soviet Union liquidated the US monopoly which had tremendous political significance, allowed the international situation thereafter to be significantly improved. . . .[53]

After " solving " the " US nuclear monopoly " problem, the Academy was given the task of dealing with another important requirement of Soviet foreign policy and strategy: to help eliminate the US territorial invulnerability to Soviet military action or retaliation by developing nuclear weapons delivery capabilities for reaching US soil. At the Academy's annual meeting in 1982 the current President reminded the members of their achievement:

> Another group of scientists, headed by [Academician] S. P. Korolev, worked on missile weapons for our country. . . . The creation in the Soviet Union of intercontinental rockets demonstrated that the USSR cannot be attacked with impunity. It was very important then. Our rockets became, so to speak, the technical basis for the fruitful outcome of negotiations to soften the international situation, being proposed continuously by our government and Party. The international situation was indeed softened, and this led to our people being able to live in peace since the end of the Second World War.[54]

But the Academy has been warned that it cannot rest on its laurels and that the leadership expects the Soviet S&T community, led by the Academy, to pitch in even more to meet a perceived growing US strategic threat. Thus, shortly before his death, Brezhnev provided the context for yet another surge in military R&D work expected of the Academy:

> Competition in military technology has sharply intensified, often acquiring a fundamentally new character. A lag in this competition is inadmissible. We expect that our scientists, designers, engineers and technicians will do everything possible to resolve successfully all tasks connected with this.[55]

In reply to the political leaders' expectations, Academy leaders have given their appraisal of the external threat to the USSR and the Academy's President declared:

> Today, for the third time the same history [of threat to the USSR] is being repeated. The situation is very tense, and for that reason it is necessary for all our scientific development, which our country requires, to proceed without delay. The development of new

[53] M. V. Keldysh, *Nauka Soyuza SSR* (Science of the USSR) (Nauka, Moscow, 1972), p. 24.
[54] A. P. Aleksandrov, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, No. 6, 1982, p. 9.
[55] L. I. Brezhnev, in a speech to a convocation of senior Soviet military personnel on 27 October 1982.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

materials, the creation of new machines, instruments and technologies are in our hands.[56]

Military R&D Policy, Organizational Factors and the Academy's R&D Performance Style as Determinants of its Future Military Work

Despite its militarization to date, the Academy acquired and retains its own unique style in performance of R&D, distinct from that obtaining in the Soviet production ministries. The demands of the Academy's increased involvement in military-related work is likely to be stimulated by the perception of the Soviet leaders that only the Academy, with its experience and capabilities for work on advanced technologies, can meet the new challenges. However, any further large-scale and effective involvement by the Academy in military R&D will depend on several key factors: possible changes in Soviet military R&D policy and the ability of the S&T community to accept, or for the Academy to readjust, its R&D approach, unique to the Soviet system. Yet, any possible changes in *military R&D policy must consider and will be affected by the interplay* between the past, traditional simplicity and the technological sophistication that has now been forced on the Soviets by the US, and will be even more so in the future. This interplay must be considered in the context of Soviet weapons options, related organizational problems, and the performance style of the Academy.

Possible Changes in Soviet Military R&D Policy

Soviet military R&D policy to date has emphasized simplicity of design, conservatism in the application of well-tested methods, the incorporation of reliable technologies in weapons systems, and an incremental approach to innovation.[57] The essential principle underlying this policy is that simplicity should not compromise adequacy in meeting the basic mission requirements. But simplicity and adequacy are relative terms when applied over time, classes of systems and within or between countries. Thus, evidence of increased sophistication in new systems does not necessarily imply a change in R&D policy, but rather may represent an evolutionary process responding to new military requirements or technological opportunities that become available.

A rigorous definition of the Soviets departing from the simple-but-adequate military R&D policy must be supported by evidence that they are adopting technological solutions whose degree of sophistication is significantly higher than that required by the given basic mission or more complex mission requirements. Evidence of some highly sophisticated new Soviet systems, incorporating relatively untested exotic technologies, is available, as for example in the Typhoon submarine system. However, this system appears to be an example of R&D forced in a

[56] A. P. Aleksandrov, *Vestnik AN*, No. 6, 1982, pp. 9–10.

[57] For a detailed discussion of recent military R&D policy, see Arthur Alexander, *Decision-making in Soviet Weapons Procurement*, IISS Adelphi Papers, Nos. 147–48, London, Winter 1978–79.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

narrow specialized area to meet the basic requirements of a specified mission. It does not necessarily indicate a fundamental change in policy according to the above definition. On the other hand, the emergence of many such systems in the Soviet arsenal across a broad front of advanced technologies and mission requirements, or evidence of a trend in such a direction, would signify a qualitative change in the innovation practice of the Soviet defence industry. The prerequisite of such a change, however, would have to be a more developed technological base which would effectively convert advanced research results into industrial production.[58]

The possibility and the problem of Soviet development of such a base to include the Academy should be considered with regard to three possible modes of further weapons development:

1. increasing complexity of conventional or existing systems stimulated by new mission demands;
2. application of advanced or exotic technologies to current weapons systems stimulated by scientific development;
3. introduction of new-in-principle weapons.

The first mode represents the gradual evolutionary process accomplished within the current Soviet defence industry system and without major departures from traditional R&D policy. The second and third modes imply the greater participation of R&D resources outside the traditional defence industrial system, mainly those belonging to the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

On this point, it is relevant to recall that the Academy has the statutory responsibility for basic and applied research and for nationwide coordination of basic research. It is the acknowledged preeminent authority in applied research that leads directly to the development of advanced technologies. In these areas, including automation, electronics, acoustics, solid-state, high temperatures and pressures, nuclear science, hydrodynamics, and other disciplines, the Academy claims outstanding achievements, leading scientific personnel, and the best research facilities in the USSR. If we consider only the area relevant to the development of advanced technologies, the number of Academy institutes exceeds by one-quarter those in the ministry system.[59] The Academy must, therefore, be recognized as the dominant S&T organization in the Soviet development of advanced technologies; consequently, it has the capability to play a still greater role in the military sector. Indeed, the participation of the Academy in military R&D, while heavy before the early 1960s, has increased substantially since then, especially in the area

[58] The Academy's Scientific Secretary Skryabin has already spoken of the need for the Academy to acquire such a base. (See *Vestnik AN*, No. 6, 1982, p. 19.)

[59] Simon Kassel and Kathleen Campbell, "The Soviet Academy of Sciences and Technological Development," Rand Corp. R-Z533-ARPA, December 1980, p. 9. In analysing "the uniqueness" of the Academy in the Soviet S&T community, the author wishes to acknowledge the sizeable benefit he derived from long-term professional interaction on this subject with Simon Kassel.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of " big science. " (The latter refers to coordinated research involving many participants, extensive resources, and costly facilities for investigating questions on the frontiers-of-knowledge.[60])

But any contemplated expansion of the Soviet applied research base to support broad dissemination of advanced technologies to military weapons systems involves three important considerations: (1) the overall, larger organizational problems affecting the performance of the Soviet S&T community, including military R&D; (2) the style of R&D performance characteristic of the Academy of Sciences, and (3) the special problem of coordinating the Academy's work with the military–industrial establishment. All of the foregoing considerations have an impact on Soviet military R&D policy and must be taken into account in assessing future changes in that policy and the role of the Academy in implementing such a policy.

Organizational Problems Affecting Soviet S&T Performance

In general terms, the performance of Soviet science and technology, including military R&D, is heavily affected by the current organizational structure of, and policies affecting, the Soviet science and technology community. These have produced S&T shortcomings likely to continue into the foreseeable future because their correction or elimination would require unlikely broader and drastic political reform, viz. the removal of the Party's control over Soviet S&T, and major organizational reform of the S&T community itself.

The Soviet R&D shortcomings result in large part from rivalries generated by the overlapping responsibilities for management of Soviet science and technology among the Academy, the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), and the more than 50 production ministries. This situation has produced fragmentation, duplication, and a failure to capitalize on innovations.

The situation has been worsened by lack of coordination. Past organizational changes have not resolved this problem. Indeed, the GKNT was established in 1961—under a somewhat different name until 1965—to provide the necessary oversight and integration because of Khrushchev's dissatisfaction with the Academy's performance regarding R&D application. When the Academy protested the formation of the GKNT, many applied research institutes were removed from the Academy's jurisdiction and subordinated to the production ministries.[61] These moves created the current overreaching problems, involving the Academy, the GKNT, and the production ministries, and have the following three dimensions:

[60] The Academy's crucial and growing role in military R&D in general and specific technologies with military application such as control systems, lasers and charged particle beams are noted in David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (2nd edition, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984), pp. 144–45.

[61] Academicians Semenov, the then President of the Academy, and Bardin the then head of the Technical Sciences Division, differed over the desirability of this divestiture.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

— There are jurisdictional disputes between the Academy of Sciences and the GKNT. These involve such matters as the Academy's loss of its monopoly over establishing and maintaining contacts with foreign scientific communities, and in providing the most authoritative guidance for Soviet science and the required coordination in implementing R&D results.
— Then there are differences between the Academy and the production ministries over the issue of basic versus applied science. Many in the Academy prefer to do basic research; the ministries, including the nine defence production ministries, however, want help on the applied end because of their need to meet new technology and production goals. Tensions arise because the Academy no longer receives its entire funding from the state budget and its research institutes must make up the shortfall through contract work from production ministries, which exert pressure on the Academy to work on applied problems. This creates another negative reaction in that many Academy scientists on assignment to ministry enterprises are unhappy because they are given the task of working on what they consider to be " nuts and bolts " production-related tasks rather than the more interesting fundamental problems.
— Finally, there are problems between the GKNT and the ministries. The GKNT is charged with identifying advanced foreign technologies and promoting their introduction into Soviet production and use. But the ministries resist the imposition of such technologies because they do not get an allowance for the time involved in installing new equipment and retraining workers. Furthermore, the resultant interruption of production can in turn lead to failure to achieve the annual production goals that affects bonuses and promotion of ministry officials and production personnel.[62]

These problems affecting the performance of Soviet S&T and industry are well known not only to political and government leaders but to such leading S&T figures as Academician Velikhov, the Academy's Vice-President for Science and Technology. The problems should have led a key official like Velikhov to propose substantive solutions and organizational alternatives. That he has not done so to date, even when he has discussed other major issues affecting Soviet S&T, is significant, especially in view of his position and past experience. He can speak with authority on the need for greater efficiency in the R&D effort, including the persistent problem of bridging the gap between research and application: he has been heavily involved in applied as well as theoretical research, including weapons development. (As a prominent physicist and Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Nuclear Energy Institute he has

[62] For a more detailed discussion of the foregoing problems, see the author's chapter in *Soviet Science and Technology, Domestic and Foreign Perspectives* (John R. Thomas and Ursula M. Kruse-Vaucienne, eds.). Published for the National Science Foundation by George Washington University, Washington DC, 1977. Cf. also *Survey*, Spring 1977–78, Vol. 23, no. 2 (102), on " Soviet Science and Technology."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directed military-related energy programmes.[63]) Since assuming his present post, his views on greater efficiency have paralleled those of the political leadership.

Given this background, Velikhov has been specifically asked, in a wide-ranging interview covering the " health " of Soviet S&T,[64] about the key issue related to improved R&D integration and application, namely, the desirability of having a single science agency provide overall S&T coordination and follow-through with industry in order to overcome difficulties in adapting and diffusing innovations. Regarding the USSR Academy of Sciences, Velikhov was explicit about its inability to fulfil such a function because of personnel and budgetary constraints. He noted that the Academy has only a small fraction of the over four million persons engaged in Soviet science and receives only a small percentage of the 20-billion-ruble science budget.

At the same time, Velikhov has strongly implied that the GKNT should not play an expanded coordinating and implementation role. Parenthetically, the GKNT has been headed by scientists who previously held high posts in the Academy, e.g. Academician V. A. Kirillin from 1965 until 1980, and Academician G. I. Marchuk since then. This Academy-GKNT interfacing has not, however, solved nor ameliorated the need for institutionalizing centralized R&D coordination. Even though Velikhov was explicitly asked about such an alternative, his failure to respond suggests he rejects centralized coordination as a solution to the problem of obtaining greater effectiveness from the Soviet R&D-production cycle.

If anything, Velikhov has refused to acknowledge the existence of an R&D coordination problem. For example, his satisfied tone in describing how the research-to-production process currently works, seems to reflect such a belief, despite the fact that *vnedrenie* (adoption and utilization of innovations) has always been, and is increasingly now, recognized as a major deficiency in Soviet science and industry.

Velikhov's views are relevant, however, not only for the present but for future Soviet S&T development and R&D policy. He has implied (in the same significant overview assessment of Soviet S&T cited earlier[65]) that no fundamental policy and structural changes are in the works to overcome the USSR's most pressing S&T problem: its inability to translate research and development achievements into actual production despite the massive and uninterrupted S&T investment in recent decades. Velikhov's assessment also suggested that there are no firm plans for S&T reform (much less reform of the Party's ubiquitous and jealously guarded control over S&T) despite increasing recent concern among the political leaders over the need to enhance the role of S&T in improving the flagging Soviet economy.

[63] It should be recalled that Kurchatov and the Institute which bears his name were involved in the original and early development of the USSR's nuclear weapons.

[64] In *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 9 June 1981.

[65] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A revived economy would, of course, reduce current pressure on Soviet leaders to choose between "guns and butter." But without reform, this economy is likely to perform poorly in the future and affect Soviet R&D, including military-related work, accordingly.

Whether the Soviet leadership will initiate the necessary basic reform (as opposed to cosmetic measures) remains to be seen. In any case it is unlikely to do so at the expense of Party control over Soviet S&T. Moreover, Soviet leaders might be dissuaded from the necessary basic reform because this would require, in the case of scientific elites, non-material incentives such as greater freedom to travel abroad and interact with foreign S&T communities; these reforms could lead precisely to loosening of controls. This, however, is unacceptable to a Soviet leadership which is trying to tighten internal discipline and to guard against hostile Western influence.

The Academy's R&D Style

Despite the leadership's stand-pat attitude on reform to date and the specific problems noted above, conservatism and incrementalism are not uniform to all Soviet R&D activities. These characteristics affect mainly the final stages of the R&D cycle involving the industrial innovation process. The early stages of the cycle, comprising basic and applied research, cannot by their nature be conservative or incremental. However, Soviet industry has the particular problem of being less bold, since innovative results of scientific research are seldom introduced into industrial production.

During the past two decades, the Academy's institutes specializing in the physical and engineering sciences have become increasingly involved in project work beyond the applied research stage. Here, the Academy has been far from conservative. It has displayed a willingness to take risks by undertaking large prototype construction projects prior to the solution of all the technical problems involved. An example of this style of R&D performance is the U-25 magnetohydrodynamic power-plant installed in Moscow by the Academy's Institute of High Temperatures. This large experimental prototype facility has been built as an operational component of the Moscow power grid, although some basic problems of heat-resistant electrodes, plasma channels, and superconducting magnets remained unsolved. The philosophy underlying this approach was based on the value of being plugged into a large established system as a way of stimulating individual local solutions to be worked out under operational conditions. Another example is the large-scale laser fusion facility at the Lebedev Physics Institute. The multi-channel Del'fin glass laser system was installed and operated at a relatively early stage of R&D, without solving the key problem of parasitic energy transmission losses.

While these attempts have to date produced relatively unimpressive results, other activities of the Academy R&D system have seen imaginative and highly successful use of new, untested approaches, such as the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development of high-speed abrasives at the Institute of Superhard Materials and new welding techniques at the Paton Institute of Electric Welding, both of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.[66]

The above examples illustrate an R&D policy that is relatively bold and innovative, rather than conservative and incremental. The two contrasting policies, one characterizing the conservatism of industry and the other, the boldness of the Academy of Sciences, have coexisted for some time. From the viewpoint of the end results, the main difference between these two policies is that the former affected serially-manufactured industrial products, while the latter led to the construction of one-of-a-kind installations or to small-batch production without extensive participation of industry. This has led to perpetuation of the R&D production gap.

The Organizational Problems of Industrial Innovation

Vnedrenie, or the introduction of R&D results into industrial production, has been the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy. In the civilian sectors of the industry, innovation faces well-known difficulties due to many factors of an economic, organizational and technical nature. The economic factors include the absence of suitable incentives for innovation, quantitative goals penalizing innovation, and a minimal system of effective demand. The organizational problems (analysed earlier in the context of Soviet S&T as a whole) include in more specific terms an R&D cycle fragmented among diverse research institutes and plants, and a pervasive lack of an effective umbrella organizational structure that could carry an entire project from applied research to production under a single leadership. Though intended to do so, formation of various scientific-production associations since the mid-1960s has not solved these problems. The technical factors involve scarcities of experimental equipment and instrumentation, and inadequate technical information support.

The inhibiting effect of the Soviet S&T organizational problems on innovation is particularly strong in R&D projects that straddle industry and the Academy system. The Academy institutes, as independent R&D performing organizations, are difficult to bring under a single project leadership outside the Academy. The independence and organizational remoteness of the Academy from industrial production, and the divergence, if not outright conflict, of interests between the Academy and the industry, tend to hamper the efficient introduction of the results of the Academy's research into mass production. The Soviet press features

[66] Western observers have had an opportunity since the 1970s to familiarize themselves with the work of the three institutes noted above: the Institute of High Temperatures, Lebedev, and Paton Institutes were among those involved in joint activities under the 1972 US–USSR Agreement for Cooperation in S&T. The author, along with others, visited many of these and other Academy institutes (as well as industrial plants) during the 1970s when he served as the Soviet Programme Director of the National Science Foundation, the Executive Agency responsible on the US side for implementing the foregoing 1972 bilateral agreement.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complaints about industrial research institutes preferring to duplicate the work done by the Academy in order to avoid using its results.

Hence, the organizational difficulties related to industrial innovation and stemming from the jurisdictional independence of the Academy of Sciences may well become the major pacing factor in the development of advanced technologies in the Soviet Union.

The military industrial sector has been less affected to date by these problems. The military leadership's ability to concentrate resources and to cut across bureaucratic rigidities in many cases effectively alleviates the economic and technical problems. In organizational structure, the military R&D also tends to depart from the typical civilian pattern. The design bureaux, research institutes, and production plants of the aircraft industry and other military industrial areas bring under one ministerial roof the R&D and production organizations that enable them to cope most effectively with technological innovation problems under Soviet conditions.[67] However, such a structure is not feasible in situations requiring the participation of the Academy's R&D institutions.

The Academy's Role in Military R&D

Advanced, or exotic, technologies have been utilized far less in developing military systems to date than there is potential for; in this context, the Academy's contribution to the development of military technology has often been limited to advisory and troubleshooting roles. But this situation may be changing as the Soviet leaders perceive a growing technologically sophisticated US threat, and as Soviet military planners pay increasing attention to the technologies of computers, very large systems integration, composite materials, directed energy, quantum electronics, etc. On these, the Academy's research facilities are the primary source of knowledge and site of R&D activity.

In this connection, it should be noted that the Academy has in the past made contributions to the development of " new-in-principle " weapons. The most outstanding of these was its leadership of the Soviet nuclear weapons programme. This programme was organized and headed by Academician Kurchatov and involved at one time the now-dissident Academician Andrei Sakharov. More recently, Academicians A. M. Prokhorov and N. G. Basov of the Academy's Lebedev Physics Institute have played major roles in the high-energy laser programme. Significantly enough, several achievements of the Academy in the directed energy field during the past decade have been adopted by the US for its own military projects, such as the cyclotron resonance laser (called the gyrotron and originated by the Academy's Lebedev Physics Institute and the Institute of Applied Physics), the high-brightness ion source, and the gyrotron high-efficiency converter for radio-frequency accelerators. (The last two were developed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the

[67] For detailed discussion of the advantages of military R&D and production over civilian, see *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1983, pp. 70–73, and David Buchan, op. cit. pp. 9–11.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Academy's Siberian Department, headed by Academician Budker until his death in 1978 and since then by Academician Skrinsky, the Academy's youngest member.[68])

But, any large-scale introduction of the Academy of Sciences into the weapons procurement process, involving advanced technology applications and new-in-principle weapons, would constitute a major change in the Soviet military R&D practices. In such a case, the type of organizational linkage between the Academy and the defence industry will be important in determining the success of such practice.

Two organizational policies have helped bring the Academy and the military closer together. The first is the encouragement of contract research in Academy institutes, combined with state budgets that have provided for little or no growth. This policy has encouraged academic institutes to seek contractual relations with sources outside the Academy's system, including the military. The second policy is the use of project planning, especially as represented by the VPK decree, in which a lead organization is given the responsibility and legal authority to plan and manage complex projects that span diverse organizational boundaries. Both policies have encouraged and permitted the growing role of the Academy in military-related R&D. However, it is unlikely that the Academy research institutes will voluntarily surrender their operational independence to defence ministry organizations. For this reason, unless a more satisfactory formula is devised permitting a smooth and efficient flow of high technology projects through the entire R&D cycle, the broad dissemination of such technologies within the Soviet defence industry will remain uncertain.

Even if the flow of technology to industry can be increased, the technology must still be produced by a Soviet industry, whose motivations are unlikely to change in the near future unless there are large-scale, basic reforms. Furthermore, the technologies must be demanded by a military that understands many of the negative effects of pushing technology and requiring performance beyond reason—higher costs, greater complexity,[69] the strain of imminent S&T manpower shortage, etc. Although the Academy of Sciences and the military are working more closely together than ever, this has not yet signalled a sharp break in past patterns of weapons development. However, the potential for such a break and still larger Academy role in military R&D may come from proposals to give the Academy added capability for an increased role in solving the problem of *vnedrenie*: as noted earlier, the Academy's

[68] Together with other foreign observers, the author had numerous opportunities to visit this institute and to meet these leading figures. They were and are proud of their achievements, including their claim that their particle accelerator work leads that in the West.

[69] The present author, in accompanying Academician Vadim Trapeznikov in 1973 on a visit to big US companies involved, among other things, in defence production, heard him note that the Soviet military often demands weapons performance that is beyond the laws of physics. His view implied the military's ignorance of the scientific process and its limits. Trapeznikov can speak with great authority on the scientific–military relations. He is a senior Academician, an automated systems expert, director of one of the Academy's largest research facilities (the Institute for Problems of Management) and an advisory member of the Military–Industrial Commission.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scientific Secretary has proposed that it get its own technological base.[70] Such a move, added to its already sizeable research facilities, would, of course, also extend the Academy's ability to contribute to military R&D.

Impact of Key Factors

In sum, it can be supposed that any R&D that results in increased complexity of weapons systems would not, when viewed as an evolutionary process, necessarily imply major changes in the Soviet military R&D programme or an increased Academy role. But the application of new, advanced technologies to military systems and the development of new-in-principle weapons, being urged by political and military leaders, will require greater participation of the Academy of Sciences in the weapons procurement process. The Academy is one Soviet S&T institution which has done and is doing the kind of applied research that leads directly to the development of advanced technologies. Because the Academy, unlike Soviet industry, has been noted for some innovative approaches, its still greater involvement could signal a shift in the Soviet military R&D policy towards less conservative and more risky undertakings. Such a shift could be induced by an accelerated, technologically sophisticated US weapons build-up. Such a shift could also reflect a change in mission requirements which demand greater performance and a multiplicity of measures.

However, any necessary greater involvement of the Academy, which currently exists as a relatively independent performer of R&D, would confront Soviet military planners with a specific, major management problem, arising out of the larger S&T organizational difficulties noted earlier: how to integrate successfully the Academy's R&D with industrial production on a broad scale that has not been accomplished to date and which would be essential to the development of weapons embodying advanced technology.

The organizational problems that have plagued the Soviet S&T community and have caused the less than fully productive situation to date have been and are manageable as long as the regime was and is content to tolerate the current fragmentation and overlap of the Soviet S&T components—the Academy, production ministries and *VUZy*—and not to force tight integration and centralized direction of the Soviet S&T effort.

However, the Soviet need to match the increasing proliferation of high and advanced technologies and the faster pace of technological development in the West, combined with a pressing scarcity in Soviet S&T resources and the deteriorating Soviet economy, may make it imperative for the Soviet regime to reconsider the obsolete organizational forms and traditional R&D approach dominating Soviet S&T. Such reexamination, as part of drawing the Academy into military work even further, may be stimulated by changes in military R&D policy. In relative terms, military

[70] G. Skryabin, *Vestnik AN*, No. 6, 1982, p. 19.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

R&D facilities operating under that policy, with its traditionally higher political priority, have been more efficient. Consequently, the Academy may benefit from the advantage that greater military sponsorship may provide in terms of ability of the military to influence reordering of S&T policy and procedures that could permit the " unleashing " of the Academy's talents and capitalizing on its uniqueness. This assumes that the military themselves will appreciate, and more fully and effectively utilize, the Academy's talents, skills and experience.

In any case, significant change in Soviet R&D policy will most likely be gradual and difficult to discern in its early stages. Important leading indicators of potential change in Soviet R&D policy and performance would include trends in the size of investment in speculative applied research, increase in number and scope of enigmatic systems, and major organizational changes, both in the overall Soviet S&T community as a whole and in the specific relationship between the Academy and the production ministries, including those of the defence industry.

Implications of Systemic and Societal Developments

In addition to the impact of possible changes in Soviet military R&D policy and organizational relationships (noted in the preceding section), the Academy's future involvement in military-related work will be affected by larger systemic and societal developments. On the political side, the moves by the Party to tighten its grip over the Academy were assessed earlier. It should get further " responsiveness " by the Academy in the short run. (Whether this will increase the effectiveness of the Academy's output is another matter.)

The Academy's role will also be affected by changes in the professional composition of its personnel. The increased number of Academy scientists with weapons- and military-related disciplines (e.g. applied physics and engineering sciences) foreshadows still greater militarization of the Academy through greater potential to meet military requirements. In this connection, the increasing influx into the Academy of personnel with narrow engineering training and a " nuts-and-bolts " approach will enable the Academy to be more responsive to the regime's call for a greater applied research effort, than was earlier the case with a personnel composed of more theoretically-inclined scientists.

Then, too, the change in its professional composition has political implications: Soviet scientific ranks to date have, in relative terms, produced more dissidents than have the engineers. This would suggest that as the number of the latter in the Academy grows, it may prove to be more responsive to the regime's wishes in general, and to its military requirements in particular, with fewer activist dissidents rising from engineer ranks.

But, to the degree that such growing military-related experience and skills cannot be transferred, or are difficult to transfer to civilian use, any trends towards further militarization of the Academy will lessen its ability

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to help solve the basic problems now plaguing the Soviet civilian economy. In turn, the longer these problems remain unsolved, the more they will affect the attitude and vigour of Soviet society, including its S&T community. For, any addition to this community's already low morale and indifferent attitude towards the Soviet system would ultimately have an impact on the Academy scientists involved in military-related work, with implications for its future role in such work.

Indeed, the Academy's and other scientists do not work and exist in a vacuum. They are intimately affected by economic and political developments in their country. Therefore, even if there were at one time two distinct worlds in the Soviet S&T community—civilian and military—as some have maintained, the greater professional interdependence and interactions and other societal developments beyond the Soviet leadership's control have long broken the artificial wall the Soviet regime has tried to maintain between the two worlds. This has had undesirable consequences for the regime's effort to utilize its scientists " according to plan, " and in a compartmentalized manner. For example, the eagerness of young Soviet scientists in the past to work for the military because of greater incentives and other financial perquisites is being offset by the increasing desire of the younger generation of Soviet scientists to travel abroad, to have their work published at home and abroad, and to participate in and be accepted as members of the international S&T community. In recent years—particularly during the " *détente* " of the 1970s—this desire was stimulated by the relatively large-scale US–Soviet S&T interaction; exchanges, joint seminars and research projects.[71]

If the Soviet regime fails at least partially to satisfy such desire, it could ultimately reduce the Academy's ability to contribute to military R&D as it lost its ability to attract " the youngest and the brightest. " Moreover, such a loss could be compounded by the Academy becoming even more militarized, and therefore subject to additional security requirements; this, when added to the already sizeable restrictions on its personnel, could further serve to repel future applicants.[72] These negative developments could be extended by a still larger societal problem affecting Soviet S&T potential. Soviet spokesmen openly acknowledge that their youth is beginning to lose its enthusiasm for mathematics and physical sciences, and that it holds these disciplines, which are the underpinnings for applied research, in lower esteem than before. For example, the head of Kharkov University has noted these trends in the Ukraine.[73] This is a revealing admission in a nation in which the honour, utility and benefits of science and technology have been so highly propagandized for 68 years of Soviet rule. Any further lowering in the USSR of the hitherto

[71] The present author can speak from personal experience during numerous visits to the USSR and discussions with Soviet scientists, including some from military-related research institutes, about the changing aspirations of Soviet scientists, particularly of the younger generations.

[72] There are already numerous reports of many young Russians " dropping out " of the Soviet S&T community when given no choice but to work only on military-related projects.

[73] *Pravda*, 12 November 1982.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

high regard for science could affect the Academy's future ability to draw the most talented into its ranks.

Finally, the future capabilities are likely to be affected still further by the generational change in Academy leadership: the older Academicians, many with direct training and/or extensive experience in and contacts with the West have passed or soon will pass from the scene; they are being replaced by those trained under the Soviet regime, with very little or no experience in the West. In the short run, such a change can portend greater responsiveness to the Soviet regime's requirements, but in the longer run such pliability may be obtained at the expense of greater creativity provided by scientific leaders such as Kapitsa.

In short, the Academy's future creativity may be significantly affected by the increased " engineerization " of its personnel, the decreasing enthusiasm for S&T among Soviet youth and the decreased ability to attract the most talented, as well as the general change in the Academy's leadership. Such a loss of S&T creativity would affect the USSR's ability to compete with the US in the fast-paced, high-technology race that increasingly underpins modern military R&D and weapons production. The impact would be greatest if the loss occurred at a time when both the US technological challenge and the perceived Soviet need to meet such a challenge might be greatest. Would it profit the Academy to become even more militarized and lose its creative soul?

Conclusions and Implications

The foregoing examination of the USSR Academy's involvement in military-related work leads one to emphasize the following points:

Sixty-eight years of Soviet rule have transformed the USSR Academy of Sciences from an elitist association of scientists engaged primarily in basic research in non-physical sciences, into the largest and the most militarized scientific-technical network of research facilities and personnel in the world. The involvement of the Academy in the development of weapons and dual-use technology is more extensive and dates back much further than is commonly believed.

The Academy's " industrialization " and " militarization " has been driven by the Soviet leadership's goals of the USSR's industrial and military modernization, by the expansive Soviet foreign policy and resultant strategic problems and opportunities. Unless these goals and foreign policy are radically altered, the Academy's already sizeable involvement in military-related work is likely to grow. In particular, it will be needed to develop advanced weapons systems, requiring appropriate scientific and technological breakthroughs, because the Academy is the leading Soviet S&T organization with the requisite capabilities and experience to achieve such breakthroughs. This has been demonstrated by its past leadership in developing Soviet nuclear weapons, ICBMs and space systems, and by its current R&D work on exotic weapons, e.g. lasers and particle beam weapons.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy's leadership has recently hinted about the Academy's greater future involvement in developing new weapons, particularly in the burgeoning Soviet space programmes. These hints have been made against a background of pressure on the Academy by Soviet political and military leaders to help solve the USSR's strategic problems.

The extent to which the Academy can effectively increase its already sizeable involvement in military-related work will be determined in large part by changes in Soviet military R&D policy, viz. receptivity towards more innovative approaches, by the ability of the Soviet S&T community to accommodate itself to the Academy's relatively independent R&D performance style. Such an accommodation within the S&T community would, however, require fundamental organizational reforms in the relationship among the key S&T organizations in the USSR, viz. the Academy, the State Committee for Science and Technology, and the production ministries (including those of the defence production). Such reform is unlikely in the near future if recent history is any indication.

However, larger, systemic developments, such as growing political control over the Academy, the generational change currently under way within the Academy, which is reducing the ranks of older, more independent-minded scientists, and the growing " engineerization " of the Academy's personnel, are likely to affect its current posture.

In the short run, these developments are likely to reduce its relative independence and make it more receptive to political–military leadership pressure for still greater involvement in developing the more advanced weapons systems. But in the long run, this pliability, together with the decreasing enthusiasm of Soviet youth for S&T, is likely to be at the expense of the Academy's creativity. Such a diminuition of Soviet scientific–technical potential could reduce the USSR's ability to compete with the US in the larger high-technology race that increasingly underpins military R&D and weapons production. In turn, this would have an impact on the USSR's ability to develop its advanced, sophisticated weapons systems and match the US technologically-advanced military capabilities.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Economics of Defence in the USSR*

Michael Checinski

THE modern Soviet war-economic doctrine is a product both of the socio-political and economic circumstances of the USSR and of the changes which occurred in Soviet military technology and military power during the six decades since the Bolshevik revolution. The war-economic doctrine has its own internal, logical history. It was developed as part of the military doctrine and strategy but was defined by the war-economic potential and economic policy of the country. Its scope expanded with the growth of the economic abilities of the country. Moreover, the Soviet economic policy was in turn an actual expression of the goals of its war-economic doctrine.

The war-economic doctrine, like the military doctrine, has two aspects: political and military-technical. Its basic political tenets were always determined by the Politburo (and also recently by the Defence Council), while its military-technical and economic-organization principles were and still are decided by the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces in cooperation with the Gosplan. The current decision-making system of the war economy is therefore a product of socio-political, military and economic factors, as well as experience learned in world and local wars of the twentieth century.

Throughout modern Soviet history, political leaders and military commanders—including Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Frunze, Tukhachevsky, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Ustinov and Ogarkov and many other major Soviet personalities—have been preoccupied with the economic aspects of preparing for waging a war. The theoretical basis for the current Soviet war-economic doctrine was established by the military and military-economic writers of the 1920s and early '30s. The conclusions derived by these thinkers have influenced all Soviet economic planning and practice during the 68 years of the communist regime in the USSR.

SOVIET military commanders and theorists, realizing that the war-economic problems of the USSR are to a large extent typical for any major power engaged in a great military build-up, have very carefully studied, together with their own experience in the two world wars and the present nuclear age, the published findings in the West. During the 1920s and '30s, Soviet experts were strongly impressed by the

* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen and Deutsches Gesellschaft für Konfliktforschung, for research support that was of use in preparing this article. He is also thankful to Professor Aleksander Nekrich of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for his comments on the draft of this article.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German literature on war economy, including works published in the Third Reich.[1] After the Second World War, special attention was paid to American publications, in as much as the USA's problems in military economy were seen as akin to those faced by the USSR.[2] The similarities between the war-economic problems encountered by both the USSR and the West cannot, however, disguise the very serious differences between the two. The specifically Soviet problems result primarily from the centralization of the whole economy under state rule, even if this set-up has made it easier to organize and develop the Soviet war-economic system. On the other hand, the USSR, one of the two largest world military-industrial entities, was obliged to develop its military power in relative isolation from the armament technology of the rest of the world. Yet, the great size of the USSR and its own peculiar socio-political institutions have provided it unique opportunities for developing a relatively modern armament industry on its own. These unique characteristics have found strong expression in Soviet military and war-economic thought.

The development of Soviet war-economic doctrine was also influenced by the experience of the Second World War, but this was never discussed coherently or directly. Almost every discussion of military affairs after 1945 starts with an analysis of the experience of the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945, in which successes are stressed and failures never mentioned. The totalitarian system forbade open discussion about the burden upon and implications of the war economy. In addition, official Marxist ideology forced public analysis into the straitjacket of a specific code of a social and political demagogy. As a result, Soviet publications on the subject are usually ridiculously unintelligible. To discover the real meaning and substance of the problems under discussion, one must try to

[1] To illustrate this thesis let us mention only the most influential books translated into Russian or those which discuss the experience of Germany: Erich Ludendorff, *Moi vospominaniya o voine 1914–1918* (My Memoirs of the War 1914–1918), Vols. I–II, Moscow 1923–24; Alfred von Schlieffen, *Sovremennaya voina* (Modern War), 2nd ed., St Petersburg, 1911; the same author: *Kanny*, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1938; Hans Gotlieb Leopold Delbruck, *Istoriya voennogo isskustva v ramkakh politicheskoi istorii* (The History of Military Art in the Framework of Political History), Vols. 1–7, Moscow 1936–39; Marshal M. Tukhachevsky wrote a long, critical " Introduction " to this work. Delbruck's work had an especially strong influence on the writings of the Soviet military theorists, like Mikhail Shaposhnikov and Alexander Svechin. In the 1930s the experience of the Third Reich in preparation of the economy for war was analysed in the book of S. M. Vishnev, *Kapitalisticheskaya tekhnika i podgotovka k voine* (The Technology of the Capitalist States and Preparation for the War), Moscow, 1936; the same author: *Kak vooruzhatsya fashistskie podzhigateli voiny* (How the Fascist Instigators of War Arm), Moscow, 1939; I. Trachtenberg, S. M. Vishnev (eds.), *Voennokhozyaistvennye meropriyatiya voyuishchikh gosudarstv* (The War-Economic Measures of the Waging States), Moscow, 1940. We should not overlook the fact that many German books and articles were read in the original, e.g. the many-volume memoirs of the Austrian Marshal Konrad von Hotzendorf. On the influence of Clausewitz, Delbruck, Schlieffen and other German military theorists see: Marshal A. Vasilevsky, " Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov," *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, 1972, No. 9, p. 33; A. Ageev, " Voennyi teoretik i voennyi istorik A. A. Svechin," *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, 1978, No. 8, p. 127; B. M. Shaposhnikov, *Vospominaniya, voenno-nauchnye trudy* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 467–70; T. A. Korotkov, *Istoriya sovetskoi voennoi mysli* (The History of Soviet Military Thought) (Nauka, Moscow, 1980), pp. 86–91.

[2] The authors who most influenced Soviet war-economic thinking were Klaus Knorr, and C. Hitch and R. McKean. See: K. Knorr, *Voennyi potentsial gosudarstv*, Moscow, 1960 (War Potential of Nations) (Princeton, 1956), and C. Hitch and R. McKean, *Voennaya ekonomika v yadernyi vek*, Moscow, 1964 (*The Economics of Defence in the Nuclear Age*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

learn the peculiar code in which the publications are written. To be sure, some specific issues of Soviet war and military economy are treated in the standard technical language, but analysis is ritualistically carried out on the basis of statistical data and information dealing with the USA, England, West Germany and even Israel, but never the USSR. Even the entry " War-Economic Theories " in the Soviet *Economic Encyclopaedia* discusses only theories of the " imperialist states."[3] The same approach is used in the Soviet *Military Encyclopaedia* and many other published books and articles.[4] In classified journals, however, and in very esoteric books and articles recently published in the USSR and Poland, a more sober kind of writing appears.

AS soon as order had been restored after the Civil War, almost all Soviet leaders and top military commanders began to assess ways to integrate economic planning into preparation for future war. One of the most obvious signs that military and economic planning were being fully coordinated was the replacement in 1920 of the former Defence Council (*Sovet Oborony*) with the Council for Labour and Defence (*Sovet Truda i Oborony* (STO)).[5] In that same year was published one of the first theoretical analyses of the economic developments in the Soviet state, written by Bukharin, who emphasized the negative economic consequences of growing military production on both capitalist and socialist systems. War brings " ever-increasing *under-production*. This process may be called *expanded negative reproduction*, and this is what war is from the economic point of view. . . ." Yet, argued Bukharin, if the war is waged by " revolutionary forces " this is " . . . the price at which human society buys itself the opportunity of further growth. . . ." Moreover, Bukharin thought that only a militarized economy enables efficient use of available resources for mass armies and for continuing the production despite the disorganized management in the plants; and to this end, " war communism " (*voennyi kommunizm*) was to be valued above other centralized economies.[6]

Theoretical studies based on the extensive experience of the First World War and the Civil War also supported the conclusion of many writers at home and abroad that future war would be total. In light

[3] *Ekonomicheskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 1, Entry: " Voenno-ekonomicheskie teorii," Moscow, 1972 pp. 253–55.

[4] See: S. A. Bartenev, *Ekonomika—tyl i front sovremennoi voiny* (The Economy—The Rear and the Front of Modern War), Moscow, 1971; B. G. Grigorev, *Ekonomicheskii i moralnyi potentsial v sovremennoi voine* (The Economic and Moral Potential in Modern War), Moscow, 1970; *Voenno-ekonomicheskie voprosy v kurse politekonomii*, (War-Economic Issues in the Teaching of Political Economy), Moscow, 1968; Yu. E. Vlasevich, *Ekonomicheskoe bremya militarizma* (The Economic Burden of Militarism), Moscow, 1980; *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 8. Entry: " Ekonomika Voennaya," Moscow, 1980, pp. 567–69.

[5] *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopaedia) (Further quoted as *SVE*), Vol. 7, p. 410. It is worth noting that Gosplan (the Planning Commission) was organized as a department of STO.

[6] Nikolai Bukharin, *Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda* (The Economy of the Transition Period) Part I. *Obshchaya teoriya transformatsionnogo protsessa* (Gosizdat, Moscow, 1920), pp. 38–39, 118–19. English translation by Oliver Field, Kenneth J. Tarbuck (ed.), *The Politics and Economics of the Transition Period* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1979), pp. 40–43, 82, 91.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of this realization, the scope of military doctrine could no longer be limited to the strategies of the military commanders and the fighting power of the army, but had to encompass comprehensively the behaviour of the whole nation as well as its entire economic potential. Therefore, a proper and effective military doctrine must function first as a war-economic doctrine, i.e. a far-reaching, long-term national economic plan. This view gained full support in the writings of the top military commanders, and found expression in the decisions of the Soviet leaders.

Among articles published in the 1920s on the Soviet war-economic doctrine, the most articulate and influential were those of Mikhail Frunze, who held the highest military positions in the Red Army.[7] In 1925, as Commissar of Defence and Chief of the Revolutionary Military Council (*Revvoensovet*), Frunze outlined the principles of the Soviet war-economic doctrine and practice which essentially remain operative today.[8] His writings stressed the necessity of full integration of military and economic planning and activities. In analysing the experience of the First World War, Frunze argued that future war effort would embrace not only the military but the whole nation's economic and technological capabilities. " Absolutely all aspects of social life are absorbed by wars and subordinated to them . . ."[9] Therefore, military strategy should be formulated in concert with the political and economic policies of the state. ". . . The government must determine in advance . . . the plan of activity [for the future war] for the *state as a whole* . . ." (emphasis added).[10] He advocated fitting all economic, administrative and political activity of the USSR into the framework of the military doctrine and mobilization policy of the Red Army. He went so far as to suggest that most non-military industrial products be designed in such a way that they could also be used by the military industry or even the military itself (e.g. metal-cutting tools and means of communication and transportation). To expedite mobilization and enable quick adaptation of the civilian administration to war exigencies, Frunze proposed the organization of a special network of military authorities (*Voenvedy*) which would control the whole national economy at all levels. By means of this network, the Soviet Union would achieve full integration of the non-military and military sectors of the economy and state administration. Waging war

[7] For a detailed biography of Frunze and other leading Soviet military commanders see: John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command, A Military Political History 1918–1941* (Macmillan, London, 1962), pp. 836–48. Mikhail Frunze was one of the most gifted theorists and commanders of the Red Army. In 1925 he was Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council (*Revvoensovet*), but died in October of the same year, probably murdered secretly by Stalin's order. Frunze published a number of articles and speeches which remain classics of military theoretical writing. The economic aspects of Frunze's military thinking are in many respects still relevant. See: A. A. Kosiukov, *Voenno-politicheskie vzglyady M. V. Frunze*, (The Military-Political Views of M. V. Frunze), Moscow, 1960; M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, 1977; Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, *The Soviet Art of War. Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics* (Westview Press, Boulder Co., 1982), pp. 27–31.

[8] M. Frunze, " Front i tyl v voine budushchego " (The Front and the Rear in Future War) in *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*, op. cit. pp. 161–70.

[9] M. Frunze, " Edinaya voennaya doktrina i Krasnaya Armiya " (Homogeneous Military Doctrine and the Red Army) in *Izbrannye proizvediniya*, op. cit. pp. 32–33.

[10] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would no longer be confined to strictly military operations but would combine the efforts of the national economy, the people and the armed forces; thus ". . . an operative plan must be completed on how to deploy the economy in time of war, as we prepare such a plan for the military itself . . ."[11] Frunze strongly recommended that since the state was sole owner of all enterprises, military suppliers directly participate in all industrial planning and production, in order to ensure not only the immediate needs of the army but also adequate state reserves. Consequently, the military-supply apparatus would have to be originally integrated into the whole industrial-research-technical-administrative structure of the country, from top to bottom.[12]

MOST of the Soviet military theoreticians and top commanders of the early 1920s shared Frunze's ideas, and in their writings are to be found the roots of current Soviet war-economic thinking, despite the many years that have elapsed and the many economic changes that have taken place.[13] An American expert noted, " Those who restated the concept of military doctrine in the 1960s paid close attention to Frunze's work written almost four decades previously."[14] Most of the important books and articles of the 1920s and '30s illustrate this.

One can begin with the writing of Yoakhim I. Vatsetis because Soviet views in the 1970s and '80s " are in many respects remarkably similar to those presented by Vatsetis . . ."[15] During the First World War, General Vatsetis served in high-command positions in the Tsarist Army. In 1918, after the revolution, he held the post of Supreme Commander (Glavkom), and from 1921 he was a lecturer in the Military Academy, which was at that time the centre of Soviet military-strategic thought. Vatsetis derived major lessons from the experience of the First World War in his theoretical study " On Military Doctrine of the Future."[16] One of his most important conclusions was that in a future war, ". . . the economy will become a central focus of strategy and of the definition of a state's readiness for war . . .," and ". . . military doctrine must deal extremely seriously with economic issues." He was aware that the underdeveloped Soviet economy might work to the country's detriment. He feared that more industrialized enemies would be able to exploit the advantages of their own industry and force the USSR to wage a long-term war, for which it was unprepared. To cover this vulnerability in the economy and avert its exploitation as a decisive, strategic factor in war, Vatsetis

[11] Frunze, op. cit. p. 167.

[12] Frunze, op. cit. pp. 168–69. According to a Soviet writer the creation of the State Defence Committee in 1941 was the realization of Frunze's idea. See: *1941–1945: Vsemirno-istoricheskaya pobeda Sovetskogo naroda* (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1971), p. 69.

[13] *SVE*, Vol. 8, (Moscow, 1980), pp. 342–44.

[14] Scott and Scott, *The Soviet Art of War*, op. cit. p. 27.

[15] Scott and Scott, op. cit. p. 32.

[16] Yoakhim Vatsetis, " O voennoi doktrine budushchego," in *Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh (1917–1940)* (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1965), pp. 178–89. See also: " Pervyi opyt kharakteristiki Y. I. Vatsetisa." in *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, 1972, No. 2, pp. 72–83; Scott and Scott, op. cit. pp. 32–34.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suggested that the USSR prepare to wage an offensive *Blitzkreig*-like war.[17] His arguments were adopted in official pre-war Soviet military doctrine, so that by June 1941 the Red Army and the entire country were prepared primarily for an offensive war. This, in turn, reinforced the Soviet preference of allocating heavy and military industry. While it is true that a large industrial centre was built in the Kuznets-Ural Basin, military industry was mostly developed in the European part of the USSR. The Soviet military commanders acknowledged that these plants could be attacked by aircraft but never admitted to themselves that an invading army could occupy these areas. As a result, the evacuation plan of 1941 was a last-minute improvization instead of a far-sighted and well-prepared programme.[18]

Of great importance in the 1930s and particularly after the Second World War was Vatsetis' insistence that ". . . a future war could hardly be prepared for solely by military scientists or military strategists, that is, by specialists in military affairs. Strategists must also be political scientists. They must penetrate deeply into the internal life of the state and determine the economic strength of their country and all other countries; and, using the strategic and economic foundation of the country, they must determine all the contingencies that the state could face in a future war . . ."[19]

ANOTHER original architect of the current Soviet war-economic theory was the leading military figure Boris Shaposhnikov.[20] A close student of Clausewitz and Chief of Staff of the Red Army for many years, he was one of the originators of modern Soviet military thinking and a founder of the Soviet war-economic doctrine. In his multi-volume study, *The Brain of the Military*, Shaposhnikov devoted a special chapter to " The Economy of War," emphasizing the military importance of the topic.[21] Like Vatsetis, he called for a very detailed war-economic programme integrated with military strategy. The government and the highest military bodies, he said, should carefully assess the economic potential of the USSR and compare it with that of Soviet adversaries, and on this basis formulate long-term economic plans. Shaposhnikov under-

[17] Vatsetis, " O voennoi doktrine . . .," op. cit. pp. 179–80.

[18] In June 1941 factories responsible for only 12 per cent of all military-industrial production were located on the East side of the Volga river. See: Marshal M. B. Zakharov, " Stranitsy istorii Sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil nakanune Otechestvennoi Voiny 1939–1941 " (Pages in the History of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War 1939–1941), in *Voprosy Istorii*, 1970, No. 5, p. 34; See also: M. G. Pervukhin, " Perebazirovanie promyshlennosti " (The Translocation of Industry), in: *Sovetskii Tyl v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine* (The Soviet Rear in the Great Patriotic War), Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1974), pp. 10–30; A. A. Epishev (ed.), *Partiya i Armiya*, (The Party and the Military), Moscow, 1977, pp. 195–99; *Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941–1945* (The History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945). Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1961), pp. 142 ff.

[19] Translated by Scott and Scott, op. cit. p. 33.

[20] Erickson, *The Soviet* . . . op. cit. pp. 292 ff., 842–43. Marshal A. Vasilevsky, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, op. cit. pp. 32–33, *SVE*, Col. 8, p. 491; Scott and Scott, op. cit. pp. 46–50; B. M. Shaposhnikov, *Vospominaniya. Voenno-nauchnye trudy* (Memoirs. Military-Scientific Works), Moscow, 1974. See particularly the " Introduction " of Marshals A. M. Vasilevsky and M. Zakharov, pp. 3–31.

[21] Boris Shaposhnikov, *Mozg Armii* (The Brain of the Military), Vols. 1–3, Moscow, 1927–29. Quoted after *Vospominaniya* . . . op. cit. pp. pp. 447–69.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stood perfectly that military might is not an end in itself. An excessive expansion of the military sector of industry, can, in the long run, compromise the economic power of the nation and thereby severely damage the country's actual military power. He noted that

> . . . If a war is lost because a nation's economic might has been overstrained, then such a loss could occur even before the start of a war, when the burden of a high military budget could threaten the solvency of the nation and does not follow the pace of the state's economic development . . .[22]

In order to prevent the economic demands and the mobilization plans of the military commanders from creating this dangerous imbalance in the national economy, Shaposhnikov suggested that a special organized body of well-educated experts be appointed to engage exclusively in military-economic planning. The group should function effectively and independently of the demands of the military elite, and thus should be responsible only to the highest government decision-makers and operate with full power. Like Svechin, he advocated ". . . linking the General Staff with the main policy-making centres so as to influence state policy."[23] Examining General Svechin's thesis, at that time very intensely discussed, that the future war should be waged according to the strategy of attrition (see below), Shaposhnikov suggested that a war of destruction should not be ruled out, and that even in a war of this kind the economy of the country remains a decisive factor. Shaposhnikov was particularly impressed by the experience of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the First World War. He often quoted the writings of Konrad von Hotzendorf and cited his failure and that of the so-called "Hindenburg Programme " to evaluate correctly the mobilization capacities of all industry, concentrating instead solely on the military industry. In addition, he maintained that production of military hardware must correspond exactly to the needs of the strategic plans. The time when a war could be waged without using the mobilization capacities of the civilian industry had passed; all industry must be mobilized for the war effort from the moment hostilities began. Therefore

> . . . the mobilization of industry must be prepared scrupulously and must be closely related to the needs of war, that is, it must provide the army with what it needs and in amounts which it might use . . . " Overproduction " of " war materials " should not be allowed . . . Mobilization of civilian industry and preparation for war are in our time so unavoidable and important that every state functionary and responsible military executive must have a good understanding of the basic principles and even details of mobilization . . . In addition, the mobilization of the entire economy of the country must be accomplished . . . The preparation for and the conduct of the war is now the business of a " collective," the work of the government which acts

[22] Shaposhnikov, *Vospominaniya* . . ., op. cit. p. 464.
[23] Erickson, *The Soviet* . . ., op. cit. p. 293.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> either by itself or through a specially created agency . . . a " Defence Council," which must operate from the first days of war . . .[24]

When the war against Germany started, a State Defence Committee was organized in the USSR, armed with all the responsibilities recommended by Shaposhnikov. Moreover, in June 1941 Shaposhnikov was made the main military adviser of the Stavka (the Highest Military Command), in July of that year he was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, and from May 1942 he served as Deputy Minister of Defence.

THE development of the post-revolutionary Soviet war-economic doctrine cannot be presented without examining the views of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. During the 1920s and '30s he held high positions of command in the Red Army. His multifarious writings on military affairs influenced the entire Soviet defence policy. Even Stalin, in principle hostile to and suspicious of Tukhachevsky, was forced in the early '30s to apologize to him and to accept Tukhachevsky's previously neglected suggestions concerning the organization of the Red Army.[25]

A close friend of Frunze, twice appointed Deputy Minister of Defence, and for many years responsible for armament planning and supply, Tukhachevsky discussed war-economic issues only incidentally in the broader context of the military strategy and philosophy of war. In 1926 he published an essay, " Problems of Modern Strategy," in which he devoted two paragraphs to war-economic affairs.[26] While in many respects Tukhachevsky simply repeated Frunze's views, he also made some original suggestions about the Soviet war economy. He advocated the establishment of an autarkic economy in the USSR as a way of strengthening the country's defence capacities, which would be developed inside a centralized and state-owned industry. He shared the views of most military writers that the entire economy must be militarized and able to be mobilized the very day a war starts, but the basic industry should not be victimized for the needs of war. He wrote:

> . . . We should militarize the whole country, the entire economy in such a way that, on one hand, we will be able to supply as many resources as possible in order to wage war, but that, on the other hand, the mobilization will not destroy the backbone of the national economy . . . Our centralized economy allows preparation of the mobilization in a planned way, to squeeze out a higher percentage of military production, and . . . to resolve our main economic problems by focusing our activity precisely so that the war would not cause detriment to our economy . . . We must learn how to manoeuvre our resources exactly as we know how to manoeuvre our army . . .[27]

[24] Shaposhnikov, *Vospominaniya* . . ., pp. 452–54.
[25] See the " Introduction " of Marshal S. Biryuzov to: M. N. Tukhachevsky, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works) (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 12–13.
[26] " Voprosy sovremennoi strategiy," in Tukhachevsky, *Izbrannye* . . ., op. cit. pp. 258–60.
[27] Ibid. Vol. 1, pp. 244–61.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1928 he wrote the entry " War as a Problem of Armed Struggle " in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*[28] in which he " sketched out the entire outline of the requirements of a modern military-political and military-industrial system."[29]

Eight years later, at the 17th Party Congress, when the process of industrialization of the USSR had sufficiently advanced, Marshal Tukhachevsky began dealing with another aspect of the economic mobilization policy, viz. the urgent need to develop civilian industry as a buffer to the military-industrial sector. He also emphasized that a higher mobilization potential of industry could be achieved not only by additional investments, but through improved cooperation among the factories and higher efficiency in their operation. Having served for many years as Chief of Ordnance responsible for the development of armaments, Tukhachevsky had the unique opportunity of encountering the bureaucratic impediments to increased production and efficiency at the factory level, and he was bitterly outspoken on this matter.[30] His extensive experience in the Soviet bureaucracy influenced his theoretical thinking. Tukhachevsky understood the importance of separately analysing and improving all stages of the flow of resources for military purposes: their allocation; their mobilization; their use as production factors and end products (weapons, military equipment, etc.). To arrive at his conclusions, Tukhachevsky needed many years of experience. It is worth noting that in the mid-1930s Tukhachevsky ordered a long forced march for artillery units (from Leningrad to Pskov). During the march most of the mechanized equipment and guns themselves broke into pieces. It became clear to everyone that the equipment was made from low-quality metal. Tukhachevsky personally visited many artillery factories to find the reason for what happened, and discovered that the managers, pressured to fulfil the production plan, were forced to accelerate the manufacturing process, even by violating basic technological procedures.[31] He learned from this the full extent of potential for failure in a centralized economy.

It was, therefore, the completely new industrial " socialist " environment emerging in the '30s that changed Tukhachevsky's views on the planning and implementation of arms production, and subsequently affected many aspects of his military concepts. In the 1920s Tukhachevsky was an extreme critic of Svechin's writing; his criticisms were not strictly loyal.[32] Svechin's views were adopted, albeit with reforms, by the drafters of the main line of the Soviet military strategy; the issue was whether to adopt the concept of the " strategy of attrition " (*strategiya izmora*). In his critique, written in 1930, Tukhachevsky was still

[28] " Voina kak problema vooruzhennoi borby," in *Izbrannye* . . ., Vol. 2, op. cit. pp. 2–20.

[29] Erickson, *The Soviet* . . ., op. cit. p. 295.

[30] Lev Nikulin, *Tukhachevsky, Biograficheskii ocherk* (Tukhachevsky, a Biographical Outline) (Moscow, 1964), pp. 170 ff.

[31] Lidiya Nord, *Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky*, (LEV, Paris, 1978), p. 123.

[32] Tukhachevsky accused Svechin of underestimating the political aims of revolutionary wars. See: Tukhachevsky, *Izbrannye* . . ., op. cit. pp. 133–35.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

convinced that the USSR was able to exploit the revolutionary movements of Central and Western Europe to wage a " war of liberation " based primarily on the " strategy of a quick crushing " of the potential enemy. This strategy embodied the injunction not to be too dependent on an economy which proved to be such a detrimental military factor in the First World War. The " strategy of crushing " was supported by a quasi-confidence that any Soviet military offensive would create sympathetic revolutions and political shake-ups in the adversary capitalist states, in turn diminishing the liability of the economic weakness of the young Soviet state. Some echoes of this politico-strategic approach can be found in current Soviet policy towards the Third World.

ALEXANDER Svechin was one of the most prominent Soviet military writers. Controversial but highly original, Svechin has become one of the most influential theorists in the history of modern Soviet military thought. Like Shaposhnikov, he had served for many years in the Tsarist Army and joined the Bolsheviks after 1917.[33] In 1918 he was Chief of Staff of the Red Army, and between 1918–21 was Chairman of the Military–Historical Commission, with the task of analysing and extracting lessons from the experiences of the First World War and the Civil War. The most criticized of his many publications was *Strategy*.[34] Svechin presented his thesis at length—be prepared first of all for a long-term " war of attrition " (*voina na izmor*)—and discussed all its consequences for the national economy, industry, material reserves, etc. His more narrow focus on the military industry as top priority contradicted the ambitious, comprehensive industrialization plans of the Soviet leaders. The main issue was not Svechin's scepticism about the real sense of an offensive " crushing " strategy based on the expectation of sympathetic revolutionary wars within the borders of the Soviet enemy; more troublesome was his demand for a clear programme of permanent military-economic mobilization of resources to reinforce the military rear. In the 1920s most of the available resources were necessary first to build a strong and modern industrial base. Svechin argued,

> . . . The end-results of a full military and economic mobilization become part of the strategy of attrition and are alien to the spirit of a strategy of destruction. Attrition is guided by more distant goals than preparation for the next large operation . . . A strategy of destruction ends with the attainment of the final military goal. But in attrition, a situation is sometimes created where the attacking side attains its designed military goal *but war continues* because a decision has *not yet been attained on the political and economic fronts* . . . Defensive actions usually entail certain losses. They strive to put off a decision until the very last moment. Consequently, it is necessary to have the capability to lose territory and it is necessary *that time work in our favour* . . . a decisive government and strong internal stability are

[33] Ageev, *Voennyi teoretik*, op. cit. pp. 126–28; Scott and Scott, op. cit. pp. 35–43.

[34] Alexander Svechin, *Strategiya*, Moscow, 1923, 2nd ed., Moscow 1927 and partly printed in A. B. Kadishev (ed.), *Vosprosy Strategiy i operativnego iskusstva*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> needed in order to endure material losses resulting from enemy offensives and to *force time to work in our favour* . . . Hence it is clearly important to make a timely estimate of the limit beyond which the offensive becomes adventurist and results in the preparation of a counterblow by the enemy.[35] (Emphasis added)

The war against Germany in 1941–45 showed how correct Svechin was. No one should wonder that in the light of the experience of the Second World War, ". . . in the sixties Soviet military theorists have shown great interest in this [Svechin's] work. Many of its basic concepts are applicable today . . ."[36]

Svechin was correct not only in his evaluation of the consequences of the strategy of attrition; like his adversaries in the polemic, he also suggested that the military should exploit the socio-political and economic structure which was built by the Soviet state and naturally suited to a central command system. He argued that a special department inside the General Staff should be organized to handle the multifarious war-economic problems. This department would necessarily be armed with the highest authority to make any decisions about the economy of the country that were important for defence. In many respects, Svechin's concept aimed at limiting the decision-making power of the highest Party bureaucracy. It is no wonder, then, that he became one of the first victims of Stalin's terror.[37]

We cannot close our list of original war-economic theorists without mentioning General Pavel Lebedev. In 1918 he held the office of Head of the Organization-Mobilization Directorate of the All-Russian Supreme Staff. Between 1919–24 he was Chief of Staff of the Red Army. His knowledge and views are represented in his book *The Defence of the State*, published in 1924.[38] General Lebedev suggested that the operating Council of Labour and Defence should organize a special war-economic directorate, responsible for preparing and coordinating all economic activities of the country in accordance with the needs of future war. In addition, he also held that a research and advisory body should be established (a National Mobilization Committee), composed of representatives of Gosplan and the most important political decision-makers. On all lower economic-administrative levels a network of similar committees should also be organized. It is worth noting that most of General Lebedev's suggestions regarding mobilization policy and the war-economic mobilization apparatus were adopted before the Second World War and remain in effect in the USSR today.

AS mentioned above the starting point for the Soviet war-economic debate was Frunze's article on *Homogenous Military Doctrine*

[35] Kadishev, *Voprosy strategiy*, op. cit. pp. 218–63.

[36] Scott and Scott, op. cit. p. 35.

[37] Svechin was arrested for the first time in 1930; then during his second arrest, together with Tukhachevsky, in 1937, he was killed in prison.

[38] Pavel Lebedev, *Gosudarstvennaya oborona* (The Defence of the State). Moscow, 1924; *SVE*, Vol. 4, p. 580.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

published in 1921.[39] While all participants in the polemic were in agreement with Frunze's war-economic plans and with the absolute necessity to prepare the country for war, they disagreed on when and how to go about it. The various solutions offered depended largely on which military strategy they represented. There was a sharp divergence in the understanding of the economic mobilization itself.[40] Some theoreticians believed that the purpose of economic mobilization was only to accumulate large reserves of the materials needed for war; others understood it to mean a total conversion and subordination of the national economy to wartime needs, reserves supporting only the first stage of war and representing a small part of the required programme. The latter group prevailed. After this the most controversial issue centred on deciding the exact moment for beginning the mobilization and conversion of the economy for war. The prevailing view was that mobilization should be fixed permanently in the economic policy of the state; it advocated gradually adapting the whole economy to the needs of war. This involved changing the structure of existing means of production in order to provide goods of a military nature as well as regular civilian products. This concept introduced a brand-new set of problems.

It was commonly accepted that an increased accumulation of strategic reserves constituted *the first stage* of war-economic mobilization. *The second stage*, if international political tension became serious, was to speed up production of specialized military-industrial factories. *The third stage*, planned to start after the outbreak of hostilities, involved the conversion of most civilian factories to the production of military goods. This idea of three-stage economic mobilization was modified in the 1930s, when the concept of a kind of permanent state-of-war readiness of industry was introduced. As a result, a large assortment of civilian goods was adapted to military purposes, while almost all new factories and enterprises were equipped with additional machines and installations to facilitate immediate conversion to mass-production of military goods, should the need arise. The obvious advantage of this new practice was that it greatly enhanced the potential of economic mobilization for war, neglecting as a matter of principle the price which would have to be paid.

Disregarding the cost of mobilization in order to speed up the process has been an integral part of Soviet war-economic policy. It is important to note that this lack of concern with the issue of cost became official doctrine only in the 1930s, accompanied by the prohibition against publicly discussing the consequences of the increasing military outlays

[39] Frunze, " Edinaya voennaya doktrina . . .," op. cit. (fn. 9).

[40] From the large number of articles written in the 1920s and '30s in the USSR in which the problem of economic mobilization was discussed, let me mention: A. Volpe, *Sovremennaya voina i rol' ekonomicheskoi podgotovki* (Modern War and the Role of Economic Preparedness), Moscow, 1926; S. Ventsov, *Narodnoe khozyaistvo*, op. cit. P. Karatygin, *Obshchye osnovy mobilizatsii promyshlennosti dlya nuzhd voiny* (The General Principles of Mobilization of Industry for the Needs of War), Moscow, 1925: S. Pugachev, *Osnovy podgotvki strany k oboronie* (The Principles of Preparation of the Country for Defence), Moscow, 1926; G. Shygalin, *Podgotovka promyshlennosti k voine* (The Preparation of Industry for War), Moscow, 1928; S. M. Vishnev, " Problemy perevooruzheniya innostrannykh armii " (The Problems of Rearming other Armies), in *Voina i revolyutsiya*, 1932, Vol. 4, pp. 68–78.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and of developing a huge military industry. Real costs are still officially hidden today.

The taboo surrounding Soviet war-economic issues was so complete that even the government could not truly estimate the costs of its military-industrial programmes—there was simply no basis for calculation. All theoreticians who had formerly debated the issue were either killed or removed from positions of influence. The military academies were purged and new personnel installed. The most important among new theoreticians was Elizaveta Khmelnitskaya.[41] To justify the policy of intensive militarization of the economy, she argued in her lectures against Bukharin's idea that large-scale arms production has the same negative impact on a socialist economy as on a capitalist one. Moreover, she claimed, the issue of cost in economic mobilization was not crucial because profits and capitalist enterprises do not exist in the USSR. She thus suggested that the USSR could indulge the entire economy in military expenditures without concern. Any price would be paid for defence and for the extensive military production and mobilization programme.[42]

This new approach contradicted the view of many leading commanders that concentration of resources and manpower for purely military tasks is not a guarantee of strength. And there were other crucial problems. These involved the reconciliation of the conflict between a very rapid technological modernization of the armament and other military industries on the one hand, and the need to supply mass armies with already-existing models of armaments on the other. The problem was to decide which kinds and models of weapons could be produced on a mass scale without becoming obsolete by the time war broke out. It was assumed that the army would have to fight against an enemy equipped with the most sophisticated modern weapons. Not only the mass-produced weaponry, but also the very industries which manufactured the weapons could become outmoded by the time of the next conflict. The logistics system, personnel training and various other aspects of the military's readiness to wage war, were also in danger of being out of date. The problem was not made easier by the fact that the Soviet Union at this time was concentrating its efforts on increasing industrial potential in general, which hampered the regular production of new models of armaments. Furthermore, without the ability to predict when the next war would break out, Soviet military experts had to struggle with the question of timing in the supply to the military of the most modern weapons. Solutions would have been much easier if the country had been planning an aggressive war. But the Soviet Union was at that time in a defensive posture vis-à-vis the Third Reich, and the problem was, therefore, much

[41] Waclaw Stankiewicz, *Socjalistyczna mysl wojenno-ekonomiczna* (Socialist Military-Economic Thought) (Ministry of Defence Publishing House, Warsaw, 1972), p. 221 and pp. 228–31.

[42] E. L. Khmelnitskaya, " SSSR v borbe za ekonomicheskuyu nezavisimost," *Bolshevik*, 1932, No. 13, pp. 34–37. It is worthwhile to note that only in recent years have some articles been published in the USSR in which the importance of a more careful cost-accounting and cost analysis of armament production are emphasized.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more complicated. In this light, the opinions of some experts of that time become comprehensible. They argued that the newest models of weaponry, even of the highest quality, could not have the desired effect if they were used in war for the first time on a small scale, which might even prove counter-productive: revealing one's hand prematurely to the enemy runs the risk of undermining the morale of one's own army if the small numbers of new weapons accomplish nothing. The proposed solution was to continue the massive production of military equipment while simultaneously improving and modernizing arms which were to be designed in such a way that their models could be continually upgraded.[43] This reduced the possibility of supplying outmoded equipment to the industry; but it also made the whole system of arms production and military-industrial R & D more conservative, and this had far-reaching consequences, as we shall discuss later, on the eve of the Second World War.

MUCH attention was paid to war-economic teaching programmes in the military schools and academies. Significantly many more articles, books and instruction materials on these subjects were published in the 1920s than in the '30s. In 1920–21, a course of study on military economy was organized in the Military-Engineering Academy.[44] A similar course was introduced at the same time in the Naval Academy.[45] A War-Economic Faculty was established in 1924 in the highly exclusive Military Academy. Graduates from that faculty were sent in 1926–27 to various civilian ministries with the purpose of integrating civilian and military activities more closely.[46] In 1931 a Military-Economic Faculty was organized in the Frunze Military Academy. Most of the graduates of the two-year programme were sent to head the military departments set up in all civilian ministries and in the Gosplans of all Soviet republics.[47] This period marked, therefore, not only a turning point in the development of Soviet war-economic theory but also the beginning of the permanent institutional ties which unite the civilian and military economic administrations in the USSR.

[43] Karatygin, " Obshchye osnovy . . .," op. cit. pp. 15–24; Vishnev, " Problemy perevooruzheniya . . .." op. cit.; I. A. Korotkov, *Istoriya Sovetskoi voennoi mysli* (The History of Soviet Military Thought), Moscow, 1980, pp. 190–91.

[44] The head of the war-economic faculty, N. S. Danilov, published two interesting works in that area: *Vliyanie velikoi mirovoi voiny na ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii* (The Influence of the Great World War on the Economic Situation of Russia), Petrograd, 1922; *Ekonomika i podgotovka k voine. Ocherki po istorii podgotovki k voine* (The Economy and the Preparation for War. Essays about the History of Preparation for War), Moscow-Leningrad, 1926.

[45] Evgeni J. Svyatlovskii, *Ekonomika voiny* (The Economy of War), Moscow, 1926. This was a re-edited version of lectures published first in 1924 by the Naval Academy in Leningrad.

[46] Frunze, op. cit. p. 214; *50 let voennoi akademii im. M. V. Frunze* (50 years of the Frunze Military Academy) (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968), p. 114; I. A. Korotkov, *Istoriya Sovetskoi voennoi mysli* (The History of Soviet Military Thought) (Nauka, Moscow, 1980), pp. 187–88. However, in the mid-'30s the war-economic chair was divided between the rear service chair and political education. See: *Voennaya Akademiya imeni M. V. Frunze* (The Frunze Military Academy) (Moscow, 1980), pp. 96 and 102.

[47] Korotkov, *Istoriya* . . ., op. cit. pp. 187–88. P. Kalinovskii, " Iz istorii voenno-ekonomicheskoi raboty shtaba RKKA " (From the History of the Military-Economic Activity of the Staff of the Red Army). *Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, 1972, no. 5, pp. 66–67.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A REVIEW of the war-economic publications of the 1920s and '30s reveals that most military commanders, politicians and economists believed that a future war would be fought on a gigantic scale involving the country's entire strength and flexibility. This meant that certain military, economic and administrative measures had to be initiated long before the outbreak of war and on an unprecedented scale so that the strengths of the whole country could be harnessed the moment war began. The success of this vast war preparation was understood to be dependent primarily on the development of the economic potential of the country.

Soviet historians discern two stages in the development of the military-industrial potential of the country. During the first, from 1926 to 1932, efforts were concentrated on expanding basic industry. In the second stage, between 1933 and 1940, the national economy was completely reconstructed and industry, particularly its military sector, was enlarged and modernized.[48] In light of the huge economic resources required for such an ambitious programme, the army was in the first stage reorganized in order to reduce military expenditure and allow more money for industrialization. Strengthening the economy as a precondition to increasing military power became a permanent principle of Soviet defence strategy.

Military industry was planned and developed in accordance with the view

> . . . that in a future war it might become necessary to fight on two fronts [European and Far Eastern—*MC*] and that a war should be waged until the complete defeat of the aggressor . . . Along with increasing military economic potential, attention was to be concentrated on creating sufficiently large military production, to make preparations for the wartime reorganization of the national economy and for increasing its stability . . .[49]

The 15th Party Congress (December 1927) accepted the directives for the First Five-Year Plan (1929–33) requiring

> . . . maximum attention to the very rapid development of those economic sectors and industrial branches in particular which have been assigned the main role in ensuring the defence of the nation and the stability of the economy in time of war . . .[50]

The 16th Party Congress (June-July 1930) emphasized even more strongly the military aspects of the plan, and the directives of these two Party Congresses incorporated the main principles of the war-economic doctrine described above. The structure and pace of the industrial build-up were fully coordinated with military strategy. Due to the

[48] *KPSS—organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo otechestva* (CPSU—The Organizer of the Defence of the Socialist Fatherland), Moscow, 1977, pp. 152–55.

[49] A. I. Pozharov, *Ekonomicheskie osnovy oboronnogo mogushchestva sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva* (The Economic Base of the Defence Might of a Socialist State), Moscow, 1981, p. 44.

[50] *KPSS v rezolyutsiakh i resheniakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts.K* (CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congress and Plenary Sessions of the CC), Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1970), p. 507.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political isolation of the USSR, strong emphasis was given to military industry and the goal of economic autarchy. This in turn increased the quantity of overall state reserves, and subsequently depressed the already low living standard of the population.

The autarchy policy could not ignore the agricultural sector. It was also for *war-economic reasons* that Stalin so rapidly and ruthlessly imposed the policy of collectivization; the Marxist doctrinal aspects were in fact of secondary importance. The war-economic literature of the mid-1920s supported the view that only a collective and state-controlled agriculture is able, in time of war, to ensure full state control over the disposal of farm produce.[51] The myth that small farms were responsible for the hunger in Russia during the First World War motivated the dismantling of Soviet agriculture in the '30s. As a result, during the Second World War hunger in the Soviet Union was much worse than in 1916–17; and only the totalitarian system stifled the protests of the tens of thousands who were to die because of lack of food and clothing.[52]

The war-economic doctrine also influenced other elements of Soviet economic policy, viz. the transportation system, the allocation of manpower, the education programme, and the organization and development of health services.

STARTING in the 1920s the General Staff of the Red Army put out a classified quarterly journal with the specific purpose of examining military-economic and mobilization problems. Publication was interrupted by Stalin in the 1930s, but resumed probably by the end of the 1950s.[53]

As noted above, the war-economic doctrine also dictated the entire structure of state administration. This began immediately after the Civil War.[54] During the 1920s, when the country had still not recovered from the destruction of the Civil War, the Soviet state began to organize its military-economic apparatus. At this time, a special department headed by S. I. Ventsov (replaced in 1925 by N. A. Efimov) was created as part of

[51] Already in the mid-'20s two war-economic experts—Karpushin and Ventsov—emphasized the importance of collectivization of agriculture, and its absolute necessity in preparation for a future war. See: A. Karpushin-Zorin, " Podgotovka selskogo khozyaistva k obespecheniyu armii i naseleniya vo vremya voiny " (The Preparation of Agriculture to Supply the Military and the Population in Time of War), in *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, 1925, No. 7–8, pp. 114–21, and the same author, "Mirovaya voina i prodovolstvennyi vopros " (The World War and the Feeding Problem), in *Voina i Revolyutsiya*, 1926, No. 8, pp. 80–92; the necessity of collectivization of agriculture was also supported by S. Ventsov, the author of one of the most complex analyses of the Soviet war-economy. S. Ventsov, *Narodnoe khozyaistvo i oborona SSSR* (The National Economy and the Defence of the USSR), Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, pp. 66 ff.

[52] Michael Checinski, " Agriculture and Nutrition in the USSR 1940–45," *Radio Liberty Research Supplement*, 18 April 1975.

[53] Kalinovskii, *Iz istorii*, op. cit. p. 68. It is interesting to note that the Editorial Board of this journal included officials of Gosplan, various ministries and members of the staff of the Red Army. The Secretary of the Editorial Board was A. L. Karpushin, an expert from the General Staff of the Red Army. In addition to this classified journal, an official newspaper, " *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* " was published by the Council of Labour and Defence (STO), *SVE*, Vol. 7, p. 410.

[54] *KPSS-organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* (CPSU—The Organizer of the Defence of the Socialist Society) (Moscow, 1977). pp. 147–54.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the staff of the Red Army. The name of this department and its successors has never been made public, but it is known to have been assigned the following tasks:[55]

1. to control all sectors of the economy, giving special emphasis to industry, with the overall objective of preparing the country for war;
2. to monitor the mobilization plans for the economy and ensure their proper execution;
3. to draw up the plans needed by the government as a basis for decision-making in time of mobilization;
4. to coordinate the activities of the most important departments of the Red Army Staff, assessing their needs for armaments and equipment (*plan zakaz*) to be presented to Gosplan;
5. to work in cooperation with other departments of the Red Army in preparing the transport system for wartime;
6. to prepare the deployment of medical and other related services to the military during time of war.

This department cooperated with the civilian administration, fulfilling the tasks described above, and collaborated very closely with Gosplan in drawing up the first One-Year and Five-Year Plans. The material needs of the army were incorporated into the Plans in such a way that purely military needs could not be easily distinguished from civilian ones. The mobilization planning of this department involved the Party apparatus and the Gosplans of the various Soviet republics as well as the planning authorities of the Obkoms and Raikoms. A special plan for adapting civilian industries to military needs was put into practice, and mobilization in various areas of the economy, industry in particular, was treated as an integral part of the whole economic process. The military department of Gosplan collaborated with its counterparts in the various ministries in drawing up the following components of the mobilization plan prior to the Second World War:[56]

1. to stockpile large reserves of strategic raw materials and semi-manufactured goods;
2. to create and develop new, large industrial centres in the Kuznets-Ural Basin;
3. to prepare the resources and means for a mass evacuation of the population and industry if a war should turn unfavourable for the USSR;[57]
4. to prepare a significant portion of the non-military industry to shift on short notice from civilian to military production.

Despite such detailed plans and the large bureaucratic apparatus in the

[55] Kalinovskii, *Iz istorii* . . ., op cit.

[56] G. S. Kravchenko, *Ekonomika SSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny* (The Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War), Moscow, 1970, pp. 66–67. Of course, the highest level decision-making body was at this time (until 1937) the Council of Labour and Defence (STO).

[57] The evacuation plans did not include the areas of Kiev and Kharkov. On the contrary, between 1939–40, additional armament factories were constructed in these cities. *KPSS-organizator* . . ., op. cit. p. 186.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military and industry, the active involvement of the *apparatchiki* was unavoidable if the system was to work and be made more efficient. To improve the adaptability of industry and transportation—the sectors most crucial to a war effort—a special decision of the Party Politburo created " industrial departments " inside local, regional and republican Party committees. These departments resolved conflicting social and economic interests and overcame the impediment caused by the sluggish decision-making system on the factory and local levels.[58] Thus, a war-economic and mobilization system, integrated with the civilian administration and subordinated to the Party apparatus, was created and developed.

TO handle conflicts at the highest decision-making levels, two special bodies were organized. On 27 April 1937, the Committee for Defence (*Komitet Oborony*) was set up and on 31 January 1938, a special sub-committee—the Defence-Industrial Commission—was established to replace the Commission for Mobilization of Industry, whose competence had been limited to the defence-industrial sector alone. The newly organized commission received a much broader mandate than its predecessor: ". . . to mobilize and prepare both the defence industry and the non-military industry for the full execution of the supply plans [for the Red Army] and the tasks ordered by the Committee for Defence . . ."[59] With a few modifications, the framework of this system has survived to the present day.

But even such powerful and high-level bodies were unable to shake the conservatism of the industrial ministries. This failure may, to a great degree, explain why before 22 June 1941, only two traditional kinds of weapons produced in the USSR—artillery and machine guns—were suitable for modern warfare.[60] The problem was not why other types of weaponry were outdated, but for what reason they continued to be produced on a mass scale. The fact that the military commanders accepted a continuing mass supply of useless tanks and aeroplanes can be explained only by the ruling Soviet planning system supported by the war-economic doctrine, which preferred huge armies supplied with great quantities of armaments, outmoded or not. This doctrine not only hindered the modernization of weaponry, but also kept an outmoded military industry in full operation. As a result, economic and military losses for the Soviet state in the first stage of the war were extremely heavy, as some statistical data illustrate. During the three years immediately before the war, the machine-building industry increased its production by about 13 per cent per year, while the military industry

[58] *KPSS—organizator* . . ., op. cit. p. 189.

[59] *KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza* (CPSU About the Soviet Armed Forces), Moscow, 1981, pp. 268–69.

[60] Marshal M. V. Zakharov, " Stranitsy istorii sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny; 1939–1941 " (Pages in the History of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War; 1939–1941), in *Voprosy Istorii*, 1970, No. 5, pp. 33–34: the issue is sketched briefly by Erickson, *The Soviet* . . ., op. cit. pp. 406–411 and 567.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advanced by 39 per cent. But still only some of the end products of the armament industry were modern. From 1930 until 1938, production of the most important weapons increased as follows: artillery (guns) from 1,911 to 12,686; military aircraft from 860 to 5,469; tanks from 740 to 2,270.[61] Only in 1939, when the war in Europe began, did the Soviet military commanders understand that their tanks and planes were obsolete and no match for Hitler's army. Nevertheless, mass production of these ineffective weapons continued. From 1939 to mid-1940 the Red Army was supplied with an additional 17,000 tanks and 7,600 aeroplanes. Finally, in 1940, the Soviet government ordered the modernization of tanks and aeroplanes, and reconstruction of the armament industry as quickly as possible. The size of this effort can be estimated from the following data: in the First Five-Year Plan the official defence budget comprised 5·4 per cent of the state budget; in the Second Five-Year Plan it comprised 12·6 per cent. In 1939 the defence budget was doubled, and reached 25·6 per cent (34·4 billion rubles); in 1940, 32·6 per cent (56·9 billion rubles); finally in 1941, defence spending constituted 43·4 per cent (83·0 billion rubles) of the state budget. In the years 1939–41, total published defence spending amounted to 174·2 billion rubles. In addition, new investments required expenditure of 82 billion rubles; 2,000 new enterprises, mostly armament factories, were built during these two years.[62]

ALL these tremendous financial outlays were due not only to mass arms production but also to the large investments needed both for complete modernization of the aircraft, armour and complementary industries (such as machine-building, metal, electronic and chemical) and for the capital needs of the R & D institutes. These economic and administrative efforts were made possible by mounting a discriminatory and destructive policy against the civilian sectors of the economy; even less important parts of the armament industry were mobilized to produce tanks and aircraft.[63] Nevertheless, even after this unprecedented allocation of resources to the military-industrial sector—especially to the aeroplane and tank industry—it was impossible to supply the Red Army

[61] M. Checinski, T. Grabowski, J. Leszczynski, W. Stankiewicz, *Historia wojenno-gospodarcza* (War-Economic History) (Wojskova Akademia Polityczna, Wydzial Ekonomiczno-Wojskowy, Warsaw, 1967), pp. 284–85; *Istoria Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941–1945* (The History of the Great Partiotic War of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Vol. I, pp. 413–15; Ya. E. Chadaev, *Ekonomika SSSR v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (The Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War) (Moscow, 1965), pp. 61–62; G. S. Kravchenko, *Ekonomika SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (The Economy of the USSR in the Years of the Great Patriotic War) (Moscow, 1970), pp. 73–75, 82; I. A. Gladkov (ed.), *Sovetskaya ekonomika v period Otechestvennoi voiny* (The Soviet Economy in the Patriotic War) (Moscow, 1970), p. 11; *KPSS-organizator* . . ., op. cit. pp. 187–88.

[62] Kravchenko, op. cit. pp. 90–91.

[63] Zakharov, " Stranitsy istorii . . .," op. cit. p. 33. The decision to use the production capacities of the artillery factories to increase other, more important kinds of weaponry, was approved by Zhdanov, Malenkov and Molotov, under strong pressure from the Commissariat for Defence, and against the view of the more conservative Armaments Commissariat. See: P. N. Goremykin," O Proizvodstve vooruzheniya i boepripasov " (Concerning the Production of Armament and Ammunition), in *Sovetskii tyl v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine*, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1974), pp. 120–21.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with necessary modern armaments. On the eve of 22 June 1941 the frontline units received no more than 30-40 per cent of the aeroplanes and tanks they needed. Thousands of outmoded types of weapons were so ineffective against German equipment that they were ignored by Soviet analysts when comparing the balance of power between Germany and the USSR.

Modern Soviet and German Tanks and Aeroplanes on the Frontline on 22 June 1941[64]

	Tanks	*per cent*	*Aeroplanes*	*per cent*
Germany	3,712	100	4,950	100
USSR	1,475	39·7	1,540	31·1

Billion of rubles spent during the pre-war years to produce thousands of outmoded tanks and aeroplanes were in fact squandered. That this policy of mobilization proved so expensive and unproductive could not but influence Soviet armament planning today.

[64] *SVE*, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1976), p. 412; Kravchenko, op. cit. p. 100; V. Khvostov, A. Grylev, " Nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny " (On the Eve of the Great Patriotic War), in *Kommunist*, 1968, No. 12, p. 70. It is interesting to note that Kravchenko cited 1,800 tanks, while in fact only 1,475 were modern and useful. The remaining 325 heavy tanks were produced *after* it had become clear that they would not be able to fight on the German front.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Quousque tandem Catilina . . .

Vladimir Bukovsky

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I suppose I should start by praising the organizers of this conference* for convening it at such a highly appropriate moment. Ironically, no sooner had the ill-famed 1984 passed by, ringing in celebrations of George Orwell, than the Free World displayed once again a remarkable ignorance of the communist system's very essence, thus leaving us to wonder: was it ever properly understood, along with Orwell's writings?

We can hardly pretend, however, that it was totally unexpected: we have already witnessed similar outbursts of Western euphoria each time Big Brother suddenly disappears from public view after a bout of mysterious Russian cold, and instead of the usual propaganda sombre music is heard from Moscow. But each time one hopes that the previous lessons have not been entirely forgotten. And each time we are forced to admit that all our efforts to explain the difference between the totalitarian and democratic worlds, all our books, articles, speeches, piles of evidence and miles of testimonies are just swept away by the inexhaustible desire of the people to be deceived.

And so it was this time again. While a solemn procession of goose-stepping soldiers and stumbling gerontocrats was slowly moving towards Red Square, numerous commentators of Western television, radio and newspapers, breathless with excitement, were warming up to proclaim a "new era." And the closer the procession moved towards Lenin's Tomb, the more optimistic were their forecasts, a growing crescendo with every goose-step, as if the communist ideology itself, and not just one of its humble servants, was about to be buried in the Kremlin wall.

Of course, the new Big Brother was immediately described as "charismatic," brilliant, young, energetic, expert in the economy, a great reformer and a peace-lover. And who was not, from Comrade Stalin onward? Particularly charismatic was Comrade Khrushchev, who charmed everybody by demonstrating his shoe to the United Nations.

Surely, the new Big Brother must be a liberal, perhaps from the same closet as Comrade Andropov. Why? Oh, because his wife is slim and handsome, not one of the usual Kremlin milkmaids. It takes a liberal, you know, to break with such respectable tradition. And she is not just a wife, she is a philosopher, one of them guys like Spinosa and Einstein. What does she do? Oh, she teaches Marxism–Leninism to kids.

And he is very well educated too. He studied law in the '50s, Soviet law, of course. Although he does not speak English, not yet, he might

* "Beyond 1984"—the Conference on Communism and Liberal Democracy organized by the Committee for the Free World took place in London on 18-20 March 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

understand it, as a British MP has assured us. Just a bit more training, a few more trips to Britain, and he will be speaking alright. Have patience, he is still young and growing.

Suddenly, this kind of drivel has filled the newspapers, jammed the radio broadcasts and occupied all the television channels to such an extent that one cannot switch on without running the risk of being overwhelmed. I am afraid even to use my vacuum cleaner, for fear that it will start babbling about a new Soviet leader as soon as I switch it on.

Thus, we are told that Comrade Gorbachov is a great expert on the economy. To be sure, he was in charge of Soviet agriculture for a few years, but if there were any great improvements in this long-suffering branch of the Soviet economy, we have failed to notice them. The Soviet import of grain continued to grow steadily, while production of meat, eggs and milk declined even further.

We are also told that, due to his exceptional talents, Comrade Gorbachov has made the fastest career ever known in the Soviet hierarchy. Indeed, he has. What was not widely publicized, however, was that his talents had very little to do with this achievement. Or, should we say, certain other talents than those implied are responsible for his success. He simply used to be the Party boss of a district frequented by Andropov for purely medical reasons—because a famous mineral water resort is located there.

This type of career is anything but exceptional in Soviet history. Khrushchev used to be a local Party organizer in the place where Stalin's wife worked. Being young, bright and charismatic, Khrushchev did not miss this golden opportunity and always praised Stalin's policy of collectivization to Allilueva, a policy Allilueva disagreed with. Sooner or later, it became known to Stalin and Khrushchev's career was made.

In a similar way, Chernenko made it to the top, first by being a petty functionary under Brezhnev, and then, later, by being his nurse, valet and errand-boy.

BUT the greatest significance is given to Comrade Gorbachov's young age. He is not, we are informed, one of the old guard. He was only eight when the Second World War started, he was only 14 when it was over. Neither the crucible of the Revolution, nor the bloody battles of the last war could temper his will. Thus, it was solemnly proclaimed by the Western media, the new generation has come to power, pushing aside the old Bolsheviks.

One can hardly imagine a more ridiculous statement. Whatever his age at the end of the war, Comrade Gorbachov was brought up and educated in one of the worst periods of the Stalin era. He was only 21 and a second-year student at Moscow University when he joined the Communist Party. This alone indicates a more than average zeal and a desire to serve the authorities. Particularly so, if we bear in mind that this was in 1952—a year of great purges and the last political campaign of the Stalin era: the campaign against "cosmopolitans," Jews and intellectuals.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Once again, as in the late '30s, mass persecutions were dramatically increased while the Jews were being prepared for a mass deportation in the wake of the "doctors' plot." According to those who were at Moscow University at that time and knew Gorbachov personally, he was quite active in this campaign, earning himself the reputation of a faithful communist.

Subsequently, for the next 33 years he was nothing but a Party *apparatchik*. From being a district secretary of the Komsomol in 1955, right after graduating from the University, till the present day, when he became General Secretary of the Communist Party, he was steadily promoted by the very "old guardsmen" whom he has allegedly "pushed aside." They have selected him and made him what he is now.

So, why should we suddenly become enthusiastic? Indeed, he is younger than the others and might be more energetic—so much the worse for us. Why should we prefer a younger and more energetic enemy, who might have a good 20 years to deal with us? For that matter, why are we so eager to endow him with better qualities, better education, bigger talents and experience than he actually has? After all, it is not in our interest to have a gifted enemy.

This seemingly irrational behaviour has a very simple explanation: neither the Soviet system, nor the communist ideology have ever been quite understood in the West. With the exception of those who have either lived under communist rule, or have otherwise had some first-hand experience of its ideology, people in the West are probably incapable of understanding them. Irrespective of their political orientation and of the number of books they might have read on the subject, they still believe in the depth of their hearts that the difference between the two worlds is not so big, after all. Those on the Left tend to perceive the other side as a mirror image of this one. They talk about "superpowers," as if the term meant anything. No matter how many crimes of communism we disclose to them, they would always come up with an equal number on this side, whether they be real or imaginary.

Unfortunately, those on the Right are not much better. At best, they perceive the Soviet system as a peculiar Russian form of dictatorship, as something inherited from Ivan the Terrible, and therefore they do not rule out the possibility of better relations, of a constructive dialogue, or of a new "pragmatic" leader coming to power in Moscow.

The current fit of Western euphoria is particularly depressing precisely because it has affected conservatives. Official Washington is reported to be "high on hope" and has hastily proclaimed an "era of new relations" with the Soviet Union. Leaders of West European countries rushed to Moscow and lined up to shake hands with the new "pragmatic" leader, vying with each other in inviting him to visit their respective countries.

Even Margaret Thatcher has been widely quoted as saying that she can do business with the new Party boss and that neither she nor Comrade Gorbachov are going to change each other. What a nice basis for "constructive relations"! Business as usual—you will give them credits

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and technology, and they will pay you back, in hard currency . . . through economic subversion. You will build them a truck factory, and they will send the trucks to Afghanistan filled with soldiers. Don't bother to change them—they will change you anyway. This is exactly the type of economic reform Comrade Gorbachov is looking for: the West will build the Soviet economy, while they build communism in the rest of the world.

Unfortunately, this is not a joke, but a sad reality. The current mellowing of mood in Moscow is well calculated and dictated by the grim conditions of the Soviet economy. It is true that the growth of their GNP is about to cease, that over 60 per cent of their industrial equipment is obsolete, that due to barbaric exploitation of the natural resources they cannot continue to satisfy their needs in oil or energy and that due to the fabulous inflexibility of their centrally-planned economy some 30 per cent of consumer goods and services are provided by the flourishing black market. But it is also true that no real reform is possible without loosening the Party control over the country, and therefore, without a total collapse of the system. The only reform they can afford is a return to *détente* as it used to be in the '70s, that is a one-way street which will allow them to enjoy Western technology and cheap credits while preserving their system intact.

I can only hope that the West will not repeat the same mistake twice within 10 years. There is absolutely no need for the West to hurry and once again save the most vicious system ever known in history, a system which openly proclaims the destruction of liberal democracies as its ultimate goal. Its need for your help will grow dramatically with each year. So, let them pay in advance, let them return what they grabbed in the past, let them fulfil their past promises and long-forgotten obligations. Let them do it first, before you even consider any improvement in relations.

The time has come to mount the pressure, not to relax it. They know they cannot afford the multi-billion Strategic Defence Initiative programme. So, for Christ's sake, don't cancel it! Not for any promises in the world.

They know they cannot at present support the most remote parts of their empire, such as Angola and Mozambique. But they also calculate quite well that the West will do their job for them. Indeed, current American policy in that region is a disgrace. At the moment these two communist regimes continue to exist only thanks to American money and diplomatic support. Rather, Americans should support popular resistance movements in these countries, thus totting up an extra pressure on the Soviets and making irreversible changes in their empire. With each year this pressure will inevitably result in more and more changes in our world.

IT would be a tragic mistake if the West once again bailed out the Soviet economy without imposing irreversible internal changes. Scared by the spectre of nuclear holocaust, frightened by hysterical crowds demanding

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

immediate peace at any price, restrained by numerous self-imposed limitations, the West is too impatient to utilize the advantages of its situation properly. Paradoxically, our eagerness to live in peace prevents its achievement.

The current wave of conservative euphoria shows us once again how little the West has understood the nature of the Soviet regime. Contrary to popular belief the Marxist–Leninist ideology is far from dead or forgotten. It is not just an absurd relic of the '20s and '30s, but is still the ruling ideology of the whole system. Sixty years after Lenin's death, the Soviet Union remains the same ideological state serving the purposes of world revolution as he conceived it. It does not matter that no one believes in communist dogma nowadays. In their everyday life the Soviet people may perceive it as a nuisance, or as a source of numerous jokes shared equally by the people and their rulers. But at the end of the day, the Communist Party is still in firm control of every aspect of Soviet life, and communist ideology is never challenged within the Party.

The contradictions between the communist and non-communist worlds are still defined as "antagonistic" (i.e. irreconcilable), as are those between the opposing "classes of capitalist society"—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

What was once a utopia, a dream, has become a structure, an institution, and a day-to-day job for millions of people. The Soviet Union is not a state in the traditional sense of the word, but a huge and well-organized army of ideological warriors, a fortress.

What do you expect a "pragmatic," "young and energetic" Gorbachov to do? Even if we accept that he wants to change the system, he has even less chance to do so than the average worker. Any deviation from the glorious path of the victorious ideology will immediately be used against him by his rivals. Besides, nobody wants to introduce any changes which might upset the established equilibrium. The Party is proclaimed to be infallible, and as long as it remains so in the eyes of the population, the hypnotism of absolute power remains with it. Surely, we cannot expect Comrade Gorbachov to approach people who have been forced to make the utmost sacrifices for half a century, and announce: "Sorry, folks. It is all our fault. We'll start all over again."

Instead, Comrade Gorbachov has already confirmed in his acceptance speech his commitment to the main principles of the ideology, including a pledge of support to liberation movements, the forces of progress and socialism around the world. The old declaration of war against the non-communist world, which is solemnly repeated every five years at each Party Congress, is thus confirmed again by the new charismatic and energetic leader.

In fact, it does not matter how young, energetic, educated and experienced the General Secretary may be because he is not a human being—he is a function. Even if he does not exist at all, the system will continue to live and function. Big Brother Andropov, Chernenko, or Brezhnev could be practically dead at the end of their reign, yet their

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

letters, decrees and interviews continued to appear. Their function continued to exist as if nothing had happened, like communist ideology continues to exist and control Soviet life, although nobody believes in it. The reality of a totalitarian society, brilliantly defined by Orwell in three old Party slogans: "War is Peace," "Freedom is Slavery," "Ignorance is Strength"—is still unchanged.

WHAT kind of "constructive relations" can the West hope to have with this machine? Or, should I better ask: is it possible to have the peaceful coexistence of a tiger and a rabbit in the same cage? Quite possible, if you maintain a steady supply of fresh rabbits.

It is time to understand that there are no quick solutions to our problems. It is time to understand that Soviet aggressiveness is inseparable from its internal oppressiveness.

As Andrei Sakharov wrote in a letter to the President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences:

> A most important concept, which in time became a cornerstone of my position, is the indissoluble bond between international security and trust on the one hand, and respect for human rights and an open society on the other.
>
> As long as a country has no civil liberty, no freedom of information, and no independent press, then there exists no independent body of public opinion to control the conduct of the government. Meanwhile, the [Soviet] military–industrial complex and the KGB are gaining in strength, threatening the stability of the entire world, and super-militarization is eating up all our resources.

Thus, Western policy should be always calculated to help the people in the communist world, not their rulers. It should promote the democratization of these societies. We have a common cause to serve, in the East and in the West: the cause of freedom and democracy.

Indeed, we are connected in this common struggle, more strongly than a chain can bind prisoners, by invisible ties. Only together can we score a victory, and if one of us fails the rest are dragged down even further.

When the crowds of hysterical people in the streets of your cities demand unilateral disarmament of the West, demand peace at any price and surrender to Soviet blackmail, not only is your future betrayed but the future of Poles and Czechs, Vietnamese and Russians. For what hopes are left for them, where can they find the strength to resist against all odds if the people of free countries choose to be rather red than dead?

Yes, this universal struggle for freedom does not know national borders or linguistic barriers, but stretches from the Polish shipyards to the mountains of Afghanistan, from the jungles of Angola and Nicaragua to the deserts of Ethiopia, from the streets of Western capitals to the Siberian labour camps and Cuban prisons.

I wish this simple truth were always remembered by the people and the governments of that small and constantly threatened patch of land called the Free World. For it is ultimately for your survival that the Afghan

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peasants are fighting almost with bare hands. The West is not even grateful enough to supply them with medicine, food or weapons. Instead, several European governments have decided to buy Soviet natural gas, perhaps the very same gas that is being pumped out of Afghanistan by the Soviet occupation authorities as compensation for "liberating" Afghanistan.

We may shake with indignation whenever we hear about the Soviet invasion of yet another country. We hate these obedient soldiers, ever ready to do whatever they are told. But what do we propose that they should do? Do we honestly expect them to rebel and face a firing squad, while the entire world continues to provide their executioners with goods, credits and modern technology? If we really are allies in this universal struggle for freedom, is it fair to expect the people in the East to sacrifice their lives, while the West is not prepared to sacrifice its profits?

Equally, when the American Congress cowardly refuses to support the popular resistance to the communist regime in Nicaragua, or when we hear about the intention to recognize the communist government in Angola we must consider it a defeat for us all. Surely, the cause of democracy and freedom will suffer if communist slavery is spread further in Africa or Central America. Neither will it encourage the people behind the Iron Curtain to risk their lives in our common struggle, but it will show them that they are alone against the most oppressive system in the world's history.

And what else should they think when they hear all these conciliatory speeches of the world's leaders about "normalization of relations" and "negotiated settlements," about "trust-building" between the East and West, in which their rights are not included? Is it considered to be "normal" by the Western Allies when 17 million Germans are kept by force from joining their nation? Is it "normal" to see Polish "Solidarity" crushed, or the Baltic states still occupied under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact?

What sort of "normal relations" or "coexistance" will it be if just in order to send their Olympic team to Los Angeles the Soviets wanted a kind of martial law to be proclaimed in California, censorship imposed on the press, demonstrations prohibited, a special *gulag* to be built for their athletes and anyone of them who might defect to be dragged back in chains? Yes, that is exactly how the Soviets understand "peaceful coexistance": it is when the West builds communism for them and helps them to keep their population in obedience. But, then, will it still be a "Free World"?

We, in the Soviet Union, understand our common cause differently. It is also for your freedom that members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group Oleksa Tikhy and Valeri Marchenko have recently died in prison, while dozens of their colleagues from the Helsinki Groups were jailed or sent into exile. Right from the moment the Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975 these people knew that the Soviet regime was not going to respect its obligations and would try to deceive the West

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by false promises. They also knew what it would cost them to expose the Soviet cheating, but they never hesitated to stand up and be counted.

And what did the West do with the information obtained at such a high price? At the first review conference in Belgrade it was decided "not to demand too much" from the Soviets, which in practical terms meant not to demand anything at all. The Western countries happily signed a Final Document with the Soviets as if nothing had happened. The human rights violations were not even mentioned. The results of the second review conference in Madrid were hardly more encouraging, although it went on for three years. At the end, the West conceded the most important part of the agreement—the link between security, cooperation and respect for human rights—and agreed to have a separate conference on security and "trust-building," while the human rights problems were again shelved.

Thus, the Helsinki Accords have lost all meaning by now. I wonder what they discuss behind the closed doors of the Stockholm conference: the trust-building measures which are kept secret from the entire world? Clearly, one is ill-advised to trust a governing clique which does not allow its people to know the truth and to discuss it, which deliberately pumps hostility and hatred towards other nations into the heads of its population. Surely, there can be no trust between East and West unless an independent public opinion is allowed to exist and to serve as a control on the government. Surely, trust should first be built between nations before it becomes possible between governments. So, what kind of security can we have without respect for human rights?

Although it would be only logical to declare the Helsinki Accords null and void because they were never implemented by the Soviets, the West still clings to this remnant of *détente*. After its human rights provisions were so blatantly violated, after "Solidarity" was crushed in Poland and Afghanistan was invaded, after an attempt on the Pope's life had been masterminded by the KGB, after Andrei Sakharov nearly died in exile and practically *all* members of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups were persecuted—what sense does it make to cling to this piece of paper? Just to encourage the Soviets to violate other international agreements?

Instead, the West is eager once again to rush to the negotiating table with the Soviets, only to procure another piece of paper which the Soviets will not respect. Aren't you tired of this endless paper game?

Scared as they are by the constant Soviet blackmail, and in the absence of a clear political concept, the Western people have become obsessed with a desire for "Talks." "Keep talking"—is a political prayer of our time, as if "talking" ever helped with the Soviets. Just as a frightened child, lost deep in the woods, starts talking loudly to calm himself down and to dispel the dark shadows, so the West believes that by talking to the Soviets they might dispel the threat of war.

It is time for us to become politically mature people and to forget our childish fears. The time has come to understand that only together with the hundreds of millions of enslaved people in the communist world can

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we successfully serve the cause of freedom, peace and democracy. It is them whom we should trust and their needs that we should keep in mind. They are our biggest and most reliable ally.

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali

April 1985, Vol. XXXII

BRONFENBRENNER M.: Pity the Country Specialist! – FEIWEL G.R.: Some Sources of Disagreements in Economics – GEHRELS F.: Allocations, Outputs and Rentals in General Equilibrium with a Limiting Factor – ZAMAGNI S.: Between the Point of Demand and the Demand Functions: Some Preliminary Notes – SECCHI C.: The Internationalization of Services and the Theory of International Trade – PELLANDA A.: Reflections on Savings from Three Centennial Dates: 1734, 1836, 1936

May 1985, Vol. XXXII

KUENNE R.: Oligopoly under Rivalrous Consonance: An Exploration of Phantom Objective Functions and Some Algorithmic Considerations – BECKMANN M.J.: A Model of Perfect Competition in Spatial Markets – GUITTON H.: Insoluble Problems – GARAVELLO O.: Devaluation and Stagflation in LDCs: The Role of Supply Rigidity – SCARPAT O.: The Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Occupational Wage Differentials – GOISIS G.: Variability of Demand, Prices of Inputs and Choice of Technologies: Some Recent Contributions

June 1985, Vol. XXXII

BASSETTI P.: Chambers of Commerce and the New Commercial Ethics – HARRISS C.L.: Government Spending: A Private Sector Effort for Cost Control (Grace Commission) – LUNGHINI G.: Marx on Machines – SUFRIN S.C.: Philosophical Foundations. An Essay in Economic Pragmatism – WEINRICH J.E.: The Dynamics of Managing Change: A Persistent Challenge – COVA A.: Moneys and Monetary Circulation in Lombardy in the Middle of the XVIII Century. A Report of G. Verri

International Review of Economics and Business: a monthly, under the auspices of Bocconi University and the University of Milan. The majority of the articles are in English; those in another language have an English summary. Subscription rate: US $ 55. Complete set of back issues available (1954-1984). Address: R.I.S.E.C. - Via P. Teulié 1 - 20136 Milano (Italy).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . Abutere patientia nostra

Richard Perle

I AM pleased and honoured to have been asked to address this distinguished gathering* and to come together with so many good friends. It is a particular pleasure to be in the company of those of you whom I know, by what you have said and written and done, as allies in the great cause of freedom.

As I listened to Vladimir Bukovsky at lunch I was reminded of a cartoon that appeared in the *New Yorker* some years ago. It depicted a scene from the American West—New Mexico or perhaps Nevada—of a broad plateau on either side of a vast valley. On one side there was an Indian, huddled over a camp fire, sending a wispy smoke signal into the air. On the distant side of the valley there loomed a large, mushroom-shaped cloud. The Indian turned to his companion and said, "I wish I'd said that."

I want to speak tonight about security—about the strategic relationship between East and West, about President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, and about arms control. I should say at the outset that I am moved to do so after having read Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech and *The Times* leader commenting on it.[1]

Consideration of the complex issues of peace and security by which we in the West are challenged, intellectually as well as politically, requires more than ordinary clarity and discipline when the Soviet Union unveils a new leader. We have heard much of that last night and today, and far too little of it beyond these rooms. We have been well advised to remember the fundamentals that are so easily obscured by the euphoria to which the West is so easily given. Of these fundamentals Orwell had much to say. I will quote him only once. "The Soviet Union is a place where yesterday's weather can be changed by decree."

To the euphoria, Western politicians have had much to contribute. Consider this statement from Denis Healey about the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "Emotions flicker over a face of unusual sensitivity like summer breezes on a pond." And this from a former minister of defence who has, on more than one occasion, called your humble speaker "the prince of darkness." Without meaning in any way to comment on internal British politics, let me just say that Britain is a place where yesterday's minister can be changed by sheer glee—and the decline of the Labour Party.

LAST Friday the British Foreign Secretary spoke to the Royal United Services Institute about the military relationship between East and

* "Beyond 1984"—the Conference on Communism and Liberal Democracy organized by the Committee for the Free World took place in London on 18–20 March 1985.

[1] *The Times*, 18 March 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West, the evolution of strategic forces and policy in the decade and a half following the arms control agreements of 1972 and about the American Strategic Defence Initiative. It was a speech that proved again an old axiom of geometry: that length is no substitute for depth. For in a mere 27 pages he succeeded in rewriting the recent history of the Soviet–American strategic relationship, rendering it unrecognizable to any one who has charted its course; in mistaking the unfulfilled promise of 1972 with the reality that followed; in questioning—in a manner that is both tendentious and obliquely declaratory—the strategic defence programme of the United States; in declaring that our best hope lies in "a balance of capability matched by mutual confidence about intentions," while warning against "raising hopes that it may be impossible to fulfil." I should have thought that in all of that room might have been found for a sentence, or even a phrase, on the implications of the enlarging pattern of Soviet violations of the most important arms control agreements that exist between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet on this the speech is silent.

In what may earn its place as the understatement of 1985 on the unrelenting build-up of Soviet nuclear forces, Sir Geoffrey observes that "We know that historical experience has inclined them towards over-insurance." I must say that, even in this city of Lloyd's, I find the concept of insurance a less than persuasive description of Soviet strategic weapons programmes—programmes that have resulted in the addition to their arsenal of more than 8,000 strategic warheads since we first met at the negotiating table in 1969, some 4,000 of which have been deployed since the second SALT agreement was signed in 1979.

Surely there is something deeper behind the Soviet drive to amass nuclear weapons on a scale that Sir Geoffrey himself says goes "far beyond the reasonable requirements necessary for the defence of the Soviet Union." But on this too the speech is silent. And while the speech takes pains to reiterate President Reagan's statement that the United States is not seeking military superiority, it nowhere even poses the question of whether the same might be said of the Soviet Union.

Sir Geoffrey evidently believes that in signing the ABM treaty in 1972 the Soviet Union ". . . reflected the agreement that there could be no winner in a nuclear conflict and that it was a dangerous illusion to believe that we could get round this reality." And he goes on to say that "The net effect [of the ABM Treaty] was . . . to enhance the strategy of nuclear deterrence through the clear recognition of mutual vulnerability."

While I believe that this is a fair characterization of the thinking that attended the ABM Treaty on the American side, I can find no persuasive evidence that this view is held by the military or political leaders of the Soviet Union. Indeed, such evidence as there is suggests that the Soviets hold a quite different view, that they have never accepted the notion that it is desirable to remain vulnerable to nuclear retaliation. The massive build-up of strategic weapons in the aftermath of the ABM Treaty

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strongly suggests that the Soviets have all along sought to acquire the capacity to destroy with offensive weapons the retaliatory forces of the United States and our British and French allies. The deployment of their offensive ballistic missiles, in numbers and of a quality that greatly exceeds parity with the United States, can have no plausible purpose other than to menace the American deterrent. The growth of Soviet air defences, which now consist of more than 13,000 launchers for surface-to-air missiles and a formidable array of radars and interceptors, hardly suggests that the Soviets are content to permit the American strategic bombers to reach their targets in retaliation. And the investment the Soviets have made, and continue to make, in all forms of anti-ballistic missile defence, including precisely those technologies that are encompassed in the American strategic defence research programme, could hardly be consistent with a policy of benign acquiesence in the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.

On this latter point, Soviet policy with respect to strategic defence, there is an underlying hypocrisy of Orwellian dimensions. Some 10 days after President Reagan outlined his plan for research aimed at establishing whether a strategic defence is feasible, there appeared, in *Pravda* and elsewhere, a statement deploring the devotion of scientific talent and resources to the development of military systems and defensive systems in particular. It was signed by a long list of Soviet scientists. Among the signatories were the man in charge of the Soviet strategic defence programme, the designer of the most lethal Soviet strategic missiles, the head of the Soviet military laser programme, the architect of the ABM system now deployed around Moscow, and several dozen of their collaborators.

There is a far simpler explanation for the Soviet interest in the ABM Treaty of 1972 than the one suggested by the Foreign Minister. Simpler and more sinister. In 1972, when the United States had begun the deployment of a limited ABM system incorporating what was then state-of-the-art technology, the Soviets were far behind technologically. So far behind, in fact, that they were then unable to deploy a system approaching ours. And they were certainly in no position to contemplate a crash effort without slowing the massive build-up of offensive weapons to which they were by then committed.

So they did the obvious thing. They agreed to ban ABM systems while planning to accelerate their own research and development. They halted the American programme, the deployment of which had begun; and they used the opportunity the treaty offered to develop their own. Today the Soviets are ahead of the United States in the deployment and technology of strategic defences. In 1985 the Soviets have in place more of the large phased-array radars on which a nationwide ABM system might be based than the United States planned to deploy in 1972. Twice as many. And among these there is the radar now under construction near Krasnoyarsk, a radar that blatantly and unapologetically violates the ABM Treaty that Sir Geoffrey calls ". . . a political and military keystone in the still shaky

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arch of security we have constructed with the East over the past decade and a half."

In Geneva the Soviets will doubtless continue to press for another agreement like the ABM Treaty of 1972, insisting that the United States abandon its current programme of research. They know that an agreement restricting our research and theirs would be unverifiable—and therefore unilateral. They have every reason—nostalgia among them—to wish to return to a situation in which they alone can carry forward, while we accept a negotiated and one-sided paralysis for however long the Soviets might require to develop their own SDI. Having learned from the past I can assure you that we will not agree; we will not make the same mistake twice.

THERE is another point to be made about the ABM Treaty and the agreement to which it was linked—the interim agreement on Offensive Arms. The understanding that we thought had been reached in 1972 was that we could safely refrain from deploying an ABM system of which we were capable because the Soviets had agreed to restrictions on the growth of their offensive forces that would obviate the requirement for that system of defence. But through a variety of devices, beginning I must say with skilful negotiation on the part of the Soviet negotiators and rather less skilful on the part of our own, and ultimately including out-and-out violations of those agreements, the Soviets have succeeded, despite our hopes, in deploying an offensive force of a size and character even larger than that which we envisioned when we decided it was necessary to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defence to protect against an offence of those dimensions. The Soviets did rather more than that. We are all familiar, having survived the difficult debate in Europe over the deployment of the SS-20, with that weapon system. It is, not many people recognize, a product of that very SALT 1 Agreement of 1972. The 1972 Agreement limited the number of launchers for ballistic missiles with a range greater than 5,500 kilometres. The Soviet Union did the obvious thing. They took a missile then in their inventory that had a range greater than 5,500 kilometres and three stages, called the SS-16. They removed one of the three stages, thereby reducing its range to approximately 5,000 kilometres and, free from any Treaty restraint or limitation, they began to deploy the SS-20. We now face over 400 SS-20s, each with three warheads deployed against every conceivable target in Europe, and indeed there are rather more SS-20 warheads than there are targets. And finally, as I indicated, the Soviets began a process initially rather tentative, and more recently rather open and blatant in violating the provisions of that Agreement. I can't help but think that the more recent and blatant violations have something to do with the failure to respond earlier to the more subtle and questionable violations.

THE "shaky arch of security" to which Sir Geoffrey refers is perhaps best expressed by the trend in the military balance of the last two

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decades—a trend that steadily diminished the capacity of the United States and its allies to deter hostile Soviet activity, thereby limiting the risks the Soviets would assume in exploiting opportunities for aggression and subversion.

Let me cite a few examples of the different US and Soviet trends in weapons development over the past two decades. The last of our B-52 bombers rolled off the production line in 1962—23 years ago. We began deploying our newest land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 15 years ago. During the same year, we began deploying the POSEIDON submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). We did not field another new strategic system until 1978, when we began deploying the TRIDENT I SLBM. Since then we have begun to deploy air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and to build the TRIDENT I ballistic missile-carrying submarine (SSBN) at the rate of about one a year.

By contrast the Soviet Union since 1971 has deployed at least three—and probably four—new types of ICBMs (the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19 and probably the SS-16), eight improved versions of these and existing ICBMs, five new types of SSBNs, four new types of SLBMs, five improved versions of existing SLBMs, long-range cruise missiles, and a new intercontinental bomber. And the Soviet Union is continuing to develop new strategic weapons of all types.

It is often said of the Soviets that they are conservative and disinclined to take risks. With this assessment I agree. But curiously the view of the Soviets as averse to risk-taking is frequently put forward as a reason why the United States need not carry out its defence modernization and rearmament programme. With this I most strenuously disagree.

For there is a clear relationship between our military potential and the willingness of the Soviet Union to take risks. Soviet perception of our willingness to defend our interests or our allies will depend on their assessment of the military balance. The Soviet Union took actions in the 1970s that it would not have taken in the 1960s. Such actions were less risky for the Soviets in the mid- and late 1970s because the military balance had substantially changed in their favour.

It is the nature of the military relationship that determines, above all else, whether a course is risky for the Soviets, or safe. Until the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the Soviets had become accustomed to riskless adventure and subversion. The importance of the President's action in Grenada was that it marked the end of an era in which the Soviet leadership, emboldened by the declining strength and will of the United States, could engage in aggression and subversion with little or no fear that they would elicit an American response.

The President's election signalled a clear consensus on the part of the American people that something needed to be done immediately to redress the serious imbalance created by an ambitious Soviet military build-up coupled with US restraint in the 1970s. It is my strong belief that the American people continue to share that concern and assessment. They overwhelmingly support the President's commitment to continue

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

upgrading US military capabilities in order to meet the enlarged Soviet threat and to restore an adequate measure to US and allied deterrent capabilities.

I MUST say I find patronizing and absurd the suggestion, now fashionable among editorialists and columnists who have never shared the President's clear and forthright judgment about the Soviet Union, that Ronald Reagan will now embrace the demonstrably false theory of *détente* of the 1970s in order to assure his "place in history." That theory of *détente*, in which the Soviets were to be adroitly enmeshed in a web of relationships, expressed in terms of agreements across a broad range of political, cultural, economic and military relationships, will doubtless earn its own place in history as an experiment that failed.

For when the haze that surrounded the *détente* policy of the early and mid-1970s was dissipated by the winds of Soviet internal repression, subversion in the Third World, war in Afghanistan, technological espionage on a grand scale and unprecedented military programmes, it became clear that it was we, and not the Soviets, who became enmeshed in a web of unrealistic expectations, commercial greed, self-imposed inhibitions on the President's freedom to protect our security—and military vigilance diminished, along with shrinking defence budgets, to a dangerous indifference.

TWICE in his speech Sir Geoffrey found it necessary to declare the seriousness with which Her Majesty's Government regards the effort to negotiate arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. That is a sentiment we share; although I must say that the frequency with which we feel obliged to reiterate the point is its own testimony to the propaganda, Soviet and domestic, that surrounds the issue of arms control.

I welcome the opportunity this occasion affords me to comment on the subject of arms control—a subject the discussion of which is in danger of deteriorating into an exchange of epithets between "good guys" and "bad guys." And as one of those officials who is so often placed in the latter category by those who feel themselves firmly in the former one, a chance to explain where we differ—and to do so in my own words and not the words of others so airily attributed to me—is a rare privilege.

I believe that the principal difference between this Administration and its critics on the subject of arms control lies in the standard we each set for the reaching of agreement. I confess that I believe we set a higher standard than our detractors: we are searching for arms control agreements that will significantly constrain the growth of Soviet military power while limiting our own proportionately.

We are searching for negotiated arms limitations which, if agreed to, would provide for greater stability at sharply lower levels of weapons. We are trying, as Congress has directed, to obtain agreements that are based upon the principle of equality between the United States and its main adversary, the Soviet Union. We are attempting to achieve agreements

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that are sufficiently precise so that we can verify compliance with them. And in attempting all this we are mindful that there are some agreements that are better than others, all too many that convey the appearance—but not the reality—of militarily meaningful restraint, and some that are worse than none at all.

Our efforts to achieve agreements that are militarily significant, drawn with precision, balanced and equitable and verifiable, are taking place against a background of anxiety here and abroad that clouds our vision and complicates our task.

The most prominent expression of this anxiety is found in the two words "arms race" and in the awesome image these words conjure up in our minds—an image of the endless piling of weapon upon weapon, an ever upward spiral without end, a race to the apocalypse. Yet the reality is more mundane, and quite elusive. It is this: the United States has, for 15 years or more, engaged in a sustained programme of unilateral arms reductions while the Soviet Union has been adding constantly to its arsenal of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons. Calculated in terms of megatonnage the reduction of US forces is even more impressive: we have reduced the megatonnage of our deployed weapons by 75 per cent over the last two decades.

But what has this to do with arms control? Nothing—and everything. Nothing because the US reductions and the Soviet increases have proceeded without regard to the three major treaties under which we and the Soviets have been living since 1972. Everything because the irrelevance of the treaties meant to regulate the competition in strategic weapons has become increasingly clear as the Soviet build-up has occurred within their provisions. Indeed, it is striking how nostalgia for the arms control of the early 1970s has become an almost automatic response to current concerns about "the upward spiral of the arms race"—as though the agreements of the 1970s were not now in effect when in fact they are. Every strategic weapon added to the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union since 1972 has been added under the terms (sometimes interpreted generously by the Soviets) of one treaty in force, one expired but still observed, and one never ratified but adhered to nevertheless. So much for nostalgia; it ain't what it used to be.

In all the confusion that surrounds the subject of arms control there is none so serious as the issue of seriousness. It has become commonplace for the Administration's critics to accuse it of a lack of seriousness about arms control. In support of this accusation there are learned journalistic excursions into the bureaucratic world of the heroic but ineffective "good guys" (who are serious about arms control) and the dominant "bad guys" (who are secretly opposed to arms control and block it at every turn but go through the motions in a false show of seriousness). And by some obscure litmus test we are—all of us—herded into one camp or the other.

But what does seriousness in arms control mean? Is it a sign of seriousness to make concessions to the Soviet desire to accumulate and preserve significant advantages in nuclear weapons? Is the ease with

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which we abandon our objectives and make "progress" towards an agreement—any agreement—a sign of seriousness? Is there any relationship between seriousness and the content of the agreements we seek to negotiate?

The charge that this Administration is not serious about arms control because it has set a standard for agreement that is difficult to achieve precisely because it is worth achieving, is damaging and unworthy—damaging to our efforts and unworthy of those who make the charge.

The burden of advice we are receiving from many of our critics amounts to little more than that we should modify our proposals so as to permit the Soviets to retain a vastly larger strategic arsenal than the levels the Administration has proposed.

According to this view seriousness is to be found on the side of the big guns—or, in this case, the big missiles. Demand too much restraint on the part of the Soviets, even though the levels we have proposed would be equal for both sides—and you are not serious. Hold out for an agreement worthy of our children's respect (and with some chance of protecting their safety and liberty)—and you are not serious. Seriousness resides with those who don't worry too much about the terms of an agreement as long as something gets signed.

That is, needless to say, not our view of what constitutes being serious about arms control. In our view seriousness requires clear-sighted objectives, militarily significant outcomes, agreements that are equal and verifiable—and the patience and courage to achieve results. It can't be done quickly or easily. Our adversaries won't permit it. They prefer to wait for terms more to their liking—terms which, like those to which they have become accustomed, leave their military programmes largely unimpeded, their build-up undiminished.

With the new Soviet leader in place, it will not be long before we hear the charge emanating from Geneva that we are not serious. I rather suspect that the Soviets in Geneva will propose that we hold research on strategic defence; that we freeze our strategic forces; that we freeze the deployment of intermediate missiles in Europe. In short that we stop where we are, enshrining for the Soviet Union the advantages they have achieved, the results of years of build-up, leaving the United States, when it is now poised in my view to regain the balance on which our security depends, unable to complete the programme. I hope and trust that this Administration will not yield to the pressures and the temptations to do that. That we will be fortified in our efforts to remain serious about arms control by gatherings like these and by the contribution that the people in this room make to the battle of ideas, without which none of these programmes either mean very much or indeed can be brought to fruition.

So let me thank you for holding this meeting and for the work that so many of you are doing and for the chance to speak to you tonight.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet–Libyan Relations Under Qaddafi

Pedro Ramet

IN the early years of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi's revolution, Libyan foreign policy seemed idiosyncratic, Qaddafi appeared mercurial and unpredictable, and Soviet–Libyan relations displayed no particular closeness, even though the Soviets had been quick to hail the 1969 *coup* as a blow against Western imperialism. Ten years later, the USSR and Libya were declaring their views to be "identical" on a large number of issues and since early 1983, Qaddafi has been seeking a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow.

Various explanations for this steady drawing together of Libya and the Soviet Union might be offered. It might, for instance, be supposed that Soviet interests in penetration are constant and that Qaddafi's perceptions of the Soviets changed as a result of an unstable personality. This is a possible explanation but has the defect of leaving obscure the nature of the policies pursued by Qaddafi. On the other hand, it might be argued that Libyan national interests coincide with Soviet national interests and that the *rapprochement* was therefore "inevitable." This approach is flawed by the difficulty in explaining why King Idris, whom Qaddafi overthrew in 1969, had not thus pursued Libya's "interests." It might, finally, be argued that the *rapprochement* reflected the radicalization of Libyan policies and that the evident symbiosis in the foreign policies of these two states is not merely a matter of convenience (though it is that), but is also an organic dimension of the shared revolutionary experience.

This third approach would seem to be the logical extension of those theories of revolutionary syndromes which aspire to conceptualize revolutions in terms of broadly predictable phases and to link changes in foreign policy to changes in the internal politics of the state. According to adherents of this model (such as Alfred G. Meyer and Robert C. Tucker), the radicalization of domestic politics should incite a radicalization of foreign policy. Moreover, in line with this expectation, it might be supposed that revolutionary systems would have more in common with each other, in some respects, than with non-revolutionary systems, and thus that a shared revolutionary syndrome would constitute a basis for a degree of symbiosis in foreign policy. This article will endeavour to test this approach, by examining the contours of the Soviet–Libyan relationship since 1969. More specifically, it will enquire as to whether Libyan support of anti-Western guerrillas is, in and of itself, an important source of cordiality with the USSR.

By way of a preliminary, it will prove useful to identify the "revolutionary syndrome" to assess to what extent the emergence and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development of this syndrome in Libya may have coincided with a change in Libyan foreign policy and also with a change in the Soviet–Libyan nexus, and to explain Qaddafi's occasional "olive branches" to the West, since these would seem to be incompatible with an interpretation which derives the central thrust of foreign policy from the character of the system as a whole.

FOLLOWING Tucker, revolutionary mass movement regimes will be understood to comprise a discrete category of political systems, in which power is monopolized by a collectivist party having a utopian vision and bent on political modernization, the expansion of orchestrated political participation, and social transformation.[1] Orchestrated political participation provides mechanisms of social control and produces the illusion of popular support. Revolution is a global concept and implicitly, if not explicitly, transcends national boundaries. Revolutionary elites manipulate ideologies which reduce the world to states in favour of revolutionary change ("progressive" states) and states opposed to revolutionary change ("reactionary" states) and typically view the international arena in terms of the struggle between systems.[2] Whereas, for the Soviets, the criterion for distinguishing "progressive" from "reactionary" regimes is cooperation with the Soviet bloc and, where possible, emulation of the Soviet experience, for Qaddafi's Libyan regime, "progressive" means adoption of a form of "Islamic socialism," while anti-socialist—and, at least in the beginning, anti-religious—systems are described as "reactionary."[3]

Revolutionary mass movement regimes confront broadly comparable tasks of uprooting the pre-revolutionary culture, expelling and resisting foreign and domestic elements opposed to the revolutionary programme, spelling out and applying a coherent policy of political and social modernization, and fashioning a foreign policy to deal with non-revolutionary as well as revolutionary states. Because the domestic tasks are tackled sequentially, it is possible to outline a revolutionary syndrome consisting of discrete programmatic phases.[4] In the first phase of system destruction, the revolutionary party repels its foes and endeavours to uproot the culture associated with the *ancien régime*. The Bolsheviks repelled the monarchist White Russian factions and the interventionist forces of France, Britain, Japan and the US, assailed "bourgeois law," religious practice, sexual restraint, and nationalized foreign property. The Qaddafi regime expelled the British and American forces, and set

[1] Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (Praeger, New York, 1963), pp. 7–9.

[2] Ilya Zemtsov, "Lexicon of the Soviet Language," in *Crossroads*, No. 5 (Winter 1980), pp. 221–223; and Richard Pipes, "Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," in *Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1973), pp. 42, 47, 51.

[3] John K. Cooley, *Libyan Sandstorm* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1982), p. 156.

[4] This analysis is based on Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Rev. ed. (Vintage Books, New York, 1965); Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*; Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," in Richard Cornell (ed.), *The Soviet Political System* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970), pp. 49–50; and Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Systems," in *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Oct. 1975), passim.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out to purify Libya of cultural "depravity"; the revolutionary regime quickly changed street signs into Arabic, closed Christian churches, converted foreign banks into Libyan joint-stock companies, and banned the sale of alcohol. The Italian and Jewish communities were expelled from Libya and foreign interests were nationalized. The Libyan regime banned all political activity and muzzled the free expression of ideas outside carefully controlled public seminars, undertaking to get rid of the private press by slashing the government subsidies hitherto doled out. Qaddafi announced, in justification, that ". . . a revolution is a vital necessity which grows naturally in the consciousness of the society as a whole . . . The necessity for complete and radical change . . . produces . . . a man of revolution, a man of comprehensive and complete change, a man who is as if born again in a new age."[5]

The phase of system destruction is typically short. In the Soviet Union, this phase was over by 1923, with the end of the Civil War, the adoption of the New Economic Policy and the drafting of a new constitution. In Libya, one could argue that the phase of system destruction ended in 1973, when Qaddifi called for the abolition of all laws and their replacement by revolutionary edicts aimed at stimulating revolutionary change and launched a "cultural revolution."

In the succeeding phase of system building, according to Meyer, a clear revolutionary programme gradually takes shape and the task of revolutionary transformation of the society is undertaken. This phase may be broken down into two sub-phases: a sub-phase of consolidation, in which there is a relaxation of policy in order to permit the party to consolidate its control over society and during which a faction may consolidate its control within the party; and a sub-phase of mobilization, in which the party undertakes the task of revolutionary transformation by setting in motion a series of interrelated radical programmes. In the Soviet case, it is possible to distinguish a consolidation sub-phase lasting roughly from 1923 to 1928, during which religious and nationalities policies were relaxed, *laissez-faire* prevailed in the economic sector, cultural policy was liberalized, republican elites enjoyed wide autonomy and the Party remained internally factionalized. In 1928, Stalin dumped his Right Coalition partners and consolidated dictatorial control, launched the First Five-Year Plan and set in motion the coercive collectivization of the farms. The period 1928–1938 thus figures as a phase of political, economic and social mobilization, in which a new socialist order was created and Party control of society was established. During this phase, charisma plays a pivotal role in mobilization. The winding down of the Terror in 1938 signalled the completion of the tasks of consolidating control and mobilizing the population and ushered in a third phase of system maintenance, characterized by efforts to co-opt the technocratic elites and scientific intelligentsia into the policy-making

[5] Quoted in Ruth First, *Libya: the Elusive Revolution* (Africana Publishing Co., New York, 1974), p. 101.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

process and to shift from a system based on charisma and overt coercion to a system based on institutionalized routine.[6]

As in the Bolshevik case, Libya's phase of system destruction (1969–1973) was marked by false starts and hesitations. This was the period of Qaddafi's active courtship of Egypt and of his extreme anti-Sovietism. An Arab Socialist Union was created in 1972, but proved abortive. The trade union structure was overhauled twice in this period, being splintered into 22 trade groups under the labour law of May 1970 and subsequently knitted together again within the ASU in 1972.[7]

By the end of 1972, new press regulations had compelled newspaper editors to subscribe to the principles of the Libyan Arab revolution and a network of People's Courts had been established with instructions to base their judgments chiefly on the political orientation of the accused and on his social position—a standard device among revolutionary regimes and one specifically reminiscent of the communist practice of taking class origin into account in judicial proceedings.[8]

In April 1973, Qaddafi launched his "cultural revolution"; he suspended all existing laws, purged the country of the "politically sick," overturned the bureaucracy and distributed arms among the populace. A network of Popular Committees (2,000 by August 1973) was quickly set up in villages, workplaces and schools, and people were urged to join in order to assume "governing" responsibilities directly. In the course of 1973, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) set up a network of political education camps for bureaucrats, ASU staff, students, members of the people's committees, union members, *imams*, and other groups, with camps lasting anywhere from one to five weeks.[9] It took Qaddafi four years, i.e. until 1977, to accomplish the tasks of his "cultural revolution," viz. to weaken the bureaucracy and consolidate his own supremacy, and to refashion the system on a revolutionary model.

> By now Libya's internal security apparatus, modelled on Egypt's and installed by members of Egypt's *mokhabarat*, comprised several overlapping but autonomously directed intelligence machines . . . Less sensational but more pervasive was the system of informers and the emergence of groups of organized government supporters who played a strategic if sycophantic role, carrying out the tenor of Qaddafi's speeches to the letter, and reporting to him only what they knew he wanted to hear.[10]

[6] See Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaption to Change: the Soviet Political Leadership System," in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies* (Free Press, New York, 1971), pp. 125–150; Ronald J. Hill, "Party-State Relations and Soviet Political Development," in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 10, Part 2 (April 1980), pp. 150–151; and Jerry F. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era: the Man and the System," in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March–April 1976), pp. 1–17.

[7] John Wright, *Libya: A Modern History* (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982), pp. 177–178.

[8] Ivo Lapenna, *State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory* (University of London Press, London, 1964), passim.

[9] Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya* (Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1980), pp. 132–133.

[10] First, *Libya*, p. 139.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Private entrepreneurs were driven out of business and the distribution and sale of merchandise was taken over by the state. In April 1974, finally, Qaddafi resigned his political offices, in order to devote himself to "ideological tasks," in a move that reminds one that revolutionary leaders frequently do not occupy, *in form*, the leading office in the apparatus.

It seems possible to interpret this period, 1973–77, as Libya's equivalent of the consolidation sub-phase, though the lower level of party development in Libya constitutes a clear point of difference. Whereas in the Soviet Union, Left and Right coalitions had jockeyed for control of the apparatus in the 1920s, there was no real Libyan equivalent of the factionalization of the Bolshevik Party in that earlier period. Instead, Libya was rocked, in the mid-1970s, by serious internal unrest, including opposition from the salaried classes and among students and middle-grade officers. As in the Soviet case, the central *policy* issue which divided the ruling elite was the question of economic management, and in August 1975, disgruntled at the decision to trim back certain social programmes in order to pay for increased weapons imports, Major Omar al-Mihaishi, Minister of Planning and a member of the RCC, attempted a *coup*.

Already in May 1973, Qaddafi promulgated an ideology for his revolution, declaring it to be a "Third International Theory," an alternative to both Western pluralism and Eastern communism, and Qaddafi's "Koranic socialism" edged towards political modernization and the mobilization style of politics: laws of 1973–74 integrated *sharia* laws and the religious *sharia* courts into the secular legal system and 1975 brought the creation of the Union of Libyan Women, a mobilization structure which clearly identified the revolutionary character of the regime and marked a break with traditional Islam.

Qaddafi's successful consolidation of his supremacy and the crystallization of his revolutionary programme were signalled in early 1977 by a proclamation changing the name of the country to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah: "jamahiriyah" is a Qaddafi neologism, which might be translated as "a state of the masses." At the same time, Qaddafi created a General Secretariat to supervise the General People's Congress, the supervisory body of the Popular Committees (now renamed the Basic People's Committees), and Qaddafi became its General Secretary. It was also at about this time that Qaddafi came to be referred to as the "Brother Colonel" and his ministers, as "brother ministers."

THE Soviets were quick to applaud Qaddafi's *coup*, extending official recognition on 4 September (three days after the *coup* was staged) and publishing a favourable article in *Pravda* on 6 September 1969. Shortly thereafter, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and other countries likewise recognized the new government. And although the new Libyan government returned the compliment by describing the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USSR as one of the Arabs' best friends, the Revolutionary Command Council headed by Qaddafi made no secret of its hostility towards communism and scrupulously limited its early dealings with the Soviet Union to commercial exchange, and most particularly to the purchase of Soviet military hardware.[11] The first sale of Soviet weaponry to Libya was transacted in July 1970, but Libya continued to seek other arms markets as well.

The RCC's revolutionary programme was relatively inchoate at first. Indeed, one of the first actions taken by the mercurial Qaddafi was to fly to Egypt to turn over his country for annexation to "revolutionary" Egypt. Qaddafi viewed himself as Nasser's disciple, but was not ready to assume Nasser's mantle when the Egyptian President died in September 1970. Qaddafi's orientation was essentially limited to anti-Westernism and Islamic fundamentalism. His expulsion of Italians and Jews and his nationalization of British and American oil company interests might have been warmly greeted, just as his Islamic hostility to communism was criticized; but Libya and the Soviet Union had few points of contact at this stage, and little interaction except at the lowest levels.

Qaddafi's backing of armed insurrection was essentially limited to two groups at this stage—the Palestinians, in support of whose cause he established a *jihad* fund in 1970, and the Irish Republican Army insurrectionists in Northern Ireland, whose anti-British campaign soon found Libyan support.[12] These groups were clearly identified in Qaddafi's mind with the revolutionary struggles against "neo-colonialism." By April 1973, in the spirit of Moslem solidarity, Qaddafi was also supplying the Philippines' secessionist Moslem rebels (the Moro National Liberation Front) with arms and financial backing.[13]

Soviet interest in guerrilla movements was then still low. Gregor Karstag, a Soviet writer, urged in 1972 that

> the notions of "guerrilla strategy," while reflecting in a distorted manner the positive fact of attracting broader and broader masses into the revolutionary struggle . . ., are the views of petit-bourgeois revolutionaries who are voluntaristically trying to fit reality to their theory.[14]

In fact, in the early years of the Brezhnev–Kosygin duumvirate, Soviet writers expressed misgivings about the Khrushchevite assumption that liberation movements were *ipso facto* components of world socialist revolution, and as of 1970, major figures in the Soviet establishment were

[11] Arieh Yodfat, "The USSR and Libya," in *New Outlook*, Vol. 13, No. 6 (July–Aug. 1970), p. 38; and Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Soviet Penetration of Libya," in *The World Today*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (April 1982), p. 133.

[12] Ronald Bruce St. John, "Libya's 'New' Foreign Policy," in *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 243, No. 1410 (July 1983), p. 15.

[13] Judith Stowe, "Philippines: the Need for a New Society," *Conflict Studies*, no. 37 (Aug. 1973), p. 17; and *Christian Science Monitor* (5 Jan. 1983), p. 12.

[14] Quoted in Robert S. Leiken, *Soviet Strategy in Latin America*, Washington Papers No. 93 (Praeger Publrs., New York, 1982), p. 24.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reluctant about the aid to guerrillas.[15] At that juncture, the "armed road" to socialism did not seem promising, and throughout the Third World, communist parties loyal to Moscow echoed the line of the peaceful path.[16] Hence, what little support Qaddafi was then giving to insurgents was of no great interest to Moscow.

In the early 1970s, Qaddafi's support was, with the exception of the Irish, by and large limited to Moslem insurgents; by the latter 1970s, he had allegedly broadened his support to include certain Marxist guerrillas as well. Until the mid-1970s, the Libyan revolution remained an inchoate blend of hostility to the West, anarchism, pan-Arabism and assertive Islamic fundamentalism, strung together by a wistful nostalgia for the days of Nasserism, and Qaddafi's growing belief that he was realizing Nasser's programme in Libya. In Qaddafi's hands, Nasser's programme for Arab unity became transmogrified into an obsessive pursuit of unity projects. Turned down by Nasser in 1969, Qaddafi returned to this idea in November 1970, conjuring up an abortive Federation of Arab Republics consisting of Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Syria. When this fell through, Qaddafi attempted to draw Egypt and Syria into a revolutionary union with Libya the following year, and in November 1972 he persuaded the two Yemens to open talks on unification—doubtless with an eye towards subsequent amalgamation with Libya.[17]

The failure of these tactics prompted Qaddafi to adopt a new approach in seeking an outlet for Libyan expansionism, and in 1972 Libya established a guerrilla training camp at Tarhuna, 90 miles south-east of Tripoli, and quickly began training about 300 Moroccan discontents there: in March 1973, calling themselves the "National Front for the Liberation of Morocco," these terrorists launched operations against Moulay-Bouazza and Goulmima in Morocco.[18] Also in 1972, frustrated with what he viewed as PLO lack of militance, Qaddafi created his own Palestinian resistance organization, the National Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (NAYLP), weaning away some of the more extreme members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and appointing the terroristically-inclined Ahmed al-Ghaffour to head the new organization.[19]

Although the RCC was clear about its determination to marry Islam, socialist revolution and nation-building (in a state where regional divisiveness was still a serious issue in 1969), its programmes and policies until about 1973 or 1974 reflected uncertainty as to how exactly to

[15] Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance* (Praeger, New York, 1980), pp. 17–18.

[16] Boris Goldenberg, "Fidel Castros Revolutionstheorie im Konflikt mit Moskau," in *Europa Archiv*, Vol. 22, No. 18 (25 Sept. 1967), p. 650.

[17] See Anthony McDermott, "Qaddafi and Libya," in *The World Today*, Vol. 29, No. 9 (Sept. 1973), p. 402.

[18] Institute for the Study of Conflict, "Libya's Foreign Adventures," *Conflict Studies*, no. 41 (Dec. 1973), pp. 4–5.

[19] Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Terrorists*, Rev. ed. (Facts on File, New York, 1982), p. 194.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

promote this marriage.[20] Qaddafi made no bones about his antipathy for communism and tended to treat the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance as equivalents—a fact which did not pass unnoticed in the Kremlin.[21] Indeed, Libya and the Soviet Union repeatedly took opposite stands on many issues in international politics. During the Indo–Pakistani war of 1971, for instance, when the USSR backed India, Qaddafi openly upbraided the Soviet role in that war as a confirmation of "the Soviet Union's imperialist designs in the area,"[22] and sent several squadrons of Northrop F-5 fighter-bombers to Pakistan. Qaddafi also sent arms to Sultan Qabus of Oman, a Western ally, for use against the Soviet-backed Dhofar rebels. When Iraq signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in April 1972, Qaddafi denounced the treaty as "imperialist," despite the fact that Libya had just signed an economic agreement with the Soviets the preceding month. Again, Qaddafi proved downright embarrassing when he told a meeting of the non-aligned movement in 1973: "We are against Cuba's presence in this Conference of Non-aligned Nations. There is no difference between Cuba and any East European country, or for that matter Uzbekistan and the Soviet Union itself."[23]

Qaddafi's independent foreign policy and militant anti-communism led to his being branded an "ignorant anti-Soviet" by the Kremlin and it provoked repeated attacks in Soviet periodicals.[24] The Soviets, unsure of Qaddafi, were therefore pleased at the collapse of Libya's initial Arab unification projects.[25] Still, when RCC member Major Abd as-Salam Jallud visited Moscow in March 1972, he was received by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny[26]—an unmistakable sign of the interest the Soviets had in fostering a Libyan connection. The two countries signed an economic agreement on that occasion, and within two months the Libyan Minister of Petroleum was in Moscow to discuss oil exports to the Soviets. It is interesting to note that despite firm Libyan press censorship, the Soviets chose to interpret articles critical of themselves, and of their role in the Middle East in particular, which appeared in the Libyan newspapers *Al-Judi* (in 1972), *Al-Balagh* (1973) and *Al-Fajr Al-Jadid*

[20] J. A. Allan, *Libya: The Experience of Oil* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981), pp. 255–268.

[21] Radio Moscow in Arabic (8 Sept. 1973), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 10 Sept. 1973.

[22] Quoted in Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970*, 3rd ed. (Praeger, New York, 1982), p. 74.

[23] Quoted in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970s*, Rev. ed. (University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, NM, 1978), p. 23.

[24] See, for instance, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (6 June 1973), TASS (13 June 1973), and TASS (23 Oct. 1973)—translated and/or reprinted respectively in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 8 June, 14 June and 24 Oct. 1973.

[25] Freedman, *Soviet Policy*, p. 131.

[26] Joint Communiqué published in *Pravda* (8 March 1972), translated in *Reprints from the Soviet Press*, Vol. 14, No. 7 (7 April 1972), pp. 58–62.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(January 1974), as reflections of factional activity within the Libyan elite, rather than as ambivalence on the part of Qaddafi.[27]

THE period 1973–77 can be viewed as one in which the character of the Libyan polity was substantially transformed. This phase was ushered in by a speech made by Qaddafi at Zuwarah on 15 April 1973, in which the Libyan leader pledged to sweep out "counter-revolutionary" elements in the bureaucracy and to suppress resistance to the revolutionary regime. All existing laws were abrogated and the RCC authorized itself to rule by decree. Between 1973 and 1975, the governmental apparatus was completely reorganized and an extensive mobilization network was set up. These changes, as J. A. Allan has observed, remade the Libyan political landscape.[28]

Qaddafi now set up a Bureau for the Export of the Revolution ("Maktub Tasdir al-Thawra") which was acting in concert with military intelligence and security services. Qaddafi, who resigned his offices in April 1974, openly embraced international revolution, and commented in 1976: "Regimes don't interest me any more; I address myself to the Arab masses."[29] Libya began training exiles from neighbouring countries in terrorism and subversion and became the principal arms supplier of the Polisario movement fighting both Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation in the Spanish Sahara. An "Islamic Militia" was also called into being, drawing recruits from other Moslem countries and from among foreign Moslems who take jobs in Libya.[30]

Through the Bureau for the Export of the Revolution and an associated body known as the Organization of Progressive Socialists of the Mediterranean Basin (OPSMB—headed by Ahmed as-Shahatti), Qaddafi now dreamt of spreading his revolution and actually established a special fund for the support of "world revolution."[31] It is clear that Qaddafi's ambitions far exceeded his capabilities, but those ambitions have nonetheless repeatedly been expressed in revolutionary rhetoric and translated into often nugatory foreign policy schemes.

Glutted with oil money, Qaddafi expanded the scope of his support of international terrorism. Libya now became involved in the training or supply of the Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia, the Frolinat rebels in northern Chad, the Moslem Malays of the secessionist Pattani National Liberation Front in southern Thailand, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, the Namibian SWAPO guerrillas, and radicals, discontents and terrorists in Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Rhodesia, and perhaps even in

[27] TASS in English (5 March 1972), Radio Moscow in Arabic (21 June 1973), and Radio Moscow in Arabic (22 Jan. 1974)—translated and/or reprinted respectively in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 7 March 1972, 22 June 1973 and 23 Jan. 1974.

[28] Allan, *Libya*, pp. 275–280.

[29] Quoted in Wright, *Libya*, p. 206.

[30] George Henderston, "Behind the Libya Scare," in *Middle East International* (4 March 1983), p. 14. See also Oye Ogunbadejo, "Qaddafi's North African Design," in *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 157–159; and *Christian Science Monitor* (8 Aug. 1983), p. 1.

[31] Arnold Hottinger, "Libya: Prophecy and Problems," in *Swiss Review of World Affairs* (Aug. 1975), p. 19.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan.[32] Increasingly convinced that his revolutionary ambitions are too momentous to be limited to a country of only three million people, Qaddafi attempted to effect union with Tunisia in 1974, with Algeria in 1976, and with tiny Malta, also in 1976. He sent 20,000 Libyans in buses across the Egyptian border in July 1973 to demand the unification of Egypt and Libya, and backed a *coup* in Sudan in 1976. While none of these plans bore fruit, Qaddafi was able to annex the uranium-rich Aozou Strip from Chad in 1976, with the comparatively small force of 4,000 Libyan troops, backed by Soviet-made T-54 tanks and MiG-23s, and in spring 1984 declared the formal annexation of the northern third of Chad.[33]

As the scope of Libya's revolutionary activities abroad expanded, Libya became increasingly estranged from the West and more isolated within the Arab world.[34] Libya and the Soviet Union drew tangibly closer within a matter of months after Qaddafi's proclamation of the Libyan "cultural revolution." Even as early as 1971, Jallud had played upon this natural affinity between revolutionary states in an effort to secure Soviet armaments.

At that time, the Soviets, while prepared to do business with Qaddafi, were nonetheless sceptical. In July 1972, however, some 90 per cent of the 15,000 Soviet advisers stationed in Egypt were peremptorily ejected and the Soviets had to surrender their airfields at Alexandria, El Mansura, Jiyanklis, Inchas, Cairo West and Beni Suef to Egyptian control.[35] While the Soviets continued for a time to do business with Sadat, Egypt's turn towards the US in the wake of the October War deepened the chill in Soviet–Egyptian relations. In March 1974, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko came to Egypt on a five-day visit, to talk about Egyptian arms needs. There was no joint communiqué at the end of the talks, however—which is always a sign of disagreement. And shortly thereafter, Sadat informed the Soviets that their naval privileges in Egypt were "under review."[36] Hence, the Soviets were eager to find alternative bases on the North African coast. Libya seemed a possibility. Whether or not Soviet scepticism had diminished, Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny met with Libyan Prime Minister Jallud on 4 April 1974, while the two men were in Paris on other business, and extended an olive branch.[37]

[32] Ibid. p. 19; Charles Holley, "Why Libya Exports Chaos," in *Atlas World Press Review* (Nov. 1976), p. 15; John F. Murphy, "State Self-Help and Problems of Public International Law," in Alona E. Evans and John F. Murphy (eds.), *Legal Aspects of International Terrorism* (Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1978), p. 563; *Africa News* (8 Sept. 1980), p. 8; and *Christian Science Monitor* (16 Oct. 1981), p. 12.

[33] *Seattle Times* (25 April 1984), p. 1.

[34] Freedman, *Soviet Policy*, p. 163.

[35] Amnon Sella, *Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East* (Macmillan, London, 1981), p. 77; *New York Times* (19 July 1972), p. 1; and *Jerusalem Post* (19 July 1972), p. 1.

[36] Sella, *Soviet Political and Military Conduct*, p. 118; Anne M. Kelly, "Port Visits and the 'International Mission' of the Soviet Navy," in Michael McGwire and John McDonnell (eds.), *Soviet Naval Influence* (Praeger, New York, 1977), p. 524. See also Pedro Ramet, *Sadat and the Kremlin* (California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, Calif., Feb. 1980), pp. 39–45.

[37] TASS (7 April 1974), in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 8 April 1974.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The result was Jallud's quickly arranged visit to Moscow on 14–24 May 1974 and the conclusion of a major arms deal, amounting to $1 billion worth of weaponry which included Soviet MiG-23s, TU-22 medium bombers, surface-to-air and Scud missile systems, and other armaments. After meetings between Jallud and Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, Ponomarev and Mazurov, a trade agreement was signed and a Joint Governmental Soviet–Libyan Commission for economic and technical cooperation was set up in order to routinize bilateral consultations.[38] A Romanian–Libyan Joint Commission was also established at this time.[39] In 1974, there were already 200 Soviet military advisers stationed in Libya, alongside a number of East German instructors. By early 1975, there were more than 480 Soviet advisers attached to Libyan military units, teaching the Libyans the use of SAM-2, SAM-3, and SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, T-62 tanks and radar systems which Moscow had sold to Libya.[40] Later that year, Qaddafi signed a $2 billion arms agreement with the Soviets for the purchase of 24 MiG fighters, 1,100 tanks, and 50 batteries of anti-aircraft missiles. By mid-1975, according to one report, thousands of Libyan military personnel, above all pilots, were training in the Soviet Union.[41] It is worth noting in this connection that Qaddafi terminated his very considerable arms supply of the secessionist Eritrean Liberation Front in late 1973, when a pro-Soviet regime took over in Ethiopia.[42]

In May 1975, Kosygin paid his first visit to Libya, meeting with both Jallud and Qaddafi. The visit produced an agreement calling for Soviet sharing of atomic technology with Libya, and in September of that year Kosygin received OPSMB's as-Shahatti in Moscow.[43]

Although the turning point in Soviet–Libyan relations clearly came earlier, viz. in early 1974, the contours of that relationship markedly changed in the course of 1976. First, beginning in May of that year, Libya began to have regular political and economic contacts with East German, Polish, Bulgarian and other East European officials, drawing Libya into closer embrace with the "socialist commonwealth." Second, it was in November of that year that the first military consultations between the two powers took place, when General Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, met with Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov in Moscow. Third, in late October 1976 the Soviet–Libyan Friendship Society—itself a clear sign of

[38] Radio Moscow in Arabic (15 May 1974), TASS (20 May 1974), TASS (21 May 1974) and Radio Moscow in Arabic (13 Aug. 1974), translated respectively in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 16 May, 20 May, 22 May and 15 Aug. 1974.

[39] US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, *Technology Transfer to the Middle East OPEC Nations and Egypt, 1970–1975* (Washington DC, 1976), p. 48.

[40] *New York Times* (21 Feb. 1975), p. 5.

[41] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 126, No. 118 (28 July 1980), p. H6630; and Gerd Linde, *Zum sowjetisch-libyschen Verhältnis* (Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, Köln, No. 47, 1975), pp. 9–10.

[42] Institute, "Libya's Foreign Adventures," p. 12.

[43] TASS (15 May and 15 September 1975), in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 16 May and 22 September 1975; and Radio Moscow in Arabic (30 May 1975), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 2 June 1975.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rapprochement—was established, after repeated delays. And fourth, after a brief stop-over in Tashkent in August, Qaddafi returned in December for an official visit to the USSR and had talks with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Gromyko. In a matter of two or three years, bilateral trade between the two countries tripled.

Whereas in the earlier phase, there had been only occasional interaction, now there was an increasing number of contacts at the highest levels. As the Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal noted in his first-hand account of Soviet–Egyptian relations, the Soviets grade their clients into three categories: the Soviet–Libyan relationship since 1974 is a clear sign that the Soviets have placed the country in question in the highest category possible.[44]

IN March 1977, Libya became a socialist Jamahiriyah, the cabinet and the RCC itself were dissolved, the Arab Socialist Union was reduced to a mere shadow, and the role of the revolutionary committees was expanded. With the publication of the second part of *The Green Book* in 1978, the radical socio-economic revolution accelerated. The accumulation of wealth was declared illegal, the ownership of more than one home was banned, the private sector of the economy was demolished in early 1981 and replaced with a string of state-run supermarkets, and the eventual disappearance of profit, exploitation and money itself was promised. In late 1981, a new currency was introduced and Libyans were given one week to redeem the old currency at the bank; the hitch was that the bank held on to most of the money, allowing Libyans henceforth to withdraw their deposited money at the rate of no more than the equivalent of $1,500 per month per family.[45] Subsequently, the Libyan regime began to talk of turning state control of the media over to the revolutionary committees and strengthening controls over the military establishment.[46] As Qaddafi told *Time* magazine (in 1981) in a revealing tautology, "anyone who is opposed to the will of the people becomes a foe of the people."[47] Not surprisingly, a revolutionary decree introduced capital punishment for criticism of the Libyan revolution or of Qaddafi.

By the late 1970s, "failure to work was anti-social; opposition to the government was dangerous; counter-revolutionary thoughts were taboo"; a system of rigid indoctrination and a network of work camps provided the underpinning for what had by then clearly evolved into a totalitarian state.[48] By the late 1970s, moreover, Libya's revolutionary expansionism had been incorporated into the Jamahiriya's ideology. And just as "the duty of the revolutionary committee is to practice

[44] Mohamed Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: the Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World* (William Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., London, 1978), pp. 25–26.

[45] *Los Angeles Times* (27 Nov. 1981), p. 12.

[46] Radio Tripoli (11 Feb. 1982), and *Al-Jamahiriyah* (Tripoli, 25 March 1983), translated respectively in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), 12 Feb. 1982 and 30 March 1983.

[47] Quoted in *Time* (8 June 1981), p. 31.

[48] Richard H. Sanger, "Libya: Conclusions on an Unfinished Revolution," in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1975), p. 410; and Allan, *Libya*, passim.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revolutionary violence against the [domestic] enemies of the revolution,"[49] so too the function of Libya's network of guerrilla training camps is to practise revolutionary violence against the foreign enemies of the revolution. West German sources claimed that Qaddafi was providing training opportunities for various guerrillas, under the supervision of East German instructors and advisers.[50]

Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in December 1977 deepened the Egypto–Libyan rift, and probably encouraged Qaddafi to draw closer to Moscow. In the late 1970s, Libya began to revise its earlier criticism of the Soviet bloc and to abandon its earlier endeavour to stake out a third position in favour of a polarized view of the international arena in which Western imperialism and Zionism are seen as the common foes of Libyan socialism and Soviet communism alike. In this vein, Qaddafi went on record, in a June 1978 press interview, with the observation that Marxism is "closer to Muslims than Christianity and Judaism."[51] At the same time, it was only after 1976 that Qaddafi's ideology assumed a clear shape with the publication of his *Green Book* and only then that he began to trumpet that ideology as a force for change.[52] And finally, it was in this period that Libyan aggressiveness in fomenting *coup* attempts in neighbouring states and in bankrolling guerrillas deepened.

Indeed, Libya's revolutionary expansionism has markedly quickened since 1977. Again there were several attempts to interest neighbouring states in political merger with Libya—Syria in September 1980, Chad in January 1981 (at a time when Libya had some 6,500 troops there, accompanied by 50 Soviet advisers), Mauritania and the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic in April 1981, Algeria in January 1982 and March 1983, and Morocco in August 1984. In September 1980, Qaddafi again met with South Yemen's leader and urged him to unite with North Yemen and then to bring the resultant entity into union with Libya.[53] Qaddafi has also tried to overthrow the rulers of neighbouring states by force, sponsoring a commando invasion of the Tunisian town of Gafsa in January 1980, and hatching unsuccessful conspiracies against the rulers of Niger (in 1977), Sudan (in 1982 and again in 1983), the Central African Republic (in 1982), and Saudi Arabia (in early 1983). A Qaddafi admirer toppled the freely-elected government of Ghana in a *coup* of 31 December 1981, and immediately began setting up "revolutionary

[49] Qaddafi, in *Time*, loc. cit.

[50] Cited in *Congressional Record*, Vol. 126, No. 118 (28 July 1980), p. H6630. See also Trond Gilberg, "Eastern European Military Assistance to the Third World," in John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp (eds.), *Communist Nations' Military Assistance* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1983), p. 84.

[51] Quoted in William A. Mussen, Jr., "Government and Politics," in Harold D. Nelson (ed.), *Libya: a country study* (American University Press, Washington DC, 1979), p. 215.

[52] See I. William Zartman and A. G. Kluge, "The Sources and Goals of Qaddafi's Foreign Policy," in *American–Arab Affairs*, No. 6 (Fall 1983), pp. 60–61.

[53] *Los Angeles Times* (3 Sept. 1980), p. 10, (11 Sept. 1980), p. 7, and (7 Jan. 1981), p. 6; US House of Representatives: Foreign Affairs Committee, *Chronologies of Major Developments in Selected Areas of Foreign Affairs: Cumulative Edition 1981* (Washington DC, 1981), pp. 36, 38; *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (25 Jan. 1982), p. 1; "Middle East and South Asia Review," *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), 29 March 1983; and *Middle East International* (24 Aug. 1984), p. 7.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

committees" *à la* Libya, while the Libyan regime itself offered food supplies and oil. Pakistani workers nominally recruited as "security guards" by labour-poor Libya were later said to have been recruited into guerrilla squads, secretly flown to Afghanistan for a six-month training programme in sabotage and hand-to-hand combat under Soviet direction, and then employed against the anti-Soviet government of President Zia ul Haq of Pakistan. Through a network of terrorist training camps including operations at el-Beida near Tobruk, at Maaten Biskara and at Bab Aziza, Qaddafi has trained members of the IRA, the Basque ETA, and terrorists from other countries. Aside from those groups previously mentioned, Libya has also provided money, training and/or arms to the Malaysian Moslem Missionary Association, the "Al Takfir Wal Higra" ("Atonement and Holy Flight") zealot organization in Egypt, Moslem guerrillas in Morocco and Thailand, Namibian and other African guerrillas, and other groups.[54]

The Qaddafi regime has also maintained contacts with the Lebanese Communist Party and the Somali Salvation Front. Currently, Libya's most intense interaction in the Middle East is with other Soviet clients, viz. South Yemen, Syria, Algeria, and certain Palestinian groups. Libya signed a friendship treaty with Soviet client-states South Yemen and Ethiopia in August 1981,[55] and in March 1983 Qaddafi announced his intention to conclude a mutual defence pact with distant North Korea. After the ouster of Nimeiri in Sudan, Qaddafi immediately began to woo the new regime.

It is often said that, under Qaddafi, Libyan foreign policy is guided by Arab nationalism and hostility to the West.[56] This is, of course, true. Yet if there were no more to the story than that, one might expect to find Libya engaging its resources exclusively in Arab and Moslem causes. Yet there are repeated reports of Libyan training of and financial support for other guerrillas, whether European or Latin American. More specifically, in this latest phase, Libya has taken an interest in the support of Latin American terrorists and leftists, and one can trace this interest to early 1977, when the Jamahiriyah was proclaimed and Cuba's Castro made his first visit to Libya. Castro visited Libya again in September 1978 and bilateral contacts began to develop, coordinated in part through the Libyan–Cuban Committee for Economic and Social Cooperation and the Cuban–Arab Friendship Association. By September 1982, there were more than 3,000 Cubans in Libya, working in construction, industry and agriculture, and the number was expected to rise still higher.[57]

[54] *Foreign Report* (2 April 1980), p. 3, (25 June 1981), p. 4, (18 Feb. 1982), p. 6 and (23 Sept. 1982), p. 8; Paris AFP (26 June 1981), in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), 26 June 1981; *Business Week* (12 Oct. 1981), p. 74; *Africa Report* (March–April 1982), p. 48; *Wall Street Journal* (17 Feb. 1983), p. 2; Dobson and Payne, pp. 224–225; and Valerie Plave Bennett, "Libyan Socialism," in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (eds.), *Socialism in the Third World* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975), p. 118.

[55] US House of Representatives, *Chronologies*, p. 68.

[56] Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Ideology of Muammar al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice," in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Nov. 1983), pp. 473, 477.

[57] Radio Havana (9 Sept. 1982), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Latin America), 10 Sept. 1982.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Qaddafi became a firm ally of the Sandinista regime; a Libyan–Nicaraguan joint committee for economic, technical and agricultural cooperation was created and an agreement to establish a Libyan–Nicaraguan joint holding company was signed. Between 1979 and 1981, Libya loaned more money to Nicaragua than any other single country.[58] Predictably, Qaddafi rallied to Argentina's side during the Falkland Islands crisis and quickly applauded the Argentine invasion. Later, when the Argentines ran into trouble, Libya acted as an intermediary for the shipment of Polish SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles.[59] Moreover, since the summer of 1982, Qaddafi has met with representatives and leaders of guerrilla groups from Antigua, St Lucia, Dominica, Barbados, St Vincent and El Salvador, hosted the Secretary-General of the Costa Rican Socialist Party in September 1982, and signed an economic agreement with Colonel Desi Bouterse, the leftist ruler of Surinam, in March 1983.[60] Qaddafi has also been linked to opposition groups in Trinidad-Tobago, and has provided assistance to Salvadoran guerrillas and to leftists in Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica and Honduras in recent years.[61] *Business Week* reported that Libya was training and supplying a leftist group in Haiti, in 1983.[62] There have also been reports that Libya has been acting as an intermediary in shipping Czech L-39 Albatross jets to Nicaragua.[63]

It has been argued in this article that the *rapprochement* of the USSR and Libya is cemented by their common support of revolutionary guerrillas. It appears that through these various activities, which serve Kremlin foreign policy objectives even though the long-range visions of Qaddafi and the Kremlin differ, Libya has attained a very special place among Soviet clients. High-level reciprocal visits between Libya and the sundry countries of the Soviet bloc have become commonplace. (Qaddafi visited Brezhnev in April 1981 and again in October 1981, while Jallud visited Moscow in May 1982 and March 1983. Qaddafi has also visited Bulgaria three times since 1977—in June 1978, April 1981 and January 1983—while Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov visited Libya for the second and third times in March 1980 and March 1984.) By early 1982, Libya had spent more than $12 billion on Soviet arms, and had more than 100 MiG-23s, 40 MiG-25s and 20 MiG-21s in stock, at least two dozen Scaleboard SS-12 missiles, and at least 3,000 Soviet tanks.[64] Already by the end of 1981, there were some 12,000 Soviet military advisers in Libya,

[58] Tripoli JANA (11 Feb. 1982), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), 12 Feb. 1982; and Olga Pellicer, "Mexico in Central America: the Difficult Exercise of Regional Power," in Richard R. Fagen and Olga Pellicer (eds.), *The Future of Central America* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1983), p. 121.

[59] Tripoli JANA (5 May 1982), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), 6 May 1982; *Los Angeles Times* (6 June 1982), p. 1; and *Foreign Report* (1 July 1982), p. 8.

[60] *Foreign Report* (1 July 1982), p. 8, (23 Sept. 1982), p. 8, and (24 March 1983), p. 8.

[61] *Seattle Times* (18 Sept. 1983), p. A24; and "The Libyan Problem," in *Department of State Bulletin* (Oct. 1983), pp. 77–78.

[62] *Business Week* (18 April 1983), p. 54.

[63] Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research* (5 June 1984), p. 19.

[64] *Foreign Report* (21 March 1979), p. 3, and (26 Nov. 1980), p. 1; and Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1982), pp. 197–198.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and by June 1984, some 9,000 Bulgarian advisers, 1,000 Czechoslovak advisers, and an assortment of Cuban, East German and North Korean specialists and advisers.[65] Military cooperation was extended now to embrace the East European states, and between April 1981 and May 1984 there were at least nine bilateral military contacts involving Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland, and there were several meetings likewise with Soviet military delegations, including, on at least one occasion, Defence Minister Ustinov. In November 1984, General Jabir travelled to Budapest to sign a military cooperation agreement with Hungary. Libyan–Polish, Libyan–East German, and other bilateral friendship societies have also been established. In addition, East German advisers have been involved in the training of all three of Libya's secret security services.[66]

In 1977, the year already identified as inaugurating the latest phase in Soviet–Libyan relations, the two countries not only viewed themselves as "revolutionary," but also shared several enemies in common—the US and Britain, Israel (though for the Soviet Union in a limited sense[67]), and (after 1974 for Moscow, after 1975 for Libya) Sadat's Egypt. In these circumstances, Libya's activist foreign policy, while not a "perfect fit" in Soviet strategy, now came to be seen as extremely useful in the Kremlin. Similarly, the Soviet arms cornucopia is useful to Qaddafi.

After early 1978, it became routine for Libya to declare its evaluation of international politics to be "identical" with that of the Soviet Union.[68] When the UN General Assembly voted on the resolution to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Libyan delegate absented himself, and later, in early January 1982, a visit by General Tadeusz Hupalowski, member of the Polish Military Council for National Salvation, provided the occasion for Libya's tacit endorsement of the imposition of martial law in Poland.[69]

Tensions in the Soviet–Libyan nexus arose in the summer of 1982, when Qaddafi became disgruntled at Soviet passivity in the face of Israel's anti-PLO offensive in Lebanon.[70] Qaddafi now sent out certain signals to the West, telling Western reporters that his support of terrorism had been overestimated, underlining his independence of the Kremlin, and hinting that he might be receptive to American courtship. How sincere the mercurial Qaddafi may have been is impossible to tell. What is clear is

[65] *Rheinische Merkur* (4 Sept. 1981), p. 7; Sofia BTA (10 March 1980), in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 11 March 1980; Bulgarian Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research* (30 March 1984), pp. 4–5; and Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research* (5 June 1984), p. 19. See also *Neues Deutschland* (1 March 1984), p. 2, and (7 March 1984), p. 1.

[66] Mansour O. El-Kikhia, "Soviet–Libyan Relations: Internal and External Determinants," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 3 Nov. 1984, p. 32; and *Contemporary Mideast Backgrounder* (7 Jan. 1985), p. 4.

[67] Golan, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization*, pp. 57, 72, 75, 88.

[68] *Christian Science Monitor* (24 March 1981), p. 10.

[69] Tripoli JANA (9 Jan. 1982), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and North Africa), 11 Jan. 1982.

[70] Tripoli JANA (26 June 1982), in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and North Africa), 28 June 1982; and Radio Tripoli (1 Aug. 1982), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and North Africa), 2 Aug. 1982.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that these signals were short-lived and that in early 1983, Libya signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and asked, during Jallud's talks with Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov, to sign a similar treaty with the Soviet Union.[71]

For Libya, *rapprochement* with the USSR may further help in the drive to expand Libyan influence in Africa and to spread revolutionary egalitarianism *à la* Qaddafi.[72] For the Soviet Union, Libyan backing of anti-Western guerrilla groups can be useful in its rivalry with the West, and has the added benefit of being "sanitary"—the work of another power. What is suggested here is not that the evolution in Libyan domestic politics has led directly to evolution in Soviet–Libyan relations, but rather that the export of revolution, intensifying as a factor of the building up of a totalitarian system in Libya, has served, both directly and indirectly, to draw the Soviet Union and Libya ever closer.

Some people may see something inconsistent between a portrayal of Qaddafi as warmly embracing the Soviet leadership, and the fact of Libyan business interests in West Germany and Italy, arms purchases from France and Brazil, labour contracting from American and South Korean firms, and efforts to purchase a nuclear reactor from Belgium.[73] Yet Libyan willingness to purchase equipment from Western sources has nothing to do with political symphathies and scarcely allows one to deny that Libya under Qaddafi has found it advantageous to maintain close relations with the Soviet Union.

[71] *Archiv der Gegenwart* (21 Jan. 1983), p. 26301; Prague CTK (16 March 1983), in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 17 March 1983; *Archiv der Gegenwart* (24 Jan. 1983), pp. 26310–26311; and Radio Moscow in Arabic (21 March 1983), translated in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Soviet Union), 22 March 1983. See also Paris AFP (22 Feb. 1981), in *FBIS, Daily Report* (Middle East and North Africa), 23 Feb. 1981.

[72] Re. the Jamahiriyah's radical egalitarianism, see Lisa Anderson, "Subsidizing Qaddafi's Utopia," in *Worldview* (Aug. 1984), pp. 17–18.

[73] See, *inter alia*, *Seattle Times* (2 Sept. 1984), p. A31; *Corriere della Sera* (3 Sept. 1984), p. 9; *Washington Post* (10 Oct. 1984), p. A14; and *New York Times* (14 Oct. 1984), p. 9.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Philippine Communism and the Soviet Union

Leif Rosenberger

IN the context of the current developments in the Far East, it would be difficult to find any observer of world affairs who was not at least vaguely aware of the staggering problems in the Philippines. The situation is clear: a beleaguered, physically weak and isolated President Marcos faces a severe economic crisis, an increasingly strident non-communist opposition demanding political, social and economic reform, and communist and Moslem guerrillas enjoying increasing success against the ill-equipped Philippine armed forces. The military, in turn, is divided and weakened by frequent charges that General Ver, the Chief of Staff, and other key military leaders were behind the 1983 slaying of popular moderate leader Benigno Aquino.

While the basic problems facing Marcos are increasingly obvious, there are no easy solutions; the future of the country is anything but certain once Marcos leaves the scene. Much depends on the strategy and activities of the Philippine Left. And how the Philippine Left interacts with the non-communist or moderate opposition is ultimately just as critical to the future of politics in the Philippines as the more straightforward military threat posed by communist, and to a lesser extent, Moslem guerrillas.

Two communist parties operate in the Philippines: the dominant, nominally independent CPP, and the much smaller, pro-Soviet PKP. The semi-legal PKP flirts with the Marcos government while gently criticizing its excesses. The PKP publicly stresses peaceful change and eschews violent revolution. The CPP, on the other hand, supports both political and military struggle against the Marcos government. The New People's Army (NPA) is the military arm of the CPP and the National Democratic Front (NDF) is its political arm. Together, the NPA and the NDF are an increasing threat, not only to the present Marcos government, but ultimately to any hopes non-communist Filipinos might have for a lasting restoration of democracy in the Philippines.

Origins of Philippine Communism

The PKP started up in 1930 as a pro-Soviet party devoted to organizing urban workers. It was outlawed a year later. As an underground movement, the PKP floundered, largely because of factionalism and because its leaders were in jail. In 1938, Philippine President Quezon pardoned Luis Taruc and other top PKP leaders. The PKP then merged with the Philippine Socialist Party. During the 1930s, clashes between peasants and landlords began to increase, especially in Central Luzon.[1]

[1] *Christian Science Monitor* (hereinafter referred to as *CSM*), 27 Sept. 1984, pp. 16–17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the Second World War, the PKP was the main force behind the creation of guerrilla fighters known as the Huks—Hukbalahap or People's Anti-Japanese Army. The Huks drew their support from poor and militant peasants in Central Luzon. Under the leadership of PKP Secretary-General Vincente Lava, the Huks began a guerrilla struggle in 1942 against the Japanese occupation forces and those landlords who collaborated with them. Many of these landlords were driven from the rural areas to Manila. By the war's end, the Huks had a well-equipped army of about 20,000 regulars and some 50,000 reserves.

Following the war, the PKP suffered a number of setbacks. First, in the April 1946 election, Manuel A. Roxas was elected President over PKP-supported Sergio Osmena. Second, six members of the Democratic Alliance—a front group dominated by the PKP—were elected to office, only to be unseated by the Philippine government on the grounds of fraud and terrorism at the polls. Third, Juan Feleo, a top official of the PKP, was murdered in August 1946. Fourth, President Elpidio Quirino's offer of amnesty to the Huks in 1948 broke down when the Huks insisted on keeping their arms for self-defence.

These setbacks—especially the failure of the amnesty—prompted the PKP to abandon its legal and parliamentary struggle (of less than four years) and opt for armed struggle. This move followed a power struggle won by the Lava faction of the PKP (led by Jose and Jesus Lava) at the PKP Central Committee conference in May 1948. CPP "appeasers" Pedro Castro, Jorge Frianeza and G. Lacuesta—all opponents of armed struggle—were suspended at the May meeting and later expelled from the party.[2]

In January of 1950, Jose Java, the leader of the PKP, issued a Politburo resolution declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation in the Philippines. The Huks then launched a military offensive which proved to be premature. The rebellion eventually spread to southern Luzan and parts of Visayas, particularly Panay Island.[3] At its peak in 1950, the Huks had a combined strength of about 25,000 men (of which about 12,800 were under arms), and an organized mass support of about 54,000. The PKP also enjoyed the support of about 100,000 members of the Congress of Labour Organizations (CLO).[4]

However, the Huk rebellion proved no match for the Philippine Armed Forces. With the help of US military assistance, the Philippine Defence Minister launched a successful counter-insurgency campaign. He also undercut Huk support by reforming the Philippine Army and using it to rehabilitate and resettle peasants.[5] Thus by the end of 1950, the revitalized Philippine Armed Forces ultimately crushed the Huk guerrillas, who had enjoyed some notable successes in the early days.

[2] See Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA., 1977), chapters 5 and 6.
[3] *CSM*, op. cit.
[4] See Benedict J. Kerkvliet, op. cit. pp. 210–218.
[5] *CSM*, op. cit.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Most devastating to the Philippine communist movement was the October 1950 arrest of Jose Lava and the PKP Politburo in Manila. In addition, Philippine President Magsaysay initiated a progressive economic development project, which by satisfying the peasant's hunger for land, helped to co-opt the previously pro-Huk masses in Central Luzon.[6] Then in 1954, the Philippine Armed Forces launched Operation Milagrosa, which led to the surrender of Luis Taruc, former Huk Chief. Taruc's capitulation demoralized large numbers of PKP members and Huk fighters. Dr Jesus Lava, who succeeded his brother Jose Lava as PKP Secretary-General, realized the futility of the armed struggle strategy and moved the party towards parliamentary struggle.

By the end of 1956, few PKP members remained in favour of peaceful struggle. What was left on the battlefield was equally unimpressive. In fact, Huk strength dwindled from an estimated 12,800 armed men in 1950 to only about 700 by the end of 1956. Similarly, the Huk mass base fell from about 54,000 in 1950 to only about 21,000 by 1956.[7]

Then in 1957, even peaceful strategy was blocked once the Anti-Subversive Law was enacted, effectively outlawing the PKP.[8] Although several hundred Huks remained under arms during the 1950s and 1960s in Central Luzon, they posed no significant threat to the Philippine government.

Origins of the CPP

But while the Huks were forced to regroup in the 1960s, they were far from dead. Peasant grievances and a new wave of Philippine nationalism during the 1960s kept the communist revolutionary mood alive. Huk remnants formed the New People's Army (NPA) under Bernabe Buscayno ("Commander Dante"). In 1970, the NPA became the military arm of a newly emerging Philippine Communist Party (CPP), which in turn had split away from the traditional PKP the previous year. In essence, the creation of the CPP was the result of a disagreement within PKP ranks over revolutionary strategy.

The older PKP, decimated by the brutally successful counter-insurgency of the late 1950s, was fearful of pursuing armed struggle, at least until it could increase its following. The PKP, therefore, supported only peaceful, legal struggle.

The CPP, under the leadership of Jose Sison, was composed of young urban intellectuals from Manila, who had not experienced the crushing counter-insurgency of the late 1950s. Internally, the CPP was guided by the militant nationalism and anti-Americanism of Senator Claro Recto. Externally, the CPP was inspired by the revolutions in Cuba and Vietnam.[9]

[6] See Benedict J. Kerkvliet, op. cit. pp. 238–242.
[7] See ibid. pp. 233–248.
[8] See David A. Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," in *Problems of Communism*, Sept.–Oct. 1984, p. 32.
[9] Ibid. p. 33.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The PKP-CPP dispute over internal revolutionary strategy had an international communist component as well. The traditionally pro-Soviet PKP went along with the Soviet view that objective revolutionary conditions must be present before successful armed struggle can take place. The CPP, on the other hand, went along with the Chinese view, which stood Leninism on its head. The Chinese felt that the pursuit of armed struggle would serve to create revolutionary conditions. Consequently, the PKP continued to receive political and material support from the Soviet Union while the upstart CPP began receiving political and material support from the Chinese.

Beginning in January 1970, the CPP put their armed struggle strategy into action. The CPP orchestrated increasingly violent street demonstrations and protests against the Marcos government, culminating with acts of terrorism in Manila.

Philippine President Marcos responded to communist-initiated violence with a brutal crackdown. In August of 1971, Marcos declared a state of emergency and suspended writ of habeas corpus (giving the Philippine leader the power to arrest and detain people without trial) and other constitutional rights. Then in September 1972, President Marcos announced the martial-law decree, citing the need to suppress the "state of rebellion" instigated by the NPA. Two months later, the Philippine Armed Forces rounded up 6,100 people.[10]

Over the next four years (1972–76), President Marcos carried out a military offensive against the CPP/NPA. In many ways, the offensive was quite successful. During this period, Manila could claim that it had captured most of the communist leadership and had all but eliminated CPP front organizations. In addition, the Philippine Armed Forces checked the growth of NPA insurgency, and forced it underground.[11]

By 1975, the CPP/NPA realized that the Chinese Party line—advocating armed struggle—had been premature at best. Even more disturbing was the Chinese decision to cut off material aid to the CPP/NPA. Henceforth, the CPP/NPA began to look to Leninism and Moscow for inspiration and political support.

In practice, this meant that the CPP would begin to follow the Soviet Party line on revolutionary strategy in the Philippines, which had been ignored by the upstart CPP Maoists in 1970. The Soviet position was that a communist political infrastructure had to be solidly in place before a successful armed struggle could be waged. Thus, Moscow advocated patient organizational and political activity until the revolutionary conditions were more favourable for armed struggle.

The CPP/NPA followed the Soviet Party line and stood down militarily between 1975 and 1980. During this period, the Philippine Army came to the false conclusion that the CPP/NPA problem had been eradicated. The Army, therefore, redirected its efforts against the Moslem

[10] *CSM*, op. cit.
[11] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

secessionists led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). This tactical mistake by the Philippine Army essentially gave the CPP/NPA a golden opportunity to recruit, organize and train military and political cadres, totally free from government scrutiny.

The CPP spent much of this period from 1975–80 building a new united front infrastructure and network. Actually, the idea of a broad united front—consisting of all elements of the anti-Marcos opposition but controlled by the CPP—had been raised by the CPP before this period. In fact, it was discussed at the second Party plenum in September 1970. Then in late 1971, the CPP Central Committee established a programme which called for CPP cadre contacts with Party sympathizers among radical students, church activists, Moslem secessionists and even anti-Marcos right-wing nationalist groups. Unfortunately for the CPP, Marcos' imposition of martial law disrupted these united front attempts. At best, the CPP was only able to attach itself to existing non-communist opposition groups. The CPP, however, did enjoy limited progress among some church activists.

But during the 1975–80 period, the CPP made giant strides in building its united front infrastructure and network. CPP Chief Jose Sison resurrected the national front programme in May of 1977. Further progress towards organizing a national front was evident at the time of the April 1978 parliamentary elections. Thereafter, it became an increasingly important institution in CPP planning.

Today's National Democratic Front—the centrepiece of the CPP political programme—really began to take shape in 1980–81. At the seventh plenum in August 1980, the Central Committee of the CPP discussed moving from the preparatory stage to the creation of a formal National Democratic Front to challenge President Marcos politically. And in contrast to its earlier efforts, the CPP took the necessary steps to assure its *de facto* control over the movement. At the same time, of course, the CPP goes to considerable lengths formally to describe itself as merely a member of the NDF, which in turn is portrayed as a radical umbrella group.

In 1980, the CPP announced that the five years of patient organizational activity had been a great success and it would once again pursue armed struggle. The CPP declared that it had about 10,000 CPP members and almost an equal number of NPA guerrillas.[12]

Over the next three years, the CPP/NPA made even more impressive gains. The NPA has expanded itself geographically. Once only strong in the mountains north of Baguio in Luzon and in the rugged Samar region, the NPA has spread its operations and influence into large areas of the Bicol region in southern Luzon, the northern part of the central Luzon province of Nueva Ecija, the mountainous area of both northern and southern Mindinao, and has most recently become strong in the West Visayan Islands of Negros and Panay.[13]

[12] Ibid.

[13] *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereinafter referred to as *FEER*), 28 June 1984, p. 40.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, according to CPP Central Committee figures, CPP membership between 1980 and December 1983 grew threefold, from 10,000 to about 30,000. CPP regional organizations increased from 12 to 17 during this period. Guerrilla fronts jumped from 28 to 45. And the total of full- and part-time NPA fighters (excluding local village militia) increased from 8,000 to 20,000 during the period.[14]

Organization and Leadership

A. The PKP

The Secretary-General of the PKP is Felicisimo Macapagal. Jose Lava, former PKP Secretary-General and current PKP representative to the *World Marxist Review*, is a ranking member of the PKP Politburo. Both Macapagal and Lava are in their seventies.

Prominent members of the Central Committee include University of the Philippines law professors Merlin Magallona and Jesus Lava, who was recently released from prison. Magallona is the PKP secretary for political affairs. In this capacity, he is believed to be the leading Party theoretician together with fellow University of the Philippines law professor Haydee Yorac. In addition, Magallona is often mentioned as the heir apparent to Macapagal.

B. The CPP

Formally, the highest organ of the CPP-ML is the National Congress, which is convened every five years by the Central Committee, unless it is deemed necessary to hold it later or earlier. The National Congress hears reports of the Central Committee, decides the Party's general political line and elects members and candidate members of the Central Committee and other central organs.

Functions and powers of the Central Committee are carried out between plenums by the Politburo and its Executive Committee. The Secretariat takes charge of the administration and day-to-day activities of the Party under guidance from the Politburo. The Secretariat also controls the National Finance Bureau, National Liaison Bureau, and the International Liaison and Propaganda Commission.

In all, there are believed to be somewhere between a dozen and two dozen Central Committee members. Although most of the members have held their positions for many years, the Central Committee is a surprisingly young group, with most of its members believed to be in their mid-thirties. Prominent Central Committee members include Chairman Rodolfo Salas (alias Commander Bilog), head of the Central Committee rural branch, Secretary-General Rafael Baylosis, head of the urban branch of the Central Committee, Antonio Zumel, chief propagandist, and Vice-Chairman Juanito Rivera (alias Commander Juaning), NPA Commander and Chairman of the CPP Military Commission.

[14] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This Central Committee Party structure is, in turn, subdivided into functional and territorial organizations. The functional offices include the National Commission on Mass Movements and the United Front Commission. The territorial offices mostly deal with Party matters in Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, the Visayas and Mindinao. These territorial offices are, in turn, subdivided into 15 regions, each serviced by a regional Party committee whose basic purpose is to facilitate Party activities at that level. In addition to the 15 regional committees, the CPP has established five Party commissions whose purpose is to direct and coordinate political and military activities across regional Party committee lines.

Thus, effective control of the CPP theoretically rests with the Central Committee, whose directives ultimately go down to the regional Party committees for implementation. But since Central Committee plenums meet infrequently, few directives actually get to the regional Party committee. Lacking detailed directives, the regional Party committees—the key link between the Party leadership and the rank and file—have developed *de facto* autonomy, often to the point of being financially self-sufficient. The autonomy of the regional Party committees has, in turn, helped the Party take advantage of local opportunities to expand. Statistics reflect just how successful the CPP has been in sharply expanding its provincial base. The CPP is now active in all of the country's 72 provinces.

As the CPP influence expanded into the eastern and southern provinces, more non-Tagalog/Ilocano speakers joined the Party, thus making it harder for the CPP Tagalog/Ilocano-speaking leadership—which is centralized in central and northern Luzon—to maintain its control. This demographic reality coupled with the archipelagic nature of the Philippines—a country consisting of 7,000 islands—has made decentralization a practical necessity for the CPP.

Decentralization of the Party has made it difficult for Marcos to develop a successful counter-insurgency. In fact, the autonomy of the CPP has played a key role in the survival of the Party despite what the Philippine government has labelled "crippling blows"—the arrest or killing of high-level CPP-ML cadres, such as Bernabe Buscayno, former commander of the NPA, who was arrested in August 1976, and Jose Maria Sison, former Secretary-General, who was captured in 1977.

C. The NPA

During the course of fighting its protracted "people's war," the NPA is trying to create and employ four types of fighting units: regular mobile forces, guerrilla forces, militia and self-defence corps, and armed city partisans.[15] Each type of unit has a specific type of task to perform. The armed city partisans are to disrupt governmental activities and assassinate individuals considered to be traitors in the cities. Militia and

[15] *The Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines*, SEATO short paper, No. 52, Bangkok SEATO Research Office, 1971, p. 24.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self-defence corps are to defend the masses in local areas without separating themselves from daily productive work. Guerrilla zones are defended by guerrilla forces, who are also to create new guerrilla zones and prepare for the emergence of regular mobile forces. The regular mobile forces are to defend the rural bases and destroy government forces on a large scale. The regular mobile forces are organized into battalions, companies, platoons and squads.

The Growing Communist Insurgency

During the first half of 1984, President Marcos continued to belittle the effectiveness of the New People's Army (NPA) and was critical of those who claimed its influence was widespread. While conceding that the NPA did affect the lives of some people in remote rural areas and kept the Army active, Marcos argued that its political influence in most major cities, where power traditionally lies, remained marginal.[16] Military and government officials said there were only about 5,000 NPA fighters active in the communist insurgency.[17] In essence, Marcos wanted Washington to believe that "everything was under control" in the Philippines.

In early 1984, President Marcos even hinted that he might take a conciliatory approach towards CPP members in the hope of co-opting them. In fact, on 17 January, Marcos disclosed to newsmen that he was studying the possibility of granting selective amnesty to CPP members who had disowned subversive beliefs and expressed a readiness to return to peaceful society.[18]

On 22 March, Philippine Defence Minister Enrile noted that the NPA had changed tactics from small group operations to massing larger attacks on secluded military or police detachments. However, he rejected the idea that this was an indication that the NPA was growing stronger, only that it was their way of "creating the impression" that it was strong and that its fighters were all over the country.[19]

However, it was not long before Marcos and Enrile had to begin taking these die-hard Philippine communists more seriously. For in early 1984, the New People's Army was indeed a formidable military force, and therefore, difficult to ignore. At the beginning of the year, the CPP Central Committee vowed to step up ambushes by company strength units significantly throughout the rest of 1984. Heightened liaison between rural NPA units and their urban front organizations was also expected, with occasional NPA-initiated terrorism in the cities.[20]

By April 1983, the NPA was enjoying so much success that it felt it could abandon its heavy emphasis on hit-and-run tactics and adopt more conventional military warfare. Instead of operating only in small groups

[16] *FEER*, op. cit. pp. 40–41.
[17] See David A. Rosenberg, op. cit. p. 38.
[18] *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service* (hereinafter referred to as *FBIS*), Asia and Pacific, 18 Jan. 1984, p. P3.
[19] Ibid. 26 March 1984, p. P1.
[20] *FEER*, op. cit. p. 40.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of three to nine guerrillas, the NPA began to operate in groups of 200 in some areas.[21]

In addition, a well-organized urban insurgency was rapidly becoming a serious problem. In cities such as Davao—the country's third largest city located in southern Mindinao—the CPP is trying to expand its influence via urban front organizations. In addition, the CPP/NPA has developed "sparrow units," consisting of three or four urban terrorists.

These sparrow units began attacking local police in Davao in early 1984. By the end of April, 22 policemen had been killed by sparrow units in Davao.[22]

In May, the CPP/NPA put the government and the military on notice that assassinations were no longer to be limited to the provinces. On 24 May, the CPP took credit for the brutal gangland-style murder of northern Manila commander Brigadier-General Thomas Karingal as he sat down for dinner at a Quezon City restaurant. CPP assassination of Karingal may have been in reprisal for Karingal's role as commander of the Army troops which broke up a strike at a Manila factory in April. The CPP Central Committee said it planned to increase the frequency of such terrorism during the rest of 1984.[23] Other senior military officers are likely to be assassinated as well. The CPP/NPA has already indicated that it is targeting senior police officers in charge of controlling protests and demonstrations.[24]

By May, even President Marcos was taking the NPA more seriously. On 2 May, Marcos admitted that there was growing evidence that the communist insurgency was once more on the upsurge despite the counter-insurgency drive launched in 1983 by the Army. Marcos also stated that intelligence estimates placed the armed strength of the NPA at 6,810 men in 1983, which was 25 per cent higher than the previous year's estimate.[25]

That same month, the NPA itself stated more credibly that the number of its trained fighters had risen to 20,000 of which 10,000 were armed. Regardless of the exact number, NPA guerrillas were making their presence felt in all of the 73 provinces in 1984.[26]

In May, the NPA began to hit high ticket items owned by powerful Filipinos. The NPA destroyed a multi-million-dollar coconut and cacao plantation in the south owned by coconut king Eduardo Cojuangco. In northern Luzon, the NPA also attacked projects run by the Cagayan Valley Development Authority, which in turn is closely associated with Defence Minister Enrile.[27]

During the May parliamentary elections, the NPA did what it could to

[21] *CSM*, op. cit. pp. 16–17.
[22] *FEER*, 28 June 1984, p. 41.
[23] Ibid.
[24] *CSM*, op. cit. pp. 16–17.
[25] *FBIS*, Asia and Pacific, 4 May 1984, p. P1.
[26] Ross H. Munro, "Dateline Manila: Moscow's Next Win?" in *Foreign Policy*, No. 56, Fall 1984, p. 181.
[27] David A. Rosenberg, op. cit. p. 38.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disrupt the democratic process. For instance, in Samar, the NPA snatched 427 ballot boxes on election day. In addition, the NPA resorted to more violent means to disrupt the elections. On election day alone, the NPA killed more than 60 Army troops.[28]

Following the 14 May National Assembly elections, Marcos tried to make a case that the Philippines was still a stable country, despite stepped up terrorism on the part of the NPA. He clung to his claim that the NPA did not pose a serious threat to his 200,000-member military or to his 18-year-old government. He attributed the strengthened support the NPA was enjoying in rural areas to poor economic conditions.[29]

In June, the CPP/NPA stated that it was especially proud of its success at assassination operations. During the first six months of 1984, the NPA claimed responsibility for 56 assassinations of political or military leaders.[30]

To be sure, President Marcos' counter-insurgency was not altogether ineffective. In fact, the Philippine Army did enjoy some successes, as was the case when it captured Pantaleon Parasi, a CPP secretary on 15 April. At his safe house, the military also found weapons and documents revealing plans to engage in terrorist activities during the 14 May elections.[31] But on the whole, Marcos was so preoccupied with staggering economic problems, the Aquino investigation and his own failing health, that the NPA insurgency did not get the attention it deserved.

In late June, Marcos finally grasped just how bad the security situation was becoming and took some strong action against the NPA. The army launched the largest military offensive ever against the NPA. Three thousand troops moved into the mountains of central and northern Luzon on a search and destroy mission. The operation was aimed at more than 600 NPA rebels on the border between Kalinga and Mountain province, in the Cordillera Mountains about 185 kilometres north of Manila. Among the military's targets was a rebel priest, Conrado Balweg. Fifty-one rebels in the northern highlands were killed in the fiercest fighting of the year. Philippine Chief of Staff General Ver indicated that the military also launched another offensive on another front in Mindinao. During the northern operation in Luzon, Philippine troops captured a guerrilla camp and found documents and ammunition abandoned by retreating NPA guerrillas.[32] Then on 7 July, the military captured Judith Acosta, another CPP ringleader.[33]

In July, even Defence Minister Enrile was changing his cavalier attitude. Enrile called the NPA insurgency a "sensitive matter" and

[28] Ibid. p. 39.

[29] For an official US government statement on how the economic problems are contributing to gains by the communist insurgents, see the statement by Paul D. Wolfowitz, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the *Wall Street Journal*, 15 April 1985, p. 29.

[30] *FEER*, 28 June 1984, p. 41.

[31] Rosenberg, op. cit. p. 40.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stated that the situation has "deteriorated. The building of the NPA was quite dramatic."[34]

By August, it was clear that NPA guerrillas and cadres had penetrated Metro Manila. They are the core of what the CPP calls "composite units," militant and well-disciplined students, workers and urban poor, who appear to be at the forefront of recent demonstrations. These composite units demonstrated their discipline and precision at a rally on 17 August.[35]

In September, Washington began to express alarm. A US Senate staff report that month argued that the NPA is "stronger today than ever before." It also claimed that the NPA is enjoying a new wave of popularity, in part because of the economic crisis and continuing abuses by the Philippine Army.[36]

Shortly thereafter, Assistant US Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz argued that the Philippine government is perceived to be on the defensive vis-à-vis the NPA, especially in Mindinao.[37] According to Wolfowitz, the CPP/NPA now influences or even controls 20 per cent of Philippine villages.[38]

Then in October, the Philippine government revealed that the NPA had killed approximately 6,000 Philippine military personnel and civilians. Of the 6,000 deaths, 1,600 had occurred in the nine-month period between January and October 1984.[39]

In late October, the credibility of Marcos' beleaguered counter-insurgency forces—suffering from an image problem because of their alleged abuses of the people they are supposed to protect—received another blow. The Agrava Board, set up by Marcos to investigate the Aquino killing, concluded in two reports issued in late October that Benigno Aquino—the popular opposition leader killed on 21 August 1983—was the victim of a military conspiracy involving senior military officers. Philippine Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver and 24 other military officers were charged with orchestrating the assassination. Following the reports, Marcos granted Ver a leave of absence pending the resolution of the case.

The Agrava Board's findings were a shot in the arm to the NPA in its efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Filipino people. With new confidence, the NPA showed increasing willingness to sustain losses and engage the Philippine Army in more conventional battles, instead of limiting operations to hit-and-run guerrilla raids. The NPA began stepping up its guerrilla activity, enlarging its attack units to battalions of about 300 guerrillas and bringing the insurgency into towns and cities.[40]

The NPA's aggressive tactics continued to put the Army on the

[34] *FBIS*, Asia and Pacific, 16 July 1984, p. P3.
[35] *CSM*, 27 Sept. 1984, pp. 16–17.
[36] *San Francisco Examiner*, 14 Oct. 1984, pp. A1 and A24.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] *Washington Post*, 3 Dec. 1984, p. 10.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defensive on a number of occasions. For instance, in the province of Agusan del Norte in Mindinao, the NPA temporarily captured an Army installation protecting a key highway junction and attacked police stations and a military headquarters in the city of Butuan.[41]

In Mindinao, NPA units were observed moving in groups of 100 to 200, swooping down on towns, police outposts and military convoys and capturing pistols, rifles, ammunition, and with increasing frequency, heavier equipment such as grenade launchers and mortars.[42]

These kinds of activities by the NPA prompted General Fidel "Eddie" Ramos to be more candid about the insurgency. In November, Ramos revealed that in the first 10 months of 1984 the NPA killed 2,650 persons, including 800 government troops and 65 civilian officials, and caused an estimated $10 million worth of property damage in about 3,500 ambushes, raids and other incidents. In addition, Ramos estimated NPA strength to be somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 armed fighters--the highest Philippine official figure up until that time.[43]

In November, about 200 NPA guerrillas using stolen trucks from a logging camp attacked a fortified base camp of an Army company at Lianga Bay in the Mindinao province of Surigao del Sur. The NPA reportedly penetrated and overran the bases and captured many weapons, including machine guns. The entire operation was considered "very professional" by diplomatic sources. Philippine Defence Minister Enrile called this attack the first effort at conventional-type warfare instead of their typical guerrilla warfare.[44]

The NPA is also conducting a somewhat less organized and more indiscriminate terrorist campaign in cities such as Zamboanga. Popular opposition leaders are now considered key targets for the NPA in these cities. For instance, on 14 November, Cesar Climaco, an opposition mayor from the southern city of Zamboanga on Mindinao, was assassinated. The new mayor, Susan de los Reyes, pleaded for help from Manila to deal with an obviously deteriorating security situation.[45]

Then on 28 November, 100 NPA guerrillas attacked about 300 soldiers at an Army installation in Mindinao's Davao del Norte Province. According to Army reports, four Philippine military members were killed and four wounded, while three NPA fighters were killed and eight were wounded.[46]

Reuben Canoy, former opposition legislator from Mindinao, challenged the Defence Minister's statement to Marcos on 30 November that "the situation in Mindinao is stabilizing." Canoy warned that Mindinao "may fall to the communists in five years or less" unless drastic steps are taken. Canoy charged that the Army was no longer capable of controlling the situation on the island and was losing battles because it

[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lacked popular support. He argued that the NPA was gaining more recruits and firepower, enabling them to overrun military facilities and occupy towns.[47]

Another such concerted NPA assault against a sizeable Army detachment occurred on 1 December, when the NPA fought an eight-hour battle at the town of Bayog about 90 miles north-east of Zambaonga on Mindinao. According to Army accounts, 20 NPA guerrillas were killed and 30 were wounded, while 10 Philippine military members were killed and 13 wounded.[48]

Then on 2 December, one government militiaman was killed and 13 others wounded in Zamboanga when a bomb exploded at the military headquarters.[49] The day after the bombing, General Ramos spent two days touring Zamboanga and Davao. Following some frank assessments by General Castro and other military leaders in the south, Ramos finally admitted that security in Zamboanga and Davao was "bad."[50]

This serious upsurge in NPA-initiated violence throughout the Philippines—but especially in Mindinao—finally prompted Marcos to convene cabinet meetings on 8 and 11 December. Following these high-level meetings, Marcos met with military leaders in an effort to come up with counter-insurgency which would more effectively arrest the terrorism directed against both military and civilian targets.[51]

At a December press conference, Ramos revealed that more than 1,650 people were killed in some 3,500 NPA-initiated attacks reported from all of the country's 73 provinces. Ramos added that in recent weeks, more than 100 casualties occurred in a new wave of violence in Mindinao alone.[52] Ambushes of military patrols and urban shootings were occurring almost daily.

During 1984, the CPP/NPA also showed signs of renewing its dialogue and tentative association with so-called non-communist urban underground guerrilla groups. Up to seven of these guerrilla or terrorist groups are active in the Philippines today. All the groups have improved their methods, changed their tactics, and generally increased their training, sophistication and violence since their relatively unsuccessful activities beginning in 1980. The largest of the groups—the April 6 Movement, named after the day of a major 1978 Manila protest—is believed to have 200 members.[53]

The CPP is talking with the urban guerrillas in Manila about a potential new alliance. In meetings with the April 6 Movement, the CPP reportedly offered the group 100,000 pesos ($5,000). Although the April 6 Movement turned down the offer, it apparently tried to persuade the CPP to concentrate on urban terrorism, arguing that the CPP was

[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] *FEER*, 27 Dec. 1984–3 Jan. 1985, p. 26.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] *San Francisco Examiner*, 14 Oct. 1984, pp. A1 and A24.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actually much better equipped and organized for urban violence than was the April 6 Movement.[54]

While the urban terrorist groups appear to be moving closer to the CPP, they will probably continue to get the bulk of their support from moderate opposition leaders, as they have in the past. According to Marcos, the late Benigno Aquino was a key figure supporting these urban guerrilla groups. Interestingly enough, many of the meetings between the moderate politicians and these urban guerrillas have occurred at homes in the San Francisco Bay area in the past couple of years.[55]

The CPP/NPA is also encouraged by some inroads it is making in the Philippine Army. At a low level, there are reports of accommodations between the military and the communists. Ross H. Munro, a journalist for *Time* magazine who visits NPA-influenced regions frequently, maintains that such accommodations are "occurring with increasing frequency and take many forms: the individual soldier who steals rifles and ammunition from his armory and sells them to the communists; the isolated unit, left without a vehicle or a radio, that ignores a communist 'teach-in' from its outpost."[56]

At a higher level, Munro claims that local commanders of the Philippine Army "reach tacit live-and-let-live agreements" with guerrillas. Manila senior military officials say that even regional military commanders have been arranging such *modi vivendi* and calling them "pacification." He cites the island of Samar as an example of an area "once rife with ugly encounters between the military and the NPA. Now it is relatively quiet despite reports that the NPA has transformed Samar's interior into a sanctuary for training, as well as rest and recreation."[57]

On 16 December, Jose Maria Sison, former chief of the CPP, disclosed that the CPP now had "tens of thousands of cadres and rank-and-file members." The CPP leader said that in Mindinao and a few other areas, the struggle had already passed through the first stage of "strategic defence" and had already entered the second stage of "strategic balance" or stalemate. But Sison added that the revolution will soon enter its second stage all across the country. He stressed that "this must be accomplished in a few years." According to Sison, in this second stage, the forces of the revolution will match the strength of the government in the political and military fields. This will make it possible for the revolutionary forces temporarily to occupy towns and provincial capitals. Sison predicted that at this point, the revolutionary forces will be capable of annihilating government Army battalions (of 500 strong each) and companies (of 120 strong).[58]

[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ross H. Munro, op. cit. p. 19.
[57] Ibid.
[58] For a knowledgeable comparison of the strengths of today's New People's Army and the Huks at its peak in 1950, see Francisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," in Lim Joo-jock (ed.), *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia* (St Martin's Press, NY, 1984), pp. 71–105.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With this goal in mind, the CPP plans to intensify its political and military activities throughout the Philippines, culminating in 1987 in what it calls a "first quarter storm." At this point, the CPP/NPA expects to have armed units—known as armed city partisans—operational in Manila on a regular basis. At the same time, the CPP/NPA plans to step up armed struggle in rural areas.[59]

Moreover, by 1987, the CPP expects to be strong enough to meet the Philippine Army in conventional clashes throughout the Philippines. At this point, NPA units plan to be operating throughout the Philippines in company-sized units of 100 or more units, something which is being done today only in NPA strongholds such as Mindinao. NPA guerrillas also plan to launch "local uprisings" in smaller urban areas.[60]

Communist Manipulation of the Moderate Opposition

In late 1984, Philippine Defence Minister Enrile said that "the military problem [posed by the NPA] can be contained and handled . . . It's the political problem that can be much harder to contend with."[61] In particular, Enrile was concerned about the increased political and subversive threat presented by the CPP-controlled National Democratic Front (NDF).

The new threat posed by the NDF is, in large part, the result of a shift in CPP strategy. "Up to now our concentration has been on the armed struggle," says an NDF supporter in Manila, who often meets with traditional political opposition figures. "But the political struggle is gaining more and more importance. It is no longer just an auxiliary to our battles in the countryside. We are organizing in the white areas [the cities], forming alliances with all sectors and organizing them."[62]

While the CPP has numerous fronts at its disposal, the NDF essentially coordinates the activities of most of them. Certainly the NDF has been more successful than any other single group—communist or non-communist—in exploiting the anti-Marcos sentiment that has increased since the Aquino slaying in 1983. The NDF has used its leaders and organizers to infiltrate every aspect of the anti-Marcos protest movement—labour, clergy, student and urban poor organizations.[63]

The CPP/NDF has long been associated with Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) and the newer League of Filipino Students (LFS) founded in 1977. The NDF also appears to be a key force behind many of the protest organizations which have sprung up since the Aquino assassination, including the Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA) movement and the August 21 Movement (ATOM). The CPP/NDF is also believed to be associated with the Task Force Detainees—a human rights group sponsored by the Catholic Church, the Ecumenical

[59] *CSM*, 27 Sept. 1984, pp. 16–17.
[60] Ibid.
[61] *San Francisco Examiner*, 11 Nov. 1984, pp. A1 and A24.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI), which defends arrested CPP/NPA/NDF cadres in court, and the Association of Concerned Teachers (ACT).

The NDF is also making inroads among the middle and upper-middle classes, newly awakened by the Aquino murder. In particular, the CPP/NDF appeals to the Philippine business class which wants a smaller role for US and other foreign businesses. In the words of one NDF strategist: "The 'urban petite bourgeoisie' is a strategic sector for us . . . We've learned a lot about how to deal with them and their basic demands in the last year. The assassination [of Aquino] helped a lot. They realized if it happened to Aquino, one of the elite, it could happen to any of them. Really big business may never side with us. But this petit-bourgeois group is another question."[64]

Another key ally of the NDF has been a radical faction in the Catholic Church in the Philippines. In fact, the rapid growth of the NDF owes much to the work of radical Catholic clergy and laymen. The radical Catholic community has worked with the NDF in political influence operations and protests against the Marcos government.[65]

The radicalization of many Catholic clergy and laymen found its expression in their embracing the "liberation theology," which has been sweeping Central and South America in recent years.[66] The new "liberation theologians" in the Philippines have declared war on capitalism in the Philippines and have in effect embraced Marxism-Leninism, a stance which runs counter to the Vatican's September 1984 condemnation of Marxist elements of liberation theology (Pope John Paul II strongly defended this position again on 21 December 1984).[67] Nevertheless, an increasing number of Catholic clergy and laymen seem determined to ignore papal instructions. In fact, many Philippine priests and nuns have actually taken up arms and are fighting with the New People's Army.

In addition, CPP/NPA links to the Moro National Liberation Front—Moslem separatists centred in Mindinao—appear to be continuing. MNLF expertise in weapons smuggling made them most attractive to the NPA, who needed increased amounts of weapons in 1984 in order to exploit Philippine instability more effectively.

Reports of CPP–MNLF links are not new. In fact, the first time the Marcos government noted that the NPA had joined with the MNLF in seeking independence for Mindinao occurred in October 1977.[68] But reports of CPP–MNLF links became more credible in the early 1980s.

During 1983, President Marcos stated that there was no evidence that the NPA and MNLF were operating together in any serious way. He

[64] Ibid.

[65] See Earl Martin, "The Philippine Church Amidst Revolution," in *Peace Section Newsletter* (Akron, PA.), published by the Mennonite Central Committee, Sept.–Oct. 1982.

[66] Ibid.

[67] *Washington Post*, 22 Dec. 1984, p. 10.

[68] *CSM*, 27 Sept. 1984, pp. 16–17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

noted that in some cases they had joint training but staged different operations. "In some instances they may exchange intelligence information, but that's about all," he added.[69]

While addressing a PC–INP (Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police) national seminar in March 1983, President Marcos acknowledged that in some areas of the south, the MNLF and NPA had joined forces and were exerting efforts to strengthen themselves further.[70]

For years, the NPA has been anxious to link up with the MNLF. Although the Moslems view communism as a "godless" ideology, there have been documented reports of on-the-ground cooperation between the MNLF and NPA in Mindanao on the basis that the Marcos government is the common enemy.[71]

As far as future relations between the MNLF and NDF are concerned, the *Southeast Asia Chronicle* noted that it is important to remember that "Misauri and many of the core leaders of the MNLF have personal and political ties with the NDF leadership." Many of them worked together, "in progressive student organizations like the KM while they were undergraduates at the same universities."[72]

The *NDF-Update* for March–April 1983, publication of the NDF International Office, claims that the NDF and MNLF have developed good relations resulting in tactical cooperation between the NPA and the MNLF's Bangsa Moro Army.

This "tactical cooperation" appears to be taking place and making a prophet out of an NPA spokesman who stated that "perhaps by the mid-1980s we'll have a formal agreement."[73]

The greatest triumph of the NDF, however, was its ability to alter significantly the nature of the moderate opposition in the Philippines. And it did so in spite of the setback it received at the time of the National Assembly elections in May 1984.

The NDF, allied with a radical minority faction in moderate ranks, pushed for an election boycott, while a traditional or "purist" majority faction in the moderate camp supported the election and wanted to keep its distance from the communists. At first, it seemed that the 59 seats which the majority faction won in the National Assembly vindicated the "purists" and strengthened the forces of democracy and non-communism in the Philippines.

But it was not long before the NDF and the radical faction experienced vindication, thus turning the tables on the "purists." While the "purists' " election victory demonstrated the unpopularity of the Marcos government, it had no real impact on Marcos' political power, since the National Assembly continued to be just as ineffective at bringing about meaningful reforms after the election as it had been before the event.

[69] *FBIS*, Asia and Pacific, 28 Jan. 1983, p. P10.
[70] *FBIS*, Asia and Pacific, 16 March 1983, p. P1.
[71] *FEER*, 22 Dec. 1983, p. 26.
[72] *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, No. 62, p. 17.
[73] See Rosenberg, op. cit. pp. 42–43.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

According to Salvador Laurel, the opposition leader who heads the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), the 14 May election "proved that people would like to exhaust all peaceful measures before they resort to violence" to bring about change.[74] However, there appears to be a feeling in opposition ranks that, as opposition Assemblyman Zafiro Respicio puts it, "the days for peaceful change are running out."[75]

A national survey undertaken in the Philippines by the Bishops--Businessmen's Conference, a Catholic civic group, statistically supports Respicio's gut feelings. The survey indicates that "people who may lose faith in peaceful means of promoting change outnumber those who are more hopeful about the situation by a margin of more than 70 per cent."[76]

Once the moderates realized that their electoral successes were ephemeral and provided little leverage with Marcos, a new polarization began to develop. Many "purists" began to see the logic in a "parliament in the streets" approach to ousting Marcos. A new radical majority was formed consisting of exasperated old "purists" and the old radical faction. These new radicals see nothing wrong with striking up tactical alliances with the communists, "since the democratic process doesn't work." Meanwhile, the old "purist" majority, which wanted nothing to do with the communists, has seen its numbers dwindle, and is now a weak minority.

The radical faction argues that it must unite with the communists if it ever expects to mount a credible challenge to Marcos. Generally speaking, this radical faction tends to view the communists as a constituency to be won over (or a force to be cast aside once they gain power), rather than as a serious competitor for power. The moderates seem to overestimate their own political power and naively underestimate the unilateral political strength which the CPP demands, and feels it is earning on the battlefield.[77]

The attitude of many in the radical faction can best be summed up by a remark made by Aquilino Pimentel—head of the Filipino Democratic Party and a presidential hopeful for 1987—at a demonstration in Manila on 21 August, a year after the Aquino assassination. Rejecting the idea that the CPP would pose any problem for the moderates, Pimentel said that "the left these days follows Butz [the brother of the slain Benigno Aquino] . . . Whatever Butz says goes."[78]

The "purists," on the other hand, feel that the radical majority are *naïve* and are already selling out to the communists. For instance, former Senator Eva Kalaw, once sympathetic to the CPP cause herself, is now sharply critical of the infiltration of communists into moderate protest movement activities. In Kalaw's words: "The reds are using us, and I'm exposing them. I don't care if we lose some votes, they're taking

[74] *Washington Post*, 13 Aug. 1984, p. 10.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] *CSM*, 27 Sept. 1984, pp. 16–17.
[78] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

advantage of our people."[79] Unfortunately, Kalaw and other "purists" are no longer respected by the activists in the streets of Manila, as was evident in August when she was booed at a huge anti-Marcos rally by communist demonstrators.[80]

The "purists" are also well aware of another subversive threat which the NDF represents. The "purists" knew that in any coalition government between moderates and communists, the CPP can depend on the NPA to remain totally loyal to the communist cause. In contrast, the moderates cannot rely unconditionally on the military. The Philippine Army has demonstrated loyalty only to President Marcos. What the Philippine Army would do in the midst of a confusing moderate/communist coalition or a succession struggle is an open question.

Within the moderate opposition, there also exists a bitter clash between those who are fundamentally pro-US but are critical of close US ties to Marcos, and those who are fundamentally anti-American, although not necessarily communist sympathizers across the board. The pro-American, moderate opposition elements find it difficult to mount an effective attack on the Marcos government without at least making tactical alliances with the fundamentally anti-American opposition elements. These anti-US elements are found in UNIDO—the largest opposition group. UNIDO has publicly come out in favour of getting rid of the US bases and has attacked "American economic imperialism." Consequently, in terms of US interests, there is little that differentiates UNIDO (and therefore most of the moderate opposition) from the NDF.[81]

As 1984 came to a close, the NDF was gaining increasing leverage over the moderates. The NDF had become virtually indispensable to the moderate's attempt to end Marcos' rule. NDF strategists point out that this dependency makes the moderates "much easier" for the NDF to exploit. In a discussion of the NDF's increasing ability to manipulate the moderates, Lingoy Alcuaz, a leader of the opposition PDP-Laban political party, says: "I don't like to be manipulated, but if they can turn out the numbers, we have to be willing to play second fiddle for now." Or as another moderate protest organizer puts it, "We couldn't get out the bodies without the National Democratic Front."[82]

In discussing the infiltration and increasing control which the NDF is enjoying in urban protests and demonstrations, leftist labour leader Amado Inchong said that "the NDF apparatus is the best organized, best funded and most militant, particularly in Manila." He added: "If you don't play with them, you're out." A moderate opposition strategist stated: "In terms of controlling and organizing demonstrations and

[79] *San Francisco Examiner*, 11 Nov. 1984, pp. A1 and A24.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Most analysts, however, continue to view UNIDO as pro-US, despite pronouncements to the contrary.
[82] *San Francisco Examiner*, 11 Nov. 1984, pp. A1 and A24.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

protests on a scale of 1 to 10, the NDF rates about an 8." "This doesn't mean," he explained, "that 80 per cent of the people there are communists. But they are there because of" the NDF.[83]

The NDF is now advancing its aggressive and increasingly successful political offensive in Manila and other major cities in the Philippines. During 1984, it became a major partner in running the so-called "parliament of the streets," the coalition of urban poor, workers and students led by "Butz" Aquino, now the key figure in the "legal" opposition to Marcos.

Aquino makes no secret of his ties to the NDF. When asked about these ties, Aquino admits that "I am being used, every part of me is being used . . . but I reserve the right to choose the groups I allow to use me. And I want a say in their tactics."[84]

Aquino's alliance with the NDF can be seen in the fact that every two weeks he meets for two hours with Horacio "Boy" Morales, the former mastermind of the NDF who continues to provide strategy to the NDF through his lawyers. Aquino said of these meetings: "We are discussing . . . working together to achieve our goals."[85]

When Morales was asked about these meetings with "Butz" Aquino, the former NDF chief said: "I encourage him to concentrate on the protest movement." Aquino and Morales also discuss a future "coalition *government*" *that Morales says "must include the CPP as a minority* member." If the NDF succeeds in expanding its organizational strength and political support, Morales believes that the NDF "could even become a majority member" of such a coalition government.[86]

To be sure, there are times when leaders of the radical factions have second thoughts about whether they can win over PKP and CPP elements. These thoughts sometimes occur at demonstrations, when CPP and PKP groups sometimes show their independence of the moderates. For instance, at a 17 August 1984 demonstration in Manila, Philippine communists ignored the efforts of radical faction leader "Butz" Aquino to cajole the police, and proceeded to march straight for a police line. After a tense confrontation, the police backed off and allowed the composite units to proceed. Upstaged in this manner by the communists, Aquino was quoted as saying that the communists probably have "their own hidden agenda."[87]

Following similar communist participation in demonstrations in Manila on 21 September 1984, the 12th anniversary of the declaration of martial law, Aquino said that this was going to end "or at least loosen" his relationship with the leftist extremists. Instead, Aquino talked about organizing a new grass-roots-oriented party. In late September, Aquino

[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] *CSM*, 27 Sept. 1984, pp. 16–17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

began to toss around names of potential core members of such a new party.[88]

During November and December, lots of names were tossed around. Reports that Marcos was seriously ill raised the possibility of an imminent succession struggle, even though under the constitution an election must be called within 60 days. To avoid the instability inherent in a succession struggle, most of the principal opponents of Marcos in the moderate camp devised a "fast track" system for choosing a single opposition candidate. Then on 26 December, 12 of 14 major opposition leaders signed a controversial "Declaration of Unity."[89]

In essence, the document reflects the increasingly leftist trend in the moderate camp—and the close affinity which is growing between the so-called moderates and the communists. It states that if any of these 12 leaders succeeds Marcos, he or she would seek to remove foreign (i.e. US) military bases, legalize the CPP, give unconditional amnesty to political prisoners (i.e. the communist subversives), and review economic agreements with foreign countries (i.e. dismantle "US economic imperialism"). Proponents of this "fast track" system include "Butz" Aquino, Lorenzo Tanada and Jose Diokno, all of whom joined forces with the CPP and PKP in boycotting last May's parliamentary elections.[90]

Needless to say, the document is a blow to the increasingly small group of non-communist "purists" in the moderate camp. The "purists" feel that the declaration panders to the CPP position on the key issues and is blatantly undemocratic, in that it does not allow for any electoral process. To a large extent, this is why the sole "purist" of the two individuals on the list of possible opponent candidates—National Assembly Member Eva Estrada Kalaw—has not signed the document.

Other "purists" in the moderate camp fear that the Declaration of Unity dovetails too closely with what the CPP and PKP want to see in a transition government. The communist-dominated National Alliance for Peace, Justice and Freedom has proposed the formation of a "democratic coalition government" composed of the CPP, PKP and the moderates. The radical faction essentially goes along with this initiative. For instance, J. Virgilio Bautista, a moderate figure and an offical in the Coalition of Organizations for the Realization of Democracy (CORD), says that "we [the moderates] see areas of complementation" between the communists and the moderates.[91]

A few moderates remain non-committal about the merits of the declaration. One of the prominent opposition figures who has not signed it is Salvador Laurel, leader of the opposition coalition United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Since Laurel, as the leader of UNIDO has publicly declared his opposition to the bases and "US economic imperialism," his initial reticence is based on tactics rather than

[88] Ibid.
[89] *Washington Post*, 27 Dec. 1984, p. 10.
[90] Ibid.
[91] *CSM*, 28 Dec. 1984, p. 15.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideology. By posturing, Laurel hopes to cajole the liberals on Capitol Hill and elicit their support in a succession struggle. He wants US liberals to believe he is really a "Jeffersonian democrat" in disguise. Laurel also wants Americans to ignore what UNIDO advocates publicly in the Philippines; that is, the removal of US bases and the curtailment of US economic ties to the Philippines.

Looking ahead, the elections of local officials in 1986 will be the next test of strength and strategy for the NDF and its alliance with the moderates. However, unlike what happened in the National Assembly elections in May—when the communists, along with Aquino and his radical faction, boycotted the vote—the NDF is now committed to a new strategy. The NDF will join all anti-Marcos groups and participate in the elections. In the words of an NDF member, "We are considering a readjustment on elections."[92]

One "readjustment" discussed in NDF circles would involve the NDF in covertly fielding candidates with legal cover. Once in place in the local government, these closet CPP sympathizers would then gradually subvert the country. In particular, these legal cadres would allow the NPA to expand its military activities, thus putting pressure on the non-communists to accommodate the CPP.[93]

Soviet Support for the CPP/NPA

For years, the PKP has been almost totally controlled by the Soviet Communist Party. This continues to be the case in 1985. A more interesting and significant development, however, has been the gradual evolution of the CPP from a Maoist, pro-Chinese CP to one which, while still formally independent, shows increasing links with the CPSU. To be sure, both the CPSU and the CPP bend over backwards to perpetuate the myth that they have no links. For instance, it is almost impossible to find Soviet statements about the NPA insurgency. At the same time, the CPP rarely discusses Soviet activities in the Philippines. "Smoking gun" evidence about Soviet material support for the NPA insurgency would severely damage the "independent" image of the CPP. All too frequently, the Kremlin faces a dilemma in foreign policy-making. That is, it often must make a choice between furthering the interests of the Soviet state and assuming a leadership role over a communist world revolutionary movement. In the Philippines, there is no conflict. Soviet interests and military objectives include an end to US military superiority in the Pacific: by any yardstick, the presence of US military bases at Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines keeps the Soviet military forces at a severe disadvantage.

All things being equal, it would have been logical for the Soviets to support the New People's Army early on, since the CPP/NPA has also wanted to rid the Philippines of US military bases and "US economic

[92] *San Francisco Examiner*, 11 Nov. 1984, p. A24.
[93] *CSM*, 27 Sept. 1984, pp. 16–17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imperialism." However, the Soviets were aware that the New People's Army was for many years not the equal of the Philippine military. Already Lenin warned all non-ruling foreign communists not to fall into left-wing "infantile disorder," not to take abrupt and premature actions that would lead to their destruction in the face of stronger "imperialist forces." Stalin was even more insistent on this point. Overt violent revolution should not be attempted in the absence of objective conditions likely to guarantee its success.

The Chinese were critical of this approach, as were a new group of upstart PKP leaders led by Jose Sison. In 1969, this group of mavericks broke away from the PKP establishment, and founded the CPP. The CPP was more insistent on armed struggle. As a result, it initially looked to Beijing for political inspiration and material support.

As part of the Sino-Soviet dispute during the 1960s, the Chinese pressed the Soviets to be more militant and "export" the revolution, even in the absence of objective conditions for revolution. In the Philippine context, Moscow ignored these Chinese taunts. Instead, Moscow supported the PKP, which dutifully followed the Soviet line that capitalism was stable in the Philippines during the 1960s. Thus, armed struggle should be avoided, and the Philippine communists should concentrate instead on political struggle and organization activities.

For a while, the CPP and its military arm, the New People's Army, looked to Beijing. Turning Leninism on its head, Beijing argued that armed struggle itself can create the necessary conditions for communism in the Philippines. The Chinese, in fact, charged that the Soviets were selling out or betraying the foreign communists.

As it turned out, Moscow was right. Back in the early 1970s, the CPP had a small mass following and the New People's Army was militarily weak vis-à-vis the Philippine Armed Forces. Most importantly, revolutionary conditions were absent. The evidence was clear. The Marcos government was strong and the Philippine economy was robust. Moscow continued to preach caution, patience and political struggle. By about 1972, Sison and the CPP came to the Soviet view that capitalist stability was not a short-run phenomenon in the Philippines.

However, the CPP did not "drop China and Maoism" and become "independent" at this point. The CPP, as good communists, had always been Leninist in many ways. Increasingly, the CPP began to look to the Soviet Union—and not to China—for political support and inspiration.

During the latter half of the 1970s, the CPP saw its support from China evaporate. The Chinese, determined to counter Soviet backed Vietnamese expansion into Cambodia, cultivated strong ties to Thailand and the rest of ASEAN. China was also forced to improve relations with the United States in order to counter the Soviet build-up in Vietnam. To reassure ASEAN and gain its support, China withdrew its support from the New People's Army and other national liberation movements in South-East Asia. As a counterweight to Soviet advances in Indochina, China also supported the presence of US military bases in the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Philippines—a position which infuriated the CPP. All of this served to sour the CPP on the Chinese and on Maoism. Shortly thereafter, Bernabe Buscayno (alias "Commander Dante"), leader of the NPA until his arrest in August 1976, flatly stated: "we are not Maoists."

As the 1980s approached, Soviet and CPP efforts to see a united front emerge in the Philippines began showing signs of success. This was particularly true in the labour sector, where Soviet links to the CPP became increasingly apparent. Between 1979 and 1982, a new trend towards closer CPP–PKP labour cooperation took place, with the active support and encouragement of the CPSU and its front organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In October 1980, the PKP's WFTU affiliate, "Katipunan," joined forces with the CPP labour union, Kilusang Mayo Uno (the May 1 Movement—KMU) and three ostensibly independent unions to create "Solidarity," a labour front organization opposed to Marcos' wage and no-strike policies.[94]

This merger was the first overt collaboration between the PKP and the CPP, and this represented a change in the CPSU guidance to the PKP. For the first time, the PKP now had the full backing of the CPSU to join overtly with the anti-Marcos opposition camp. Finally, the fact that the so-called "independent" trade unions were officially affiliated with the Soviet-controlled WFTU meant that they could be influenced by Moscow. This also meant that the CPP was no longer trying to disguise its ties to Soviet-influenced organizations.

The Soviet hand became evident in 1979, when Stanislav Levchenko was acting chief of the active measures group of the Tokyo residency of the KGB. In a July 1982 testimony on *Soviet Active Measures* delivered to the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Levchenko said he personally witnessed KGB officers, under instructions from the International Department of the CPSU—which is "the hand of the Politburo"—"delivering money to the illegal Communist Party of the Philippines in bags with two bottoms . . . [The] messenger . . . [of the] Communist Party of the Philippines . . . visited Tokyo during those years. [He] was visiting Tokyo on a more-or-less regular basis to get money from the KGB . . . I witnessed this personally. I had to help the KGB case officer . . . to be sure that Japanese counterintelligence was not surveilling the whole operation. So, I was driving the car to a hotel, and that KGB case officer disappeared from the car with a heavy bag of money and went back without anything in his hands."[95] Morton C. Portman of CIA's Operations Directorate said that "the information [Levchenko] gave us we have been able to check out through various other means, and we are satisfied . . . that . . . he told the truth . . . We did a very thorough investigation of Mr Levchenko after he defected, which included the polygraph."[96]

[94] *International Press*, 28 Nov. 1983, p. 703.

[95] *Soviet Active Measures*—Hearings Before the Permanent House Select Committee on Intelligence (US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1982) 13–14 July 1982, pp. 166–167.

[96] Ibid. pp. 3–4.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet hand in the CPP was also apparent in 1982 and 1983 when Carlos Gaspar, an East German, was discovered to be the CPP's link in a complex international funding support system.[97] Carlos Gaspar, alias Karl Gaspar, 36, an anthropologist and church lay worker, was arrested by a military intelligence team raid on a suspected "underground" house of the CPP–ML Mindinao regional party committee in Davao City, the Philippine's third largest city. Gaspar was identified as head of the Resources Development Foundation, a legal institution suspected of being a CPP–ML front. Gaspar was suspected of being the head of the Mindinao United-Front Committee. Confiscated documents indicated Gaspar had travelled regularly to Europe, North Africa, the United States, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Bangladesh to contact various groups. The documents also indicated that the CPP–ML maintained links with Soviet-sponsored solidarity groups in foreign countries through its international liaison committee.[98]

The Philippine military authorities believe the CPP receives about 80 per cent of its agitation and propaganda funds from international funding institutions, many of which are Soviet-sponsored. The Manila *Times Journal* of 29 March 1983 citing captured documents, noted that the communists were using humanitarian organizations in the Netherlands and West Germany as a source of funds for fronts known as "legal institutions."

Moscow also enjoys the support of the CPP in many of its foreign policy adventures. For instance, while the Chinese blast the Nicaraguan revolution as a victory for "Soviet social-imperialism," the CPP supports the Soviet position.[99]

Improving Revolutionary Conditions

Following the August 1983 assassination of popular Philippine opposition leader Benigno Aquino, the Kremlin assessed the revolutionary conditions in the Philippines. Judging from an analysis of the Soviet press since the Aquino assassination, the Soviets feel the revolutionary conditions are improving. Seen through a Soviet ideological lens, the social and economic pressures for change are building, opposition to the "Marcos-US dictatorship" is increasing, and the ability of the Marcos regime to cope with the rising tide of the communist insurgency and sentiment among non-communist opposition groups is declining.

The economic crisis in the Philippines is a particularly encouraging development to the Soviets. The crisis in the economy in the Philippines is a natural result of President Marcos' efforts to modernize the Philippine economy and integrate it more fully into the "capitalist world economy," which in turn is dominated by US "economic imperialism." Philippine dependency on the United States makes it vulnerable to the ups and

[97] *FBIS*, Asia and Pacific, 28 April 1983, p. P1–P4.
[98] *Manila Bulletin Today*, 3 April 1983, p. 10.
[99] *Intercontinental Press*, 28 Feb. 1983, p. 116; and *NDF-Update*, Vol. III, No. 3, March–April 1983, p. 6.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

downs of an "unjust" international capitalist system: the economic crisis in the Philippines was preceded by the international recession, high interest rates, the deterioration in terms of trade, the increase in oil prices in 1979–80 and volatile international financial markets. According to *Fortune* magazine, the Philippine foreign debt reached $25 billion in 1984 and 30 per cent of the sum was accounted for by the US.

From the present Soviet perspective, the economic crisis facing the Philippines is creating growing pressures that eventually could threaten a national upheaval. In contrast, Moscow remembers the 1970s, when revolutionary conditions in the Philippines were low. Marcos' ambitious development programme brought a 5–6 per cent annual growth rate and relative popularity to the Philippine President. Today, the Soviets are encouraged by a radically different economic picture in the Philippines:

—Excessive borrowing and a decline in prices for all major exports have greatly increased the nation's foreign debt.

—Of the estimated $25 billion in overall foreign indebtedness, about 60 per cent is owed to commercial banks.

—This figure is nearly four times the 1978 debt of $6·3 billion.

—The country's projected debt service ratio for 1983 was 30 per cent, and its interest payments are costing the government over $125 million daily. Although the debt burden may be manageable at present, the Philippines faces future uncertainty, especially now that real GNP growth has fallen to −2·27 in 1984, according to IMF figures.

The Socio-Economic Impact

Moscow is also encouraged by the impact which the "capitalist" economic crisis has had on the people in the Philippines, whose hardships in turn make them more susceptible to communist propaganda. *Izvestiya*, on 12 May 1984, points out that the income (of Filipinos) from traditional export commodities—sugar, coconut oil and metal ores—has tended to drop off in recent years. In the rural areas, the collapse of the coconut export market has sharply reduced the incomes of many rural Filipinos. Similarly, the decline in the world sugar price reduced the real income of workers in the industry to some of the lowest levels in history.

Moscow sees the economic crisis in the Philippines as punctuating a more gradual economic decline since the 1970s–early 1980s. The Soviets can point to a number of socio-economic indicators contributing to "rising revolutionary conditions" in the Philippines. For instance, *Izvestiya*, on 12 May 1984, stated that the US colonial legacy is keeping 40 per cent of the Philippine population in poverty, according to data from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In addition, Moscow can also point to other indications of socio-economic disarray:

—Unemployment has risen by almost 50 per cent nationwide since 1981.

—Rural-urban migration is straining public resources at a time when

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more and more resources must be diverted to repay the huge debt, most of which is public.

—The socio-economic "contradictions" are compounded by the fact that the Philippines suffers from one of the highest population growths in the world.

—Rising repayment obligations on the foreign debt over the coming decade will make it more difficult to find investment funds for job creation.

Moscow is also encouraged by the need of the Marcos government to deal with the expanding burden of foreign debt payments, double-figure inflation and decelerating economic growth. Even if Manila is able to meet its debt burden, the social and political costs are certain to be high. The Soviets can assume that President Marcos will be forced to lower his developmental sights. The Philippine President will also be hard pressed to use fiscal policy to improve his political position. The Soviets can also hope that the budgeting constraints will mean less money for co-opting leaders in the Armed Forces, thus putting to the test the long-standing loyalty of the military to civilian rule under Marcos.

Similarly, the Soviets are probably encouraged by the ability of the communist insurgency to force the Marcos government to devote increasing energy and resources to counter the guerrillas, thus draining assets critically needed to maintain support in urban areas, particularly Manila. Ultimately, Moscow probably believes that the development of serious urban violence on top of the communist insurgency in the rural areas, particularly if the two were properly coordinated, could constitute an unmanageable security problem for the Marcos government. Already, the Soviets can point to the ability of the New People's Army to contest government authority in large areas and to establish their own alternative political structures.

Faced with further budgetary constraints, Moscow probably sees the ability of the Marcos government to provide adequate security protection as declining. Already, the Soviets can argue that the current security threat to the Marcos government is potentially more serious than the violence proceeding the imposition of martial law in 1972. The current security threat to the Marcos government is insurgent in nature, national in scope and well-organized. Moscow is probably also encouraged by the ability of the New People's Army effectively to control parts of Luzon, the Visayas Samar and Eastern Mindinao. As a result, Moscow can point to the inability of the Marcos government to protect pro-Marcos village leaders in these areas.

Even if security *per se* is not an imminent problem for Marcos, the Soviets can point to the inability of the Marcos government to maintain authority and influence over the Philippine population and territory. Again, budgeting constraints make it increasingly difficult for the government to maintain "the hearts and minds" of Filipinos across the country without reverting to strong-arm tactics. In rural areas, Moscow

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can show how President Marcos' government has developed a bad public image due in part to military abuses, lack of discipline and the occasional unsanctioned activities of paramilitary groups.

Moscow also knows that the chief problem which the Marcos government has is in trying to arrest its declining influence, and it is not likely to improve in the face of budgetary constraints. The chief obstacle facing Manila is geographic—the Philippines has more than 7,000 islands. The areas of weakest authority for the Marcos government are north-east Luzon, the Bicol, Samar and parts of Mindinao—which are also areas of active insurgency.

Moscow is also heartened by socio-political pressures that appear to be building against the Marcos government. The Soviets believe that Marcos' denial of free political expression during the martial law era damaged those peaceful and democratic political institutions that helped to defuse factional conflict for more than two decades after independence from the United States.

Despite the lifting of martial law and the holding of national elections, Marcos continues to suppress outlets for legal dissidence. Representative assemblies remain virtual rubber stamps for Marcos. As a result, there are few institutional restraints on Marcos' power. In essence, the Philippine President continues to rule by executive decree.

Growing Opposition to Marcos

The Soviets see the economic crisis as prompting moderate oppositionists to seek more radical, or in some cases, communist alternatives to the Marcos government. Already, Moscow can hope that the economic and political problems in the Philippines have made it possible for the Philippine communist and radical Left to elicit support across the socio-economic spectrum.

The Soviets can recollect with satisfaction the US consular study on the Philippines leaked in August 1982. The report concluded that the deteriorating economic conditions in Eastern Mindinao have driven elements of the local population to support communist as well as Moslem insurgents. It concluded that the major reason for the successes of the New People's Army was the poor economy.

Moscow is also encouraged by the fact that many of the younger Catholic priests and nuns have become involved in radical social issues which advocate civil disobedience. A kind of "liberation theology" is becoming popular among a minority of activist clergy and laymen in the Catholic Church in the Philippines. The Soviets are probably particularly pleased to see that a few of the priests and nuns have been sufficiently radicalized to the point of giving active assistance to the communists. In some instances, Catholic priests and nuns have actually taken up arms and fought with guerrilla units against the Philippine military. Currently at least 25 Catholic activists have been accused by Manila of aiding the New People's Army.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In addition, the Soviets are probably encouraged by the militancy of many trade-union activists. Government-sponsored labour organizations have largely failed to meet the rising demands of workers for better pay and better working conditions, thus giving communist-sponsored trade unions contentious 'issues to exploit. The Soviets can point with satisfaction to the large number of strikes and work stoppages since the lifting of martial law as evidence of increasing restiveness among those urban workers hit by the economic crisis. Marcos' modest wage increases in June 1984, in the face of sharp price rises in the cost of food, will undoubtedly fuel still further labour unrest.

And finally, Moscow is probably encouraged by signs that the opposition to Marcos has crossed class barriers, with upper- and middle-class Filipinos allying with peasant and workers' groups against the Marcos government. Indeed, a late 1982 public opinion poll in Metro Manila revealed that only 38 per cent of respondents, identified with the upper socio-economic classes in Manila, characterized the government's programmes as responding effectively to the needs of the citizenry. In addition, the massive infusion of US-owned capital, much of which is concentrated in manufacturing and export sectors, is creating annoyance among the business community and the urban middle class, causing them to question the regime's ability to maintain its economic independence.

The Soviets are also especially pleased to see the Marcos government beginning to lose the political loyalty of the economic elite, many of whom had been supporters of the Philippine President during the era of economic prosperity. The confidence of the business community, in particular, has begun to decline with the deteriorating economy. According to the President of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 99 per cent of Filipino businesses are facing financial difficulties.

Moscow can now point with satisfaction to a radicalization of some members of this business elite. Already, Marcos has publicly accused a few of them of fomenting unrest. The Soviets, therefore, have some basis to be hopeful that the upper and middle class will support, or at least condone, the anti-Marcos forces who are prepared to use violence to overthrow the government.

Anti-Americanism Increasing

As the opposition of Marcos becomes broader and increasingly radicalized, the Soviets are probably encouraged by indications that the moderate anti-Marcos opposition is becoming more anti-American. This is a significant departure from the past, when Washington could count on unofficial support from anti-Marcos moderate or conservative opposition groups which were committed to the restoration of the political system that had prevailed prior to the imposition of martial law in 1972.

The Soviets could also take some satisfaction from the so-called "economic nationalism" of the moderate opposition, which argued that

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

almost all the social and economic ills of the Philippines can be traced to American economic "imperialism." But recently, as elements of the business community and the more radical elements of the Catholic clergy move further to the Left, the Soviets are probably pleased to see the moderate opposition making similar moves in order to remain in the forefront of opposition activities.

Thus, Moscow is probably encouraged by the fact that the demands for the removal of US military bases, which was once a minority position represented by Senator Lorenzo Tanada among the moderate opposition, is now the official position of the major organization of the moderate groups, the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Most recently, UNIDO has accepted "removal of all foreign bases" from the Philippines as an integral part of its anti-Marcos programme. As the moderate opposition groups became obsessed with pulling down the Marcos government, the ideology and programmes of their tactical political allies became less important, thus allowing their mutual fear of communism to diminish. As a result, the Soviets apparently see less and less that distinguishes the moderate from the radical opposition in terms of American economic and security interests. Neither has recently given much evidence of a concern with US interests.[100]

In Soviet eyes, this similarity between moderate and radical opposition is particularly true in the case of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), the best known Filipino opposition group and the remnants of the pre-martial law political parties. Moscow is undoubtedly pleased to see UNIDO adopting a more nationalistic and left of centre position which espouses "democratic socialist" ideals and calls for the dismantling of American military bases and other forms of "neo-colonialism."

Moreover, the Soviets are probably encouraged by UNIDO's tactical cooperation with communist and other leftist labour, student and political front organizations. For instance, UNIDO participated in a joint political rally with the communists and other radical groups in September 1982 in Bacolod, Negros Occidental. The statements of UNIDO and the communists were similar and the tone of the meeting was highly nationalistic and strongly anti-US/Marcos.

As UNIDO becomes more radicalized, Moscow probably sees UNIDO becoming a more credible political threat to Marcos. The Soviets can point to indications that it is beginning to organize into a national political party. And in the 14 May 1984 National Assembly election, UNIDO received one-third of the 183 elective seats in the 200-man body.

While Moscow is pleased to see UNIDO and the moderate opposition moving in a more radical, anti-American direction, the Soviets also know that there are pro-US elements there who would like to see the

[100] For an alternative view, see Rosenberg, op. cit. p. 27.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Philippines maintain close ties with the United States. Moscow no doubt is satisfied to see UNIDO and the so-called moderate opposition disunited on US policy and thus weakened in any post-Marcos successor government. In this regard, *Izvestiya*, on 12 May 1984, notes with satisfaction that UNIDO and the moderate opposition remains disorganized and fragmented, unified only in wanting to remove Marcos and his associates from power. It continues to lack a cogent political philosophy or a practical political plan for action.

Given the disunity in UNIDO and among the moderate opposition elements in general, Moscow recognizes potential for serious political dislocation in a post-Marcos era. In this confused and politically unstable setting, the Soviets probably believe that only the most radical political elements would profit. In this regard, the Soviets probably see the CPP as far and away the opposition group best prepared to take advantage of any political dislocation or upheaval in the post-Marcos era.

While the moderate opposition remains factionalized and divided over strategy, the CPP is tightly organized and dedicated. Moscow probably feels that the CPP emphasis on planning, strategy and tactics, together with a focus on social injustice, can make the CPP a potent force during any post-Marcos period of political dislocation or social upheaval. In contrast to the vague slogans by the moderate opposition about democratic socialism, the CPP is armed with a practical political action programme. It is attracting non-communist sympathizers by being pragmatic and emphasizing "nationalism" and "social and economic injustice" rather than displaying Marxist dogma.

Moscow is obviously pleased by CPP tactical flexibility. Although the CPP almost certainly plans to rule alone in the post-revolutionary Philippines, it has issued a direct appeal to all sectors of society (not just peasants and workers), including students, clerics, government employees, the intelligentsia, the middle class, minorities, and even the "traditional elite opposition." In addition, the CPP has promised to integrate government soldiers into the ranks of the New People's Army.

Concluding that the revolutionary conditions in the Philippines were in fact becoming increasingly favourable, the Soviets moved quickly to exploit the anti-Marcos, anti-American sentiment which gathered momentum after the Aquino assassination. The Kremlin sharply increased the size of the Soviet mission and changed its character in late 1983 and early 1984. Energetic Soviet cover operatives replaced tired old diplomats. A KGB official, Doris Smirnov, was assigned to Manila on 12 April as "the first secretary" of the Soviet embassy. Smirnov is a skilful disinformation expert who, in 1976, successfully passed off the alleged "last will of Chou En-lai" to Tokyo, and then sowed confusion everywhere (including among Chinese leaders).[101]

In the Philippines, Smirnov's assignment was to fan anti-Americanism. A few weeks after Smirnov's arrival in Manila, a bogus questionnaire

[101] *Business Times*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 5 Dec. 1984.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"from the US Information Service" was distributed among leading Filipinos seeking information on subjects such as their political leanings and military experience. The anti-American operation was deemed successful, as many of the recipients were reportedly outraged by this "American impertinence."[102]

Soviet involvement in arms transfers to the NPA is more difficult to detect. The fact that the Philippines has some 7,000 islands makes it almost impossible for Manila to monitor such deliveries effectively. Nevertheless, the Soviets were evidently involved in at least one recent shipment of arms from Eastern Europe that was made through South Yemen to the New People's Army in the Philippines.[103]

In addition, the Soviets advance their interests in the "parliament in the streets." The PKP, almost totally controlled by the CPSU, is a partner of the CPP in many of the same demonstrations and rallies. PKP and CPP members work together in the National Democratic Front.

From 30 November to 4 December 1984, the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (WPC) and its Philippine WPC affiliate, the Philippine Peace and Solidarity Council, co-sponsored the first International Conference on Peace and Security in East Asia and the Pacific. The conference was held at the University of the Philippines, a central location for National Democratic Front activity. It therefore afforded the Soviets a golden opportunity to use its WPC affiliate, the Soviet Committee for Defence of Peace and its PKP proxy to strengthen ties with the CPP, and to fan opposition to the US bases and "American imperialism."[104]

This kind of situation is not unknown in other countries where communists have tried to capture local nationalism. Now it provides fertile ground for revolutionary propaganda in the Philippines. As the BBC correspondent in Manila put it:

> . . . Filipino nationalism has been aroused and the Americans are getting a lot of the blame for the excesses of the Marcos regime. Everywhere you hear the chant "the US-Marcos dictatorship." It is unfair, even a little grotesque, but it is what people believe. You even detect a sort of deliberate provocation. People are using the language of revolution to punish the United States, which has become, even in the most respectable quarters, a convenient scapegoat for the middle-class's sense of guilt for its own silence during the dark nights of martial law.
>
> It is almost impossible to say which way things will go. The Left hopelessly miscalculated last year when it called for a boycott of the parliamentary elections and have had to trim their ambitions to take account of the fact that Filipinos still believe in elections despite the violence and the cheating. If there is a revolutionary situation, it is a nationalist not a Communist one.[105]

[102] Ibid.
[103] Ross H. Munro, op. cit. p. 186.
[104] *Pravda*, 4 Dec. 1984, p. 1.
[105] Hugh Prysor-Jones in *The Listener*, London, 30 May 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But will the Filipinos clearly see the implications of the situation? Will they avoid replacing an authoritarian regime with a totalitarian one? Will they realize that in so doing they will sooner or later also permit the Soviet Navy to take over the bases of Subic Bay and Clark Field, as it did the one at Camrah Bay?

ZL

ZESZYTY LITERACKIE

Cahiers Littéraires: 37, rue Geoffroy St Hilaire, 75005 Paris France
C.C.P. Paris 574286 E

ZESZYTY LITERACKIE NR 10

W numerze 10 (WIOSNA 1985): Czesław MIŁOSZ, Wiersze. **Prezentacje:** Gilbert LELY, Słowo i chłód. Konstanty A. JELEŃSKI, Antologia czyli zbiór kwiatu poezji. **Proza i poezja:** Stanisław BARAŃCZAK, Nowe wiersze. Sławomir MROŻEK, ,,Słodki ptak młodości". Tomasz JASTRUN, Wiersze. Urszula Małgorzata BENKA, Odium. **Spojrzenia:** Adam MICHNIK, ,,Niezłomny" z Londynu. Adam ZAGAJEWSKI, Wykład o pałacu. **Europa Środka:** Anna ACHMATOWA, Requiem. Lidia CZUKOWSKA, Jak postało ,,Requiem". **Listy z Paryża:** Wojciech KARPIŃSKI, Lekcja wolności. **Interpretacje:** Josif BRODSKI, Divertimento litewskie. Tomas VENCLOVA, ,,Divertimento litewskie" Josifa Brodskiego. Wiktor WOROSZYLSKI, Nowy panmongolizm?. **O książkach:** Konstanty A. JELEŃSKI, Adam Ciołkosz: socjalista konkretny. P.M.K., Studium o Herbercie. Marek ZIELIŃSKI, Tragiczne wcuelenie. **Notatki, Listy do redakcji, Nowe publikacje, Noty o autorach.**

Do nabycia w redakcji
(Cahiers Littéraires, 37 rue Geoffroy St. Hilaire, 75005 Paris).

Cena pojedynczego egzemplarza plus porto — 46 FF (6,00 US$); pocztą lotniczą — 55 FF (7,50 US$).
Prenumerata roczna — 155 FF (20,00 US$); pocztą lotniczą — 190 FF (25,00 $USA).

Cahiers Littéraires: Association Loi de 1901 — J.O. du 18-9-1982

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Role of Baptists in Soviet Foreign Policy*

Rebecca V. Strode

And Jesus answering said unto them, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's. And they marvelled at him.

Mark 12:17

THE Reverend Billy Graham's recent visit to the Soviet Union to participate in a Soviet-sponsored " peace conference " of world religious leaders has brought to the fore the question of the role of organized religion in Soviet foreign policy. Church leaders in the Soviet Union regularly participate in international religious conferences, and as the West European anti-nuclear movement gains momentum, this participation has become increasingly influential. In contrast to the peace initiatives of their Western counterparts, however, the peace activities of Soviet churchmen are neither spiritually inspired nor freely directed. All are organized and orchestrated by the Soviet state, to serve the interests not of peace but of Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, Soviet participants in such conferences attend not out of conviction, but to fulfil specific requirements of their jobs as officials of " legal " religious bodies in the USSR—requirements established not by the church members or church leaders themselves, but by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This in and of itself should imply something about the integrity of conferences like the one held in Moscow in May 1982, and should also say something about the advisability of participation in such conferences by such outspoken advocates of religious liberty as Reverend Graham. But the problem is much deeper than this. The participation of Soviet church leaders in international conferences is not just a sham, it is an integral component of the Soviet state's policy of religious repression. Soviet representatives utilize international religious conferences to defend not just the USSR's foreign policy, but its domestic policy, particularly its policy towards religious belief. In so doing, Soviet church leaders systematically seek to deceive their Western counterparts as to the extent of religious freedom in the USSR, and oppose efforts by Western churches to lessen the plight of believers in the Soviet Union who are being persecuted. The willingness of Soviet church leaders to engage in this process is in fact a condition of their continuation in office. Its impact on individual believers suffering repression behind this screen is tragic; its effect on congregations deprived of honest leadership is equally so. That

* The author expresses her appreciation to Professor Curtis Vaughan and Ms. Marsha Ellis for their assistance in obtaining Baptist World Alliance documents, and to Professor Gilbert Meilaender and David Powell for their comments on a draft of this article.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many Western church leaders have been so slow to recognize this deception or, seeing it, have nevertheless participated in it is shameful. Using the Baptist Church in the Soviet Union as a case study, this article will examine the extent to which the Church in the Soviet Union has been used as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, and the degree to which this has meant the compromise of church leaders, from both East and West.

TO evaluate the role of the Baptists in Soviet foreign policy, one must first understand the position of Russian Baptists under tsarist rule. There were two groupings of Baptists in the Russian Empire. One was the Baptist Union, which grew out of the pietist revival which swept through the Ukraine during the mid-nineteenth century, and eventually spread throughout southern Russia, the Ukraine, and the Crimea. The second group, centred in St Petersburg under the leadership of I. S. Prokhanov, called itself the All-Russian Union of Evangelical Christians. In their contacts with Baptists abroad, the two groups cooperated, and foreign Baptists recognized both as members of the Baptist fellowship. Nevertheless, the two organizations differed over the key doctrinal issue of baptism, and their socio-economic make-up was very dissimilar. These differences prevented the groups from uniting throughout the tsarist period. The unusual circumstances surrounding their eventual merger under Stalin's rule provide important evidence of the extent to which the Soviet government controls the internal affairs of Baptists in the USSR today.

Though the Russian Baptists suffered considerable persecution at the hands of the tsarist regime, they were allowed to make contact with Baptists in other countries, and they sent delegates to the early congresses of the main international Baptist association, the Baptist World Alliance (BWA). From its inception, the BWA held the Russian Baptists in special regard due to the persecution they endured. Prior to 1917, Russian delegates kept their foreign brethren well informed of their situation. Particularly outspoken was Prokhanov, who, at the founding congress of the Baptist World Alliance in 1905, frankly admitted not only the Russian Baptists' lack of religious liberty, but also their financial need.[1] Similarly, at the Second Baptist World Congress, held in Philadelphia in 1911, another Russian Baptist, P. Pavlov, so eloquently described the need for funds with which to build a seminary that $66,000 were raised for the purpose during a single morning session.[2]

During the First World War, Russian Baptists were subjected to severe repression because many were pacifists and refused to bear arms. As a result, large numbers of Baptists were exiled and their meeting-houses

[1] Steve Durasoff, *The Russian Protestants—Evangelicals in the Soviet Union: 1944–1964* (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Rutherford, 1969), pp. 235–38.

[2] Philip L. Jones (ed.), *The Baptist World Alliance, Second Congress* (Harper and Brothers Company, Philadelphia, 1911), p. 242.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

closed. Thus, while in 1914 there were 105,000 Russian Baptists, by 1916 their number had shrunk to only 60,000.[3]

CLEARLY, during the final, turbulent years of tsarist rule, the very existence of Russian Baptism was in jeopardy. Consequently, Baptists did not view tsarism's downfall as an unmitigated tragedy. They did not, however, approve of Bolshevism. Baptists felt their survival depended on two conditions: first, a stable social order; and second, separation of church and state. The Bolsheviks promised the latter, but Baptists distrusted them for their atheism. And although the Bolsheviks promised to pull Russia out of the world war, their espousal of revolution and class war did not enhance the prospects for a stable society.[4]

Nonetheless, once the Communists had come to power, Baptists did their best to conciliate the regime in civil matters. In 1923, for example, the Evangelical Christians declared military service to be an obligation, and in 1927 the Baptist Union endorsed conscription of its members.[5] While the Baptists were not enthusiastic supporters of the Soviet regime, they cannot rightfully be charged with political disloyalty.

The Bolsheviks, for their part, had an ambivalent attitude towards the Baptists. Ultimately, of course, Lenin and his followers were opposed to all organized religion. Their immediate concern, however, was to elicit mass support and to weaken the opposition of pro-tsarist or Orthodox segments of society. Because the Protestant sects represented a protest against Russian Orthodoxy and tsarist interference in religious affairs, the Communist Party sought the support of Russia's Protestants in its efforts to erode support for the *ancien régime*.[6] After taking power, the Soviet government decreed the separation of church and state, thereby placing Russian Baptists on an equal standing before the law with all other religious groups for the first time in their history. The regime's initial tolerance presented Russian Baptists with unprecedented opportunities for growth. By 1928, the Evangelical Christians had a seminary in Moscow, 3,219 congregations, and at least 4,000,000 adherents. Evangelism was spreading beyond the confines of Russia to the Moslems in Soviet Central Asia.[7]

In addition, the Soviet government continued to allow Russian Baptists to attend conferences with their brethren outside the USSR. In 1925, for example, Prokhanov visited the United States to raise money for the publication of religious literature. Gifts were generous. By the end of the year, Prokhanov's group had printed 175,000 volumes of Scripture and

[3] Serge Bolshakoff, *Russian Nonconformity* (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1950), p. 118; and *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, 2nd ed., Vol. 4 (Moscow, 1950), p. 215.

[4] Andrew Q. Blane, "The Protestant Sectarians," in *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917–1967*, ed. by Richard H. Marshall, Jr. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971), p. 303.

[5] Robert Conquest (ed.), *Religion in the USSR* (The Bodley Head, London, 1968), p. 100.

[6] *Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts K*, I (Moscow, 1970), p. 72.

[7] Bolshakoff, *Russian Nonconformity*, p. 120, and *Fourth Baptist World Congress* (Stewart Printing Service, Toronto, 1928), p. 76; and Prokhanov, *Atheism or the Gospel in Russia—Which?* (New York, 1933), p. 23.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

religious literature.[8] Thus, it was not coercion, but sincere appreciation, which led the Russian delegates to the Fourth Baptist World Congress (Toronto, 1928) to praise Soviet legislation on religion, for the decree on the separation of church and state had enabled them to attain a far better position than had ever been possible under tsarist rule.

The Russian delegates to the international Baptist Congresses of the 1920s attended as representatives of Russian Baptists, not as agents or emissaries of the Soviet state. Their statements indicate that they felt relatively free to say what they wished, so long as they did not directly criticize the Soviet regime. At the 1928 Baptist World Congress, for example, the Russians confessed that, for all their recent successes, they still laboured under " hard and difficult conditions," with a shortage of preachers, meeting-houses, and funds. Ironically, the very fact that they felt free to acknowledge their hardships provides evidence that their situation was not nearly so dreadful as it would soon become. The darkest days of Stalinism still lay ahead, yet never again would Western Baptists hear from official Russian delegates the urgent, yet hopeful, plea with which P.V. Ivanov-Klyshnikov concluded his speech to the Baptist World Congress of 1928:

" Come over and help us! "[9]

IT was in that same year, 1928, that Stalin finally consolidated his hold over the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. Stalin's reign marked the darkest period in the history of Baptist and other religious groups in the Soviet Union. The majority of Baptist churches and organizational centres, including the seminary, were closed. Baptists were tried as British, American and Polish spies. Others were branded as kulak elements, forbidden to enter the collective farms, and deported to Siberian labour camps, where many perished. During the terrible decade of the 1930s, 70 per cent of the Evangelical Christian congregations simply disappeared.[10] Another blow was struck in August 1941, when the entire Volga German population, among whom the Baptist Union was strong, was deported to Central Asia.[11] Georgi Vins, a dissident Baptist leader who was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1979, estimates that from 1929–41, 25,000 Baptists were arrested, of whom 22,000 died in the camps.[12]

During this period, Soviet Baptists were not allowed to send delegates to international religious conferences, and virtually all contact between

[8] Prokhanov, *Atheism or the Gospel in Russia—Which?*, pp. 15–17.

[9] *Fourth Baptist World Congress*, pp. 76–78.

[10] Conquest (ed.), *Religion in the USSR*, pp. 101–102. See also Prokhanov, *Atheism or the Gospel in Russia—Which?*, p. 6. Prokhanov also reports that preachers began to be imprisoned as early as 1927. See ibid. p. 9.

[11] Janice A. Braun, " Evangelism in the USSR," *Christianity Today*, 21 June 1974, p. 11.

[12] " Testimony of Georgi Vins " before the US Commission at the Convention on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 7 June 1979; reprinted in 1980 by the International Representation for the Council of Evangelical Baptist Churches of the Soviet Union, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet and Western Baptists ceased. But this isolation only served to alert Westerners to their brethren's plight. In 1933, the Baptist World Alliance urged President Roosevelt (unsuccessfully) to obtain some definite modification of the Soviet Union's anti-religious laws in order to allow freedom of conscience, worship, and preaching before granting the USSR diplomatic recognition. At the Fifth Baptist World Congress (1934) it was noted that:

> *Russia* has occasioned the deepest anxiety. Russian Baptists returned from the Toronto Congress of 1928 to find their government preparing measures of repression, and early in 1929 these took the form of the law.[13]

Unfortunately, the two Baptist World Congresses of the 1930s only deepened the Stalinist government's distrust of international religious organizations and hardened its determination not to allow Soviet Baptists to participate in such fellowships.

Both the Fifth and Sixth BWA Congresses (1934 and 1939) vigorously condemned communism. In the absence of a Soviet delegation a dissident Russian was given the floor at the Sixth Congress: I. V. Neprash, former pastor of the Leningrad Baptist congregation, castigated communism for persecuting believers behind a façade of hypocritically altruistic rhetoric. All influential Soviet Baptists, he assured the congress, were either in prison or in exile.[14] It was probably the record of these two congresses of the 1930s which later convinced Stalin, even after he had relaxed his anti-religious campaign, that the Baptist World Alliance was implacably hostile to the Soviet Union and should not be allowed contact with Soviet Baptists.

WHEN Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin was forced to call off his anti-religious drive, for he needed the support of every segment of society in the war effort. Baptists rallied quickly once churches were again able to operate openly. In June 1942, one year after the relaxation of religious persecution began, Russian Baptist leaders issued an appeal to Baptists throughout the world to struggle against fascism, " in the name of 4,000,000 Russian brothers and sisters."[15] Apparently, Soviet Baptists served their country well during the war, for Polianskii, chairman of the government's Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, later expressed satisfaction with the war record of the non-Orthodox sects.[16]

Though the systematic assault against religion was halted, believers were not allowed religious liberty as it is conceived in the West.

[13] J. H. Rushbrooke (ed.), *Fifth Baptist World Congress* (Baptist World Alliance, London, 1934) pp. 25–26.

[14] J. H. Rushbrooke (ed.), *Sixth Baptist World Congress* (Baptist World Alliance, Atlanta, 1939) pp. 214–15.

[15] Quoted in Conquest (ed.), *Religion in the USSR*, p. 102.

[16] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Proselytism—so central to evangelical Christianity—was circumscribed. Worship was allowed only in congregations which had been registered with the government, and the state denied many congregations this legal status.[17] Perhaps most importantly, the government sought to exercise control over Baptists by intervening in the appointment of ministers and by organizing the institutional hierarchy of the Baptist community. In October 1944, the Russian Baptist Union and the Evangelical Christians were united and placed under the authority of a newly established All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (*Vsesoyuznyi sovet Evangelskikh Khristian i Baptistov*—VSEKhB).[18]

Neither the Soviet government nor the VSEKhB itself has admitted that the union of the two Baptist groups under VSEKhB leadership was effected at the government's insistence. But several facts indicate that this is in fact the case. First, the merger occurred soon after the establishment of the government's Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. Second, the VSEKhB was organized in a manner surprisingly similar to the Russian Orthodox Church, with 70 districts corresponding to the Orthodox dioceses and with the VSEKhB leadership corresponding to the Patriarchal Synod.[19] Third, the 10-member VSEKhB was never elected by any recognized body of Baptists.[20] Fourth, one charter member of the VSEKhB, Mikhail Orlov, admitted in 1945 that officials of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults " decide the problems of our congregations and take an extremely attentive attitude toward our needs."[21] Finally, the VSEKhB is the only Protestant institution which the government has allowed to organize on a national scale, although the authorities have persistently pressurized the VSEKhB to incorporate other non-Orthodox sects into its ranks.[22]

By incorporating all non-Orthodox sects into one body, the government could more easily gather information on the sects' membership and could keep tabs on their ministers and leaders. However, the VSEKhB has thus far not broadened its scope to non-Baptist sects. Only briefly in 1945 did it accept the Pentecostals. Soon their differences proved too great, and within a year the Pentecostals had left. This would seem to indicate that although the government exerts an enormous influence over the VSEKhB, even to the extent of having established it and of hand-picking its members, it nevertheless allows the VSEKhB some measure of autonomy.

Although the state appointed the membership of the VSEKhB, the

[17] Michael Bourdeaux, *Faith on Trial in Russia* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1971), pp. 56–57.

[18] In 1947, the VSEKhB's name changed from the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians *and* Baptists (*Khristian i Baptistov*) to the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians–Baptists (. . . *Khristian—Baptistov*).

[19] Bolshakoff, *Russian Nonconformity*, p. 129.

[20] Bourdeaux, *Faith on Trial in Russia*, pp. 55–56.

[21] Quoted in ibid. p. 53.

[22] William C. Fletcher, " Protestant Influences on the Outlook of the Soviet Citizen Today," in *Religion and the Search for New Ideals in the USSR*, by William C. Fletcher and Anthony J. Strover (eds.) (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967), p. 66; and " Plenum Vsesoyuznogo soveta Evangelskikh Khristian—Baptistov," *Bratskii Vestnik*, No. 5 (1972), p. 69.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people selected were Baptists of long standing. Indeed, all but one of the original 10 members had been imprisoned for their faith during the 1930s.[23] Nevertheless, the extent of government control over the VSEKhB not only violated the existing Soviet law on the separation of church and state, but was also inconsistent with long-standing Baptist principles. Baptists have traditionally insisted on both the separation of church and state and the autonomy of individual congregations. The VSEKhB's acquiescence to government intervention violated the former precept, and its assumption of centralized, hierarchical authority over all Baptist congregations in the Soviet Union violated the latter.

In effect, the Soviet government struck a compromise with Baptist leaders in 1944. In return for Baptist support of government policies and Baptist acquiescence to considerable state control through the VSEKhB, the state was to allow Baptists to worship with at least some degree of freedom. As William Fletcher has demonstrated, a similar agreement seems to have been made with the Russian Orthodox Church at the same time.[24]

Despite its dubious origin, the founding of the VSEKhB signified the regime's recognition, at least in principle, of the right of Baptists to worship. In the immediate post-war years, the Evangelical Christian-Baptists grew rapidly. The number of legally recognized congregations rose from 3,000 in 1945 to 4,000 in 1947. By 1954, there were 5,400 congregations, 512,000 baptized members, and some three to four million " sympathizers " (persons who had not received adult baptism) who attended services.[25] Since the mid-1950s, their number has grown more slowly. By the 1970s, their membership had risen to about 539,000, with sympathizers still ranging between three and four million. The Baptists thus remain one of the three largest Christian denominations in the Soviet Union today, the other two being Roman Catholicism with three million members and Russian Orthodoxy with 50 million.[26]

FROM his experience in the Second World War, Stalin learned to view his countrymen not just as threats to be destroyed, but also as assets to be exploited. This was especially true of the three to four million Baptists who had repeatedly demonstrated their courage and fortitude. The Soviet government therefore began to use the VSEKhB as a means of promoting support for the regime at home and, cautiously, as an instrument of foreign policy as well.

The VSEKhB gave wholehearted support to Soviet domestic policies not only in its correspondence with local pastors, but also in the journal it

[23] Bourdeaux, *Faith on Trial in Russia*, p. 53.

[24] William C. Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945–1970* (Oxford University Press, London, 1973).

[25] Conquest, *Religion in the USSR*, p. 103.

[26] " Baptists of the World—1975," in *New People for a New World—Through Christ* (Official Report of the 13th Congress, Baptist World Alliance, Stockholm, Sweden, 8–13 July 1975). Robert S. Denny, General Secretary; by Cyril E. Bryant and Debbie Stewart (eds.) (Broadman Press, Nashville, 1975), p. 314; and " Baptists Besieged," *Time*, 23 June 1972, p. 66.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was allowed to begin publishing in 1945. *Bratskii Vestnik* (The Fraternal Bulletin) is the only Christian periodical besides the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* which is legally published in the Soviet Union. Although its edition is not large, it is widely read by Russian Protestants.[27] The journal offers Bible lessons, devotional messages, and moral instruction. But the leading articles are usually devoted to Soviet domestic or foreign policy concerns. The authors of these political articles are prominent members of the VSEKhB. Though they do not directly support communism and do not couch their arguments in Marxist terms, they do endorse all official Soviet policies, usually by appealing to the Scriptures or to the readers' patriotism. Nevertheless, the early editions of *Bratskii Vestnik* were as noteworthy for what they left unsaid as for what they said. For example, the leading article of the first edition did not mention Stalin once, and though later articles did, such references were far less frequent and far more reserved than was customary in Soviet literature of the time.[28] This " damning by faint praise " was probably the most which Baptist leaders could hope to achieve and still be allowed to function.

By the end of the Second World War, the shape of Stalinist Russia had been largely determined. Industrialization and industrial recovery were proceeding apace, the collectivization of agriculture had been completed, and open dissent had been crushed. In the post-war years, therefore, Stalin turned his aggressiveness outwards, extending his power beyond the boundaries of the USSR. The political activities of the VSEKhB correspondingly became increasingly concerned with Soviet foreign policy.

The wartime alliance, meanwhile, temporarily softened the attitude of some Western Baptists. In 1943, BWA President J. H. Rushbrooke wrote:

> Let it be said as emphatically as possible that no community can be more ready than the Baptists to acknowledge the real benefits flowing from the Soviet Revolution . . . I bear my own testimony that from the lips of Russian Communists I have heard noble expressions of an ethical outlook truly Christian.[29]

Perhaps due to this generous spirit, the Soviet government allowed representatives of Soviet Baptists to visit their brethren abroad, for the first time in almost 20 years, when two VSEKhB officials were permitted a short trip to Sweden and Finland in 1946.[30] But the Cold War soon brought renewed distrust to both East and West. Never again in Stalin's lifetime would Soviet Baptists be allowed personal contacts with their

[27] Interview with Petr Vins (Georgi Vins' son), Cambridge, Massachusetts, 31 July 1980.

[28] Ya. Zhidkov, " Nash Zhurnal," *Bratskii Vestnik*, No. 1 (1945), p. 4.

[29] J.H. Rushbrooke, *Baptists in the USSR: Some Facts and Hopes* (Broadman Press, Nashville, 1943), p. 15.

[30] " Otchet o VSEKhB i ego pozitsii—VSEKhB (Vsesoyuznyi sovet Evangelskikh Khristian—Baptistov): Ego otnoshenie k gonomoi tserkvi EKhB i ego rol' sredi gonitelei " (Dec. 1970). Arkhiv Samizdata, *Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata*, Vol. 15, AC No. 871-k, compiled by Radio Liberty, Munich, 1973, p. 17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western counterparts on foreign soil. Thus the VSEKhB felt constrained to decline its invitation to the Seventh Baptist World Congress (Copenhagen, 1947) because the agenda included a speech condemning communism. In a letter to the Baptist World Alliance (which was also published in *Bratskii Vestnik*) the VSEKhB wrote:

> Not only do the Russian Baptists not consider communism to be an obstacle to evangelism, but they also fully contend that its socio-economic principles do not contradict the teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ. Attending the Congress, we, the Evangelical Christians-Baptists of the USSR, would not be able to listen indifferently to speeches against our beloved Motherland, which did so much for all freedom-loving humanity in the last world war.[31]

The Baptist World Congresses of the early post-war years did indeed prove highly critical of the Soviet Union. At the Seventh Congress, British delegate Ernest Brown declared himself to be " passionately opposed " to communism, " for it is atheistic in its essence, and tyranny is its political face."[32]

Most chilling were the reports of *émigrés* from the Baltic republics. At the Eighth Congress (1950), Estonian Baptist Tabea Korjus reported that in 1941, Soviet occupation troops deported 10,000 Estonians to Russian slave labour camps, and that the deportations had continued periodically until as late as March 1950. Korjus continued with details of Soviet brutality:

> *You wonder* whether there was *actual* cruelty during the nine months of Communist rule. Oh yes. Over 1800 corpses were found of tortured and deformed victims, among them pastors and women whom we knew.[33]

The Soviet government obviously did not want Russian Baptists to hear such statements, and it kept them away from the congresses. But although Baptists were not trusted to participate in open international organizations, the government did want to harness them to its foreign policy goals. What was needed was a more controlled forum in which to allow the VSEKhB to act. In 1950 the government began encouraging Soviet Baptists to protest the US involvement in the Korean War. The VSEKhB sent a message to the United Nations Security Council in June 1950, declaring: " We, the Evangelical Christians-Baptists of the USSR, unanimously endorse the noble and humane demand of the Soviet government for a rapid end of military actions in Korea." Later that year, Yakov Zhidkov, then President of the VSEKhB, made a radio appeal to Baptists of the world, particularly those in the United States and Britain, asking them to put pressure on their governments for peace. Zhidkov

[31] " Rukovodyashchemu komitetu Sedmogo Vsemirnogo Kongressa Baptistov," *Bratskii Vestnik*, No. 4 (1947), p. 7.

[32] Walter O. Lewis (ed.), *Seventh Baptist World Congress* (The Carey Kingsgate Press, London, 1948), p. 66.

[33] Arnold T. Ohrn (ed.), *Eighth Baptist World Congress* (The Judson Press, Philadelphia, 1950), p. 105.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

noted that Baptists in the US and Britain were 16 million strong; that many Western Baptists held high positions in government and society; and that they could therefore be an effective voice for peace. Baptists who supported America's " aggressive actions " against North Korea, said Zhidkov, " defame Christianity and are not worthy of the name of Baptists."[34]

In 1952, the Soviet government enlisted the VSEKhB's aid in its campaign to have the United States forces in Korea labelled war criminals. To lend these efforts more weight, the Soviet government arranged its own ecumenical and international religious forum, the Conference in Defence of Peace, held in Zagorsk in May 1952. Seventy-four delegates from Christian, Moslem, and Buddhist religious associations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe attended, including five members of the VSEKhB. The delegates condemned the United States for bombing civilian populations in North Korea and China and for using bacteriological warfare.[35]

The Zagorsk Conference was the first major religious assembly in which Soviet Baptists sought to elicit support both at home and abroad for Soviet foreign policy. The effort may have succeeded in impressing Baptists in the USSR. However, its value in affecting Western public opinion was minimal. Though a few Western churchmen (most notably Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury) joined the campaign against America's " germ warfare," most, like Baptist World Alliance President W. O. Lewis, suspected the Zagorsk Conference of being initiated and controlled by the Soviet government and therefore devoid of credibility.[36]

STALIN'S suspicion of everything he did not control deprived him of the flexibility needed to give Soviet religious groups an effective voice in international religious affairs. But with his death on 5 March 1953, the way was cleared for a more subtle use of religious associations in Soviet foreign policy pursuits. The post-Stalin leadership tried to improve its " public relations " by presenting an image of moderation and freedom. In 1954, the VSEKhB received its first foreign visitors on Soviet soil, when it escorted three leading US and British Baptists through six Soviet cities. And in 1955, Soviet Baptists were allowed to attend a Baptist World Congress (the Ninth, convened in London) for the first time since 1928. Since Stalin's death, contacts between Western and Soviet Baptists have steadily increased, to the point that between 1970 and 1974, the VSEKhB's International Department received 178 official visitors from 20 countries and sent out 3,300 individual letters and 210,000 reports.[37]

[34] " Uchastie Evangelskikh Khristian—Baptistov SSSR v dele zashchity mira," *Bratskii Vestnik*, No. 1 (1953), pp. 4–6.

[35] *Conference in Defence of Peace of All Churches and Religious Associations in the USSR* (Zagorsk, 9–12 May 1952) (Moscow Patriarchate, Moscow, 1952), pp. 77–78.

[36] John C. Clews, *Communist Propaganda Techniques* (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London, 1964), p. 199; and Durasoff, *The Russian Protestants*, pp. 251–52.

[37] " Otdelnyi doklad o deyatelnosti VSEKhB za 1970–1974 gody," *Bratskii Vestnik*, No. 1 (1975), pp. 38 and 41.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VSEKhB members also meet with non-official visitors in the USSR. By 1972, they had received more than 2,000 tourists from 50 countries.[38]

Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the primary foreign policy function performed by Soviet Baptists was to blunt Western criticism of the Soviet state. Soviet Baptists stress two points in dealing with Christians abroad: (1) that they require no financial assistance, and (2) that they enjoy complete religious freedom.[39]

That they have convinced Western Baptists on these matters is doubtful, but the very presence of Soviet citizens at international Baptist conferences has muted the Baptist World Alliance's anti-communist stance. After 1955, mention of Soviet religious persecution became less frequent and less blunt, in part due to Soviet Baptist pressure and in part to Western Baptists' fear that overly harsh criticism in the presence of Soviet Baptists would bring reprisals against the entire Baptist community within the USSR.

Ironically, just when Western Baptist criticism of Soviet religious policy dropped to its lowest point, Khrushchev undertook an aggressive anti-religious campaign. Beginning in 1960, Christianity in the USSR was subjected to the fiercest attack since the 1930s. Church members were expelled from educational institutions and fired from their jobs. Many churches were closed; the number of Russian Orthodox parishes fell from 16,000 in the late 1950s to only 7,500 in 1964.[40] Baptists suffered especially severe repression at this time. Not infrequently their children were taken from them, and several hundred pastors and lay leaders were imprisoned. That this repression of 1960–64 passed largely without comment from Western Baptists is an indication of the VSEKhB's success in moderating Baptist criticism of the Soviet Union.

Although successful in their " public relations " role, the VSEKhB was much less effective in eliciting Baptist support for particular Soviet foreign policy goals. At the Tenth Baptist World Congress of 1960, for example, Yakov Zhidkov endorsed Khrushchev's proposal for universal and complete disarmament and tried to persuade the Baptist assembly to do the same. The congress, however, resolved only to support a " *practical* programme of disarmament," insisting on the necessity " to agree on satisfactory methods of inspection designed to ensure that all nations shall exercise good faith in this matter."[41] (The VSEKhB's later pleas that Baptists " make their influence felt to seek an end to the suffering of the people of Vietnam " would be equally ineffectual.[42])

Once again, the open nature of international Baptist meetings had frustrated Soviet designs. Yet, as the experience with the Zagorsk

[38] " Plenum Vsesoyuznogo soveta Evangelskikh Khristian-Baptistov." p. 67.

[39] See, for example, Bolshakoff, *Russian Nonconformity*, pp. 126–127; and Arnold T. Ohrn (ed.) *Golden Jubilee Congress* (The Carey Kingsgate Press, London, 1955), p. 261.

[40] William C. Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945–1970* (Oxford University Press, London, 1973), pp. 96 and 127.

[41] Arnold T. Ohrn (ed.), *Tenth Baptist World Congress* (Broadman Press, Nashville, 1960), pp. 202 and 301–303. My italics.

[42] Josef Nordenhaug, " The Baptists in the USSR," *The Baptist World*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Feb. 1967), p. 8.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conference had shown, obvious Soviet control alienated Western churchmen. What was needed was a forum which the government controlled, but controlled from behind the scenes. Such a forum was created with the founding of the Christian Peace Conference in 1961 in Prague. Like the Zagorsk Conference of 1952, the Christian Peace Conference was largely a Soviet and East European organization. And like the Zagorsk Conference, it aligned itself with Soviet disarmament proposals, encouraged national liberation struggles, and attacked capitalism and Western aggression. But unlike the Zagorsk Conference, the Christian Peace Conference was able to appeal to a broad spectrum of Western and Third World churchmen. This was due to the flexibility which Khrushchev injected into Soviet foreign policy. Absolute domination by Russian churches was not required; Czechoslovak theologians were allowed to organize the institution. The Soviets undoubtedly guided the organization's activities, but they did so unobtrusively.[43]

Though the Soviet Baptists and the Russian Orthodox Church took an active part in its activities, the Christian Peace Conference was successful only so long as the Soviet government remained in the background. This was possible because there existed a congruence of interests between the USSR and the Christian Peace Conference's Czechoslovak leaders. But in 1968, after Soviet tanks offered " fraternal assistance " to the Czechoslovak people, this façade could no longer be maintained. When the Christian Peace Conference supported the invasion, it became clear that the Soviet government was actually in charge. Western religious leaders were again alienated, and by 1969, the Christian Peace Conference had virtually ceased to function.[44]

THERE remained one other international religious organization in which the Soviets could hope to use the Baptists. This was the World Council of Churches (WCC). Stalin had not allowed Soviet religious associations to join the WCC, but under Khrushchev the VSEKhB was allowed to affiliate in 1963. At first, the VSEKhB pursued the same " image politics " in the WCC as it had in the Baptist World Alliance. But in 1964, Khrushchev was ousted. Leonid Brezhnev's subsequent ascendancy brought a significant alteration in the VSEKhB's international activities. The state grew impatient with the church's mere public relations role and began to demand more concrete foreign policy victories. Consequently Soviet religious organizations became more assertive in their dealings with Christians abroad. The VSEKhB's tactics seemed to revert to the totalistic approach of the Stalin era, but with one significant difference. Rather than withdraw from organizations it did not control, the Brezhnev regime sought to extend its control within such institutions.

The Soviets' new hard line was particularly evident in the World Council of Churches. Soviet delegates grew less willing to accept defeats

[43] Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945–1970*, pp. 39–45.
[44] Ibid. pp. 53–55.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on subsidiary issues in return for concessions on more central questions. In 1967, for example, Soviet delegates denounced even a relatively pro-Soviet resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict because it did not completely conform to the Soviet position.[45]

To what extent changes in the political outlook of the WCC are directly attributable to the influence of Soviet participants cannot be determined, but certainly their influence facilitated its increasing interest in revolutionary political movements. The Soviet delegates wholeheartedly supported the World Council's controversial Programme to Combat Racism, which, in September 1978, donated $200,000 to 19 anti-racist groups, 14 of which operated in southern Africa. Grants from $2,000 to $20,000 were distributed to these organizations " irrespective of whether they use military means to achieve freedom." Among the recipients were Mozambique's FRELIMO, Angola's MPLA, and Portuguese Guinea's PAIGC, all of which were receiving arms from the Soviet Union.[46]

The Soviets' assertiveness also affected the VSEKhB's activities in the Baptist World Alliance. In this more conservative organization, Soviet Baptists avoided radical proposals and direct confrontation. However, in the 1970s they undertook a drive to break Western dominance in the Alliance. The VSEKhB campaigned for more emphasis to be placed on African and Asian Baptists. Particular emphasis was given to Japan, perhaps in congruence with the Soviet government's efforts to obtain greater leverage over this Far Eastern economic power. The 12th Baptist World Congress (1970) met in Tokyo, where the VSEKhB proposed structural changes in the Alliance to eliminate what it felt to be excessive American influence. The Soviet plan was to establish three regional committees (American, Euro-African, and Asian) with proportional representation in the Executive Committee.[47] At the Stockholm Congress in 1975, these proposals were implemented, and the Congress elected its first Asian General Secretary, choosing a Japanese layman for the office.

SOVIET Baptist delegations abroad have achieved varying degrees of success in promoting Soviet foreign policy goals. The Christian Peace Conference supported all Soviet positions, but this brought little real benefit to the Soviet state since, especially after 1968, the conference was not recognized as a legitimate, independent religious organization by Western churchmen. In the World Council of Churches, Soviet influence was not necessarily decisive, but it was substantial. The Soviets were least successful in their dealings with the Baptist World Alliance, whose constituencies are generally conservative both theologically and politically. But even here, the VSEKhB was not wholly without influence. Though unable to induce fellow Baptists to endorse specific Soviet policy

[45] Ibid. pp. 140–42.
[46] Ibid. pp. 132–33.
[47] Ibid. pp. 63–64, and " Otdelnyi doklad o deyatelnosti VSEKhB za 1970–1974 gody," p. 39.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

positions, it did significantly mute the anti-communist sentiment which had been so frequently expressed prior to VSEKhB participation in the Congresses.

Soviet propaganda efforts have been most successful when they present arguments which are in tune with views already held by many in the West. Here Soviet representatives need not change popular Western notions, but only reinforce existing criticisms and concerns of prominent churchmen. For example, Soviet spokesmen have expressed satisfaction with the prominent part taken by American and West European religious leaders and organizations in the growing anti-nuclear movement. One Soviet foreign policy analyst notes:

> Whereas in the Cold War years, the Vatican and Protestant churches in the West were unquestioning supporters of the militaristic circles, today the appeals coming from across the Atlantic for a crusade against the East and for greater confrontation obviously do not coincide with either the current or long-term interests of the Catholic and other Christian churches.[48]

THE participation of Soviet Baptist leaders in international conferences has not only affected churchmen abroad. Its greatest impact has unquestionably been upon the Baptist Church in the USSR itself. The foreign activities of the VSEKhB have been a major contributing factor to a serious schism within the Church which has produced one of the most significant dissident movements in the Soviet Union today. This in turn has produced repercussions in the Western attitude towards the VSEKhB, which may lead the Soviet government to reassess the value of using religious associations as instruments of foreign policy in the future.

The VSEKhB is the leading organ of the officially recognized Baptist congregations in the USSR; that is, of those congregations which have been registered by the government. But as early as 1950, Serge Bolshakoff expressed "no doubt that along with the licensed religious organizations in the Soviet Union there are many 'underground groups.' "[49] Such churches exist illegally because they will not or cannot register with the state. In 1960, dissident Baptists estimated that two-thirds of all Baptist congregations in the USSR had been denied legal permission to worship.[50] Others refuse to register because the state uses this requirement in order to interfere in the church's activities. The state demands detailed information on the church's membership, leadership, and financial accounts in order to enforce its prohibition on financial or charitable gifts by the church and to exercise its *nomenklatura*, or personnel appointment privileges, regarding ministers and presbyters of

[48] Y. Konstantinov, "For Peace and Security in Europe" *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5, 1981, p. 53.

[49] Bolshakoff, *Russian Nonconformity*, p. 129.

[50] *Christian Appeals from Russia*, by Rosemary Harris, Xenia Howard-Johnston (eds.), with an introduction by Michael Bourdeaux (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1969), p. 38.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

local congregations.[51] According to dissident Baptist sources, this government interference

> practically paralysed the spiritual life of the congregations. No church worker could become a minister of the congregation or even a preacher without the consent of the above-mentioned official. It is not difficult to guess what qualities the church worker must possess to satisfy the atheist official.[52]

In 1964, A. Puzin, then chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs (formerly the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults) acknowledged that:

> Agents of the Council frequently divulge confidential information they obtain from the believers, members of the executive organs of religious associations, and ministers.[53]

Dissident Baptists say of this practice:

> What a horrible thing this is! Agencies which are engaged in the struggle against the church learn the least detail of everything that transpires in the church from its own ministers, and finally the church, which knows nothing about this intelligence gathering, dies because of it.[54]

The extent of government interference with the Church seemed to increase by an order of magnitude in 1960 when the VSEKhB issued two controversial documents which were binding on all Baptist churches. These documents were the *New Statutes* and the " Letter of Instructions." That they were drawn up by state authorities and simply foisted upon the VSEKhB is almost certain; first because many of the same demands were introduced into the Church Regulations of the Russian Orthodox Church at about the same time, and secondly because the content of the documents was so alien to the spirit of an evangelical church.[55] They forbade believers to gather for spiritual fellowship outside the walls of the church building, to bring children to worship services, or to proselytize zealously. Most shocking was the instruction to ministers and presbyters forbidding them to baptize anyone under 30 years of age.[56]

Many Soviet Baptists hoped the VSEKhB, having issued the new regulations, would then try to ignore them; but to their distress, the church leaders enforced the statutes vigorously. As dissident pastor Georgi Vins recalled this period:

[51] " Soviet Law Restricts Freedom of Conscience," *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, Vol. XV, Nos. 10–12 (1976), p. 155.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Quoted in *Bratskii Listok*, Nos. 1–4 (1975), as cited in " Registration of Churches—A tool of Religious Repression," *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 7–9 (1975), pp. 114–15.

[54] Ibid. p. 115.

[55] Bourdeaux, *Faith on Trial in Russia*, pp. 63–64; and *Christian Appeals from Russia*, p. 39.

[56] " Baptists Besieged," p. 66; *Christian Appeals from Russia*, p. 11; and Vsesoyuznyi sovet EKhB, " Instruktivnyi list starshim presviteram " (1960), Arkhiv Samizdata, *Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata*, Vol. 14, AC No. 773, compiled by Radio Liberty, Munich, 1973, pp. 4–6.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The main question at that time was the issue of children. In general, it was forbidden to bring children to the church. Categorically forbidden, and the enforcement of this rule was handed over to those pastors who had been broken, who had submitted to compromise. And *pastors* stood at the doors of their churches and turned away children! This created tremendous agitation. Only then did many people see how far things had gone.[57]

The VSEKhB justified its actions by asserting, in the words of Chief Presbyter Melnikov, that " our breaking of these laws can close for us the door of our activity."[58] But a large proportion of the Baptist population felt that to obey the statutes would be to abrogate Christian duty altogether. In an appeal to the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant they wrote:

> Over many years believers have met in silence persecution from outside, but they could not allow the penetration of alien statutes in internal church life.[59]

After appealing in vain to the VSEKhB to convene an All-Union Congress to discuss these matters, the dissenting Baptists, known as the *Initsiativniki*, turned directly to the government for redress in August 1961, requesting permission to hold a conference to vote on the *New Statutes*. The authorities' response was brutal. Two hundred of the *Initsiativniki* were arrested; others lost their jobs and suffered other harrassments. Those arrested were imprisoned and in some cases beaten.[60]

The reaction of the VSEKhB to this episode was equally disturbing. Not only did it seek to hide news of this repression from Christians abroad, but at its orders members of registered congregations who protested the arrests were themselves driven out of the Church.[61] Soon unrest began to develop among Baptists all over the Soviet Union. Complaints were heard that the leaders in the VSEKhB were emphasizing international activities to the neglect of domestic problems.[62]

In an effort to stave off a major split, in 1963 the VSEKhB convened the All-Union Congress, for the requesting of which 200 believers were now in prison. The Congress revoked the *New Statutes* and " Letter of Instructions," but the VSEKhB refused to open its hierarchy to democratic processes. Moreover, though the offensive regulations were ostensibly revoked, in practice they continued to be enforced. In 1965, with all hope of genuine reform within the VSEKhB lost, over 1,000 congregations (comprising approximately one-fifth of the Baptist population in the USSR) withdrew from the VSEKhB's auspices and

[57] Interview with Georgi Vins, 8 April 1981.
[58] " Plenum Vsesoyuznogo soveta Evangelskikh Khristian-Baptistov," p. 71.
[59] *Christian Appeals from Russia*, p. 40.
[60] Ibid. pp. 22–25; and " Testimony of Georgi Vins," p. 6.
[61] Bourdeaux, *Faith on Trial in Russia*, p. 85.
[62] Fletcher, " Protestant Influences on the Outlook of the Soviet Citizen Today," pp. 70–71.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

united into a Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian-Baptists (*Sovet tserkvei*).[63]

The Soviet government has dealt harshly with the *Sovet tserkvei* membership. Between 1961 and 1970, 524 Baptists were arrested for refusing to comply with religious legislation they believed to be inconsistent with Christian duty. Eight of these believers died in prison or in the labour camps.[64] Yet, as the *Sovet tserkvei* has noted bitterly,

> before the whole world in these very years the leaders of the VSEKhB repeatedly announced that in our country there are no prisoners of faith. Not one article in *Bratskii Vestnik* has mentioned the Christian prisoners during the whole period of the VSEKhB's existence![65]

Despite the persecution they have endured, *Sovet tserkvei* members have been very outspoken. In 1966, more than 600 members from 130 towns assembled in Moscow in one of the largest public protest demonstrations in Soviet history.[66] In 1969, they sent an appeal to Brezhnev on behalf of their imprisoned brethren which contained 1,453 signatures. This protest document was at the time second in number of signatures only to one signed by Crimean Tatars.[67] In addition, the *Sovet tserkvei* has developed an effective *samizdat* network and even operates a printing press, which has published at least 40,000 Bibles. It also releases the small journal *Bratskii Listok* (Fraternal Note).[68] From 1969–81, the *Sovet tserkvei* printed over 500,000 pieces of religious and devotional literature, in a variety of languages: Russian, Ukranian, Belorussian, Moldavian, German, and Kazakh.[69]

BY placing large numbers of believers in an unofficial, unregistered status, the schism among Baptists in the Soviet Union hinders the state's ability to keep religious activities under surveillance and control. Georgi Vins estimates that by 1980 approximately 100,000 of the total 400,000 adult, baptized Baptist membership in the Soviet Union belonged to unregistered congregations.[70] Perhaps the authorities' main concern is that the ferment in the Baptist Church might spread to the much larger Orthodox population. Indeed, an underground Orthodox

[63] Edward E. Plowmar, " Confronting the Kremlin," *Christianity Today*, Vol. 19 (28 Feb. 1975), p. 41; and " A Testimony to the Enduring Power of Christ's Word," *The Right to Believe*, Special Issue (Keston College, Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism, 1977), p. 2. The Council was organized on 9 Sep. 1965.

[64] " Otchet o VSEKhB i ego pozitsii—VSEKhB: Ego otnoshenie k gonimoi tserkvi EKhB i ego rol' sredi gonitelei," p. 34.

[65] " Otchet o VSEKhB i ego pozitsii—VSEKhB: Ego otnoshenie k gonimoi tserkvi EKhB i ego rol' sredi gonitelei," p. 33.

[66] " Baptists Besieged," p. 66.

[67] Bourdeaux, *Faith on Trial in Russia*, p. 152.

[68] " Baptists Besieged," p. 66.

[69] Interview with Petr G. Vins, 31 July 1980.

[70] Georgi Vins, speech at King's College, Briarcliff Manor, New York, 8 April 1981.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movement which charged that the government exercised illegal control over the Moscow Patriarchate had already taken shape by 1965.[71]

Realizing that repression alone would not stop the reform movement, the authorities in 1966 added the customary carrot to their stick. While the *Initsiativniki* were arrested under the newly ammended Article 142 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, minor concessions were made to the official Baptists in an attempt to undercut the position of the *Sovet tserkvei* and to draw its members back into the registered congregations. The VSEKhB was allowed to print a limited number of Bibles and hymnals, to increase the edition of *Bratskii Vestnik*, and to introduce a theological correspondence course. The VSEKhB pointed to these concessions to convince Christians abroad that religious freedom did exist in the Soviet Union and that the charges of the *Sovet tserkvei* were unfounded.[72]

Throughout most of the 1960s, the VSEKhB was quite successful in underplaying the extent of the split in Baptist ranks and in hiding from the West the severity of the repression to which the *Initsiativniki* were being subjected. In May 1966, for example, the World Council of Churches' *Ecumenical Press Service* rebutted reports in the secular Western press that recent ammendments to Article 142 of the RSFSR Criminal Code were intended to provide a more effective legal basis for repressing the *Initsiativniki*. The *Ecumenical Press Service* correctly noted that the ammendments reduced penalties for some violations, but it did not mention the addition of certain vague and broadly defined crimes with harsh sanctions.[73] In August, *Izvestiya* quoted this World Council of Churches article as proof to the USSR's own people that the Soviet government was not suppressing religion.[74] Unfortunately, the secular Western news agencies turned out to be correct. Article 142 became the legal basis for the arrest and imprisonment of numerous reform Baptists.[75]

The WCC article could have been an honest mistake. Although it is curious that the article refuted all other Western analyses, there is no evidence that the VSEKhB was directly involved. Such evidence is available, however, in one other case. In November 1967, the World Council of Churches issued a statement concerning a document it had received from the *Initsiativniki*. The document appealed for aid and gave detailed information on over 200 Baptists then in prison. The WCC announced that the document was being carefully studied, but that consultation with official Russian Baptist leaders would be made before further comment. The document was never mentioned again, depsite the fact that throughout the period protests were being made by the WCC

[71] Michael Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia: Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious Policy* (Macmillan, London, 1968), pp. 184–86.

[72] *Bratskii Listok*, Nos. 1–4 (1975), quoted in "Registration of Churches—A Tool of Religious Repression," p. 115.

[73] "New Societ [*sic*] Decrees Interpret Russian Laws on Religious Cults," *Ecumenical News Service*, No. 17 (26 May 1966), p. 10.

[74] "Neskol'ko voprosov o religii i tserkvi," *Izvestiya*, 30 August 1966, p. 4.

[75] Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 128; and Berman, *Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure* (2nd edn., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972) pp. 73–74.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against the confinement of political prisoners in the non-communist countries of Greece and South Africa.[76]

The VSEKhB has also sought to undercut criticism of Soviet religious repression among Baptist circles in the West. In January 1963, 32 unregistered Siberian Baptists approached the American embassy in Moscow with a request for asylum from religious persecution. Asylum was not granted, and after several hours the embassy allowed Soviet police to take the Baptists away. This episode angered the Baptist World Alliance. The BWA's President, Josef Nordenhaug, demanded an explanation from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and requested Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin to allow an impartial, international body to investigate the state of religious liberty in the USSR.[77] The request came to naught, but the incident is significant for the contrast it offers to later Baptist World Alliance actions.

Just nine months later, on 19 September 1963, the *Initsiativniki* managed to send a letter to the General Secretary of the Baptist World Alliance explaining their position.[78] Thus it cannot have been through ignorance, but only by design, that no mention was made in BWA circles of the plight of the *Initsiativniki* until 1966, after the Soviet press had itself brought the schism into the open and subjected the dissidents to a concerted attack.[79] The only plausible explanation for this silence is that the VSEKhB, the representative body of Soviet Baptists in the Baptist World Alliance, persuaded BWA officials not to repeat the public indignation they had shown in January 1983.

By 1966, following the amendments to Article 142 and the *Izvestiya* attack on the *Initsiativniki*, the American and European press had brought the schism to the attention of the informed public. The Baptist World Alliance now felt it could no longer ignore the problem. But although it expressed sympathy for the dissenters, the BWA generally supported the VSEKhB's position. Damage to the USSR's image as a land of religious tolerance was held to a minimum. Josef Nordenhaug, for example, was persuaded by his conversations with VSEKhB officials in Moscow that the complaints of the *Sovet tserkvei* were unjustified, and were motivated either by mistaken judgment or by ambition. He accepted the official Soviet line that the *Initsiativniki* " refused " to register their churches, while in fact their applications were often systematically rejected by the government. Finally, Nordenhaug stated that although many dissenting Baptists were Christians of deep conviction,

> there are others who major on separatism . . . A few have a craving for being martyrs on a limited scale and deliberately seek to be arrested.[80]

[76] Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 127.

[77] " Churchmen Criticize US Embassy Refusal of Asylum to Russian Evangelicals," *Ecumenical Press Service*, No. 1 (12 January 1963), pp. 2–3.

[78] Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia*, p. 65.

[79] Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 94.

[80] Nordenhaug, " The Baptists in the USSR," pp. 7–8.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nordenhaug did not meet with any *Sovet tserkvei* members, and thus did not have an opportunity to hear first-hand accounts of how some of these " martyrs on a limited scale " had already been physically beaten and deprived of custody of their children.

By the late 1960s, however, Western churchmen had grown more concerned about the plight of the *Sovet tserkvei Initsiativniki*. Particularly instrumental in this change of attitude was Michael Bourdeaux of the influential Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism, who began to report regularly on the group's activities. To counteract his influence, VSEKhB official Mikhail Zhidkov (son of Yakov Zhidkov) travelled to London just prior to the publication of Bourdeaux's book on the Baptists and sought to present an unsympathetic interpretation of the *Initsiativniki* movement.[81] But Zhidkov's task was rendered increasingly difficult as the schism gained coverage in the West. Attention focused on *Sovet tserkvei* leader Georgi Vins, whose courage and faith in the face of long years of imprisonment and broken health were documented in such widely read secular periodicals as *Time* magazine.

THE tide of opinion began to turn in favour of the reform Baptists by the mid-1970s, particularly in organizations in which Soviet Baptists did not take part. Religious periodicals such as *Christian Century* and the *Baptist Standard* began to report Vins' sufferings even while the World Council of Churches and the Baptist World Alliance remained relatively quiet. The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, representing nine US and Canadian denominations, gave Ambassador Dobrynin a letter in March 1975 which read, " We regret laws in any nation that restrict the religious freedom of the people."[82] In April 1975, the Southern Baptist Historical Society hosted Roger Hayden, a London minister and associate of the Centre for the Study of Religion and Communism, who called upon Baptists to support the *Sovet tserkvei*.[83]

Pressure was also mounting within the Baptist World Alliance itself. While attending the 41st Congress of the VSEKhB in Moscow in 1974, BWA General Secretary Robert Denny requested and received an audience with government officials to discuss church-state matters. The authorities announced that the VSEKhB had recently requested clemency for 180 Baptist prisoners, and that 60 had been released. The government apparently hoped this would raise the image of the VSEKhB. But Denny noted in reply first that nothing had been done by either the VSEKhB or the government to alleviate the situation of the imprisoned and dangerously ill Vins, and second, that new arrests had already occurred since the clemency.[84]

[81] Fletcher, *Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 97.
[82] " Baptists Call for Freedoms in Russia," *The Baptist Standard*, 12 March 1975, p. 3.
[83] " Russians Seek More Religious Freedom," *The Baptist Standard*, 7 May 1975, p. 10.
[84] Plowmar, " Confronting the Kremlin," p. 42.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Matters came to a head at the Baptist World Alliance's Stockholm Congress of July 1975. More than 130 delegates from communist countries attended, including 20 from the USSR—the largest Soviet delegation ever. But among the thousands of Soviet ethnic Germans who had emigrated to the West since 1972 under Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* were 6,000 *Initsiativniki*. Twenty-one of them attended the Stockholm Congress, distributing mimeographed letters and " press releases." They also requested an opportunity to address the Study Commission on Religious Liberty and Human Rights. The official Soviet delegates complained, insisting that the VSEKhB, not the *Sovet tserkvei*, was the recognized representative of Soviet Baptists to the Alliance. " After some hesitation and a great deal of awkwardness," reports one observer. commission chairman Gardner Taylor granted the dissidents an opportunity to speak, but only at an informal session following the regular meetings.[85]

During the regular session, the VSEKhB delegate, Alexei Bychkov, spoke on world peace, not religious freedom or human rights. Bychkov assured the assembly that not only Soviet Christians, but all Soviet citizens, earnestly desire peace. The reports on religious liberty and human rights were delivered by Mrs Ella P. Mitchell, of the Ecumenical Centre for Black Church Studies, and Daniel Grant, President of Ouachita Baptist University. Their reports focused entirely on social and sexual prejudice in the United States, without one word about the persecution of believers in the USSR.[86]

But at the informal session, the *Sovet tserkvei* representative provided detailed accounts of their personal experiences in Soviet labour camps. Bychkov, the official Soviet delegate, cautioned against unwarranted criticism of the USSR, which, he said, might jeopardize religious freedom and bring further restrictions on church activities.[87] The Stockholm Congress ultimately resolved " to pray, advocate, and work for effectual religious freedom for all human beings, knowing that many of our brothers and sisters have lost their freedoms and in some cases their lives while resisting government restrictions."[88] No specific government was named in any part of the resolution, which passed without debate.

The VSEKhB delegation made other efforts to limit criticism of the Soviet Union at the Congress. Texts of Bychkov's speech to the 41st VSEKhB Congress (Moscow, 1974) were distributed at the Stockholm Congress's " book tables." This speech charged that the *Sovet tserkvei* " does not manifest sufficient Christian desire to eliminate division." At the same time, the Soviet delegation tried to prevent the exhibition of books critical of communism and communist governments. This ploy

[85] " Baptist World Alliance: Liberty for All," *Christianity Today*, Vol. 19 (8 Aug. 1975), p. 34.

[86] *New People for a New World—Through Christ* (Official Report of the 13th Congress, Baptist World Alliance, Stockholm, Sweden, 8–13 July 1975). Robert S. Denny, General Secretary; by Cyril E. Bryant and Debbie Stewart (eds.) (Broadman Press, Nashville, 1975), pp. 224–26.

[87] " Baptist World Alliance: Liberty for All," p. 34.

[88] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

failed, however, and books such as Bourdeaux's *Faith on Trial in Russia* were displayed.[89]

THE year 1975 brought changes not only in the climate of Baptist World Alliance opinion, but also in that of the World Council of Churches. Andrei Sakharov, the famous Soviet dissident, wrote to the WCC on Georgi Vins' behalf, asking that a Christian lawyer be sent to represent him in his trial. The World Council of Churches requested permission from the Soviet government to do so, but never received a reply. Vins was convicted soon afterwards.[90]

Though the WCC intercession was unsuccessful, it marked a significant departure from past practice. After years of "selective indignation"—denouncing oppression in southern Africa while ignoring it in the Soviet Union—the Council had now directly and publicly confronted Soviet authorities. The incident evinces a decline either in the VSEKhB's willingness to object to such statements or in its influence within the organization. In light of the VSEKhB's actions at the Baptist World Congress in Stockholm, a decline in VSEKhB influence seems the more likely explanation. Further evidence that this is the case was provided by the 1980 BWA Congress in Toronto, which, for the first time in two decades, failed to elect a Soviet delegate to a high position.

If the VSEKhB is losing influence in international religious organizations, the Soviet government may reassess the value of its participation. But the immediate problem for Soviet authorities is to stem the tide of *Sovet tserkvei* support. The urgency of this task became clear in the autumn of 1976, when the United States Congress passed a concurrent resolution calling for Vins' release and for the granting of religious liberty to all Soviet citizens. The resolution warned:

> The continued denial of this fundamental human right in the Soviet Union could have adverse implications for the growth of amicable relations between our two countries.[91]

To undercut such criticism, the Soviets temporarily relaxed their repression of *Sovet tserkvei* Baptists. As of 15 May 1977, there were 53 Baptists in the prisons or camps, the lowest number in 15 years. Also, while in the 1960s sentences were very long (10 years), since 1975 they have tended to be shorter (3–5 years).[92] And in a symbolic gesture, the authorities finally allowed Georgi Vins' home church to register in 1975 (although Vins himself remained in Siberian detention for four more years).[93]

At the same time (1975), registered churches were promised more

[89] Ibid.

[90] Plowmar, "Confronting the Kremlin," p. 41.

[91] "Concurrent Resolution in Support of Georgi Vins," *The Congressional Record*, (1 Oct. 1976), reprinted in *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, Vol. XV, Nos. 10–12 (1976), p. 173.

[92] "Baptist Prisoners in USSR," *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*, Vol. XVI, Nos. 7–9 (1977), pp. 135–39.

[93] "Détente with the Church?" *Christianity Today*, Vol. 19 (12 Sept. 1975), p. 60.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

autonomy. According to Georgi Vins' son Petr, now in exile in the West with his father:

> The authorities were frightened by the large percentage of Baptists who joined the *Sovet tserkvei*, so they proposed " complete freedom " for the official Baptists—more freedom than they'd ever known before, because the authorities feared that " official " congregations would go " unofficial."[94]

But no sooner had the new government policy of leniency begun to produce results than a renewed crackdown was instituted. Less than a year after Vins' congregation was registered, police harassment of the membership was renewed, arrests increased, and in at least one case (in 1977) a Baptist layman was incarcerated in a psychiatric ward for his religious beliefs.[95] Simultaneously, pressure on church leaders to collaborate with the government increased. Petr Vins recounts one such incident, which occurred in the Kiev Central Congregation, a registered church with some 900 members:

> The Kiev church had a presbyter named Pavlovsky—a profoundly religious man, a very good man. The church loved him very much. For five years, the KGB had been trying to get him to work for them, but he always refused. Then they began to pressure the church as a whole to expel him from the presbytery. The church held a closed, internal meeting of presbyters. A full 80 per cent voted to keep Pavlovsky as presbyter; 20 per cent voted against him. That 20 per cent stayed on after everyone else had left, held a second vote, and rescinded Pavlovsky's presbyter status.
>
> From then on, the KGB continually threatened him—every day for the next six months. This was very rare, because this was an official, registered church. It was horrible. But meanwhile, the pastor in Kiev comes to Toronto [for the 1980 Baptist World Alliance conference] and says that there is complete freedom, that no one is persecuted.[96]

ON 27 April 1979, Pastor Georgi Vins was released after four years' imprisonment and, together with four other Soviet dissidents, was expelled from the USSR and sent to the United States in exchange for several Soviet spies in US custody. Since his arrival in the United States, Vins has sought to inform Western churches of the plight of Baptists in the Soviet Union. His personal experiences and his accounts of the imprisonment of other believers are so well documented that the continuing efforts of official Soviet Baptist representatives to deny them can no longer be described as anything other than a deliberate disinformation campaign. Nevertheless, the VSEKhB continues to wield sufficient influence within the Baptist World Alliance to prevent the BWA from providing any measurable degree of material or spiritual support to

[94] Interview with Petr Vins, 31 July 1980.
[95] Petro Grigorenko, *V podpol'e mozhno vstretit' tol'ko krys* . . . (Detinets, New York, 1981), p. 757.
[96] Interview with Petr Vins, 31 July 1980.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Baptists in the Soviet Union. As far back as 1976, while Vins was still a prisoner in Siberia, the World Council of Churches passed a resolution which appealed for his release. But the Baptist World Alliance, which should have been the most concerned, passed no such resolution.

Vins' initial experience with Baptist leaders in the West was encouraging. In May 1979, soon after his arrival in the United States, he was invited to speak in Washington to a conference of 30 leading BWA officials, including Dr Russel, General Secretary of British Baptists, and Robert Denny, the BWA General Secretary. He was given a hero's welcome, complete with photographs, applause and congratulations. He was then invited to speak at the forthcoming Southern Baptist Convention in Houston, where he was again greeted with a standing ovation. Thus, when Vins spoke privately with Western Baptist leaders, or when he dealt with strictly *US* Baptist organizations (in which the VSEKhB has no role), Vins received some support. But when he turned to the official international organ of the Baptist Church, the BWA, these same leaders reacted in an entirely different manner.

For example, Vins asked the BWA to invite Gennadi Kryuchkov, chairman of the *Sovet tserkvei*, to speak at the Baptist World Alliance conference scheduled to convene in July 1980, in Toronto. Kryuchkov had already spent three years in prison and labour camps, and was now in hiding from the KGB. Although Vins knew Kryuchkov would never be allowed to leave the Soviet Union, he hoped that a formal invitation by the BWA would put pressure on the Soviet authorities to allow Kryuchkov to resume a normal life with his family. For months, Vins received no reply from the Alliance. Finally, he was informed that the BWA could not grant his request because neither Kryuchkov nor the *Sovet tserkvei* were affiliates of the Alliance. Vins then pointed out that he too was unaffiliated with the Alliance, but that this had not prevented the BWA and other Baptist organizations from inviting him to speak at various forums since his arrival in the United States. Moreover, Vins insisted that an invitation to Kryuchkov in no way implied any criticism of the VSEKhB or any encroachment of its right to be represented at the BWA conference. Nevertheless, the Alliance refused to change its position.[97] VSEKhB delegates were especially vocal in their opposition to giving dissidents a platform at the congress. BWA Vice-President Alexei Bychkov formally protested the BWA's attempt to compromise by granting Vins permission to attend the conference.[98]

Vins then wrote a letter to General Secretary Denny, requesting an opportunity to speak on behalf of " the persecuted church " himself at the Toronto convention. Again, Vins stressed that he had no intention of criticizing the VSEKhB; he wished only to inform the Alliance delegates of the hardships under which Baptists laboured in the Soviet Union. But this request, too, was denied. Privately, several BWA leaders expressed their sympathy. " We want to help," Vins was told, " but unfortunately

[97] Interview with Georgi Vins, 8 April 1981.
[98] *Baptist and Reflector*, 23 July 1980.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there is nothing we can do." Vins then replied, " If you can't do anything, then I will try to do something, for I cannot be silent."[99]

Now acting independently, Vins sponsored a conference entitled Voice of the Persecuted Church, held coterminously with the BWA convention. Three thousand delegates attended. Baptist World Alliance delegates, who were already in Toronto, were also invited to attend. Vins stressed that his conference was intended solely for education; no confrontation with the VSEKhB or the BWA was intended. Nevertheless, a small number of US and Canadian supporters of Vins demonstrated against the BWA congress, and Toronto's popular press condemned the BWA for supporting " KGB agents."[100] Vins himself did not endorse such actions, and when asked, refused to call VSEKhB leaders agents of the KGB. Nevertheless, the growing atmosphere of acrimony no doubt contributed to the BWA's lack of enthusiasm for Vins' efforts. But internal pressure played a role as well, as Vins recalls:

> We said not one word about the VSEKhB or any such questions, nor did we make any mention of the Baptist World Alliance. We spoke only about persecuted Christians in the Soviet Union, about Baptists. However, our statements very much displeased the Baptist World Alliance. How *dare* we speak about persecuted Christians openly! In other words, this upset someone. Someone was pressuring the Baptist World Alliance to cover up the facts about the persecuted church. I was even told, " You Vins, are a hero. You were in prison. Speak only about yourself; don't touch upon anything else." I have no use for that role. The question is not about Vins. The question is about the thousands of Baptist Christians in the Soviet Union who today are in prison, or psychiatric hospitals, or living at home, but undergoing persecution, having their children taken away from them, forbidden to preach the Gospel."[101]

The open controversy appears to have had an impact on the Soviet government's attitude towards allowing VSEKhB officials to travel. At the last minute, the size of the Soviet delegation to the Toronto BWA conference was halved. Moreover, Vins' educational and documentation efforts have forced the VSEKhB leadership to admit publicly that some Soviet Baptists are indeed imprisoned, although the exact number remains a matter of dispute. Vins claims it was 125 at the end of 1981, while Alexei Bychkov, now General Secretary of the VSEKhB, contends " There are not more than 60, maybe less."[102] According to Bychkov, they are in prison for " Western-style " church activity, such as " organizing Sunday Schools and conducting open-air evangelistic meetings."[103] Before Vins reached the United States, the VSEKhB did not publicly

[99] Interview with Petr Vins, 31 July 1980, and Georgi Vins, 8 April 1981.

[100] See *Toronto Sun*, 2 July 1980, 6 July 1980, and 9 July 1980. For a more balanced view, see *Toronto Star*, 19 July 1980.

[101] Interview with Georgi Vins, 8 April 1981.

[102] " Tarrant Pastors Ask Release of Russian " *Baptist Standard*, 9 Dec. 1981, p. 4.

[103] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

acknowledge that Baptists in the Soviet Union may be imprisoned for purely evangelistic activity.

At home, the VSEKhB continues to encourage Soviet Baptists to submit to all government regulations, citing from the Scriptures the passage " Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." But in analysing this passage, the church leaders discuss only Caesar's due, wholly ignoring the second clause of the passage.[104] One VSEKhB official is even reported by dissident sources to have remarked:

> Since authority is from God, this means that the KGB is also of God. We should give the information which the authorities demand of us.[105]

Gradually, the government control under which the VSEKhB labours is becoming clearer to religious leaders throughout the United States and Europe. Still, Soviet authorities continue to sponsor religious forums for foreign policy purposes. Most recently, Soviet religious leaders hosted an international conference in Moscow on nuclear weapons, with over 1,000 delegates in attendance—many of whom were brought to Moscow at Soviet expense. The majority of speakers applauded Soviet arms control intitiatives, while condemning the arms programmes and policies of the United States.[106] Especially notable was the attendance of the Reverend Billy Graham. Preaching at the Moscow Baptist Church, Graham avoided the question of religious liberty, and left the church building without acknowledging the presence of what was by Soviet standards a sizeable crowd of people outside the church protesting the imprisonment of their friends and relatives. At the conference itself, Reverend Graham, already under fire in the United States for not taking a more forceful stand, did at last call for respect for the freedom of religion, but he mentioned no specific country or cases of violation.[107]

IF the compromise of the Second World War was that the Baptists would support Soviet policy in return for greater religious liberty, the VSEKhB can be said to have fulfilled its half of the bargain impeccably. The same cannot be said for the state. Unfortunately, the VSEKhB does not appear zealously to have pressurized the authorities for more freedom. Moreover, VSEKhB President Bychkov's claim that criticism of Soviet religious policy would jeopardize religious freedom cannot be substantiated. First, the statement falsely implies that religious freedom exists already. Second, it suggests that VSEKhB silence on the issue of

[104] A. V. Karev, " Khristianin i Rodina," *Bratskii Vestnik*, No. 3 (1970), pp. 50–54.

[105] *Bratskii Listok*, Nos. 1–4 (1975), in "Registration of Churches—A Tool of Religious Repression," pp. 116–17.

[106] Durasoff, *The Russian Protestants*, p. 259.

[107] *New York Times*, 18–21 May 1982. Richard Stengal, " Questionable Mission to Moscow " *Time*, 24 May 1982, p. 60; and Billy Graham, " Graham's Mission to Moscow," *Christianity Today*, Vol. 26 (18 June 1982), pp. 20–23.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

religious repression improves the church's ability to function. Yet it was precisely when the VSEKhB was most cooperative with the regime, to the point of turning away children from the church, that government repression and interference reached its height (in 1960–64). Only after dissident members made their opposition known publicly did the government allow the VSEKhB to rescind the most offensive church regulations. Only after the *Initsiativniki* began to produce religious literature on their own underground presses did the government permit the VSEKhB to expand its own small publishing efforts. The few concessions which Soviet officials have made have resulted not from VSEKhB pressure, but rather from the actions of " unofficial " Baptists. It is not to VSEKhB cooperation that the government has responded, but to *Sovet tserkvei* challenge. It is therefore difficult not to agree with the following *Sovet tserkvei* criticisms of the VSEKhB:

1. By accusing all of its critics of being opponents of government authority, the VSEKhB has facilitated the arrest and persecution of believers.
2. By accusing the *Sovet tserkvei* of slander when it accurately reported the persecution of believers, the VSEKhB again facilitated further government repression.
3. By seeking to delude Christians abroad as to the position of believers in the USSR, the VSEKhB has played " the role of a self-styled state-religious screen, behind which state-atheism suppresses freedom of conscience in our country."[108]

It is now incumbent upon believers in both the Soviet Union and the West to weigh with full seriousness the charges of the reform Baptists. Such an examination could have a powerful impact on VSEKhB influence abroad; more importantly it might provide support to believers in the Soviet Union who are struggling for the right to worship.

[108] " Otchet o VSEKhB i ego pozitsii—VSEKhB: ego otnoshenie k gonimoi tserkvi EKhB i ego rol' sredi gonitelei." p. 34.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Japanese Economy

Karel van Wolferen

Consolidation or Moving Further Ahead?

The answer to the question of "whither the Japanese economy?" is not obvious. There are dynamic forces pushing the Japanese economy ahead. It must, on the other hand, put up with conditions and attitudes which form a more formidable collection of drag-anchors than is probably realized abroad. Consolidation—in the sense of solidifying a position which has already been achieved so as to provide the opportunity for national relaxation—has to my mind never been a voluntary Japanese goal. But foreign circumstances might force the nation to adopt it. Japanese themselves generally think that the only alternative to moving ahead is to fall behind.

Some seemingly indispensable factors for long-term prognoses of the Japanese economy, particularly political ones, are not treated in Japanese economic discussions. Genuine debate on desirable policy is rare to begin with. Economic discussion amongst the experts and in the media generally does not move beyond the familiar categories established by decades of bureaucratic-corporate monitoring of progress along a course which was decided in the 1950s. In the absence of what could be called a national debate and in the presence of too many imponderables, both making prophecies on the Japanese economy even more hazardous than prophecies usually are, I hope to be forgiven for leaving the question mark where the organizer of this colloquium* has put it. In the meantime, however, there are many things relating to this subject that could be said.

TO begin with, when we speak of the Japanese economy, we are dealing with a phenomenon which, although by now very extensively commented upon in the West, still causes tremendous conceptual difficulties, and not only among foreigners. No general agreement exists as to what constitutes this phenomenon.

For example, Japanese bureaucrats, politicians and company officials emphatically maintain that theirs is a free-market economy. This view is in direct conflict with what half a dozen well-known Japanese economic thinkers told me in recent conversations. Almost to a man they contended that the subservient function of the Japanese market mechanism is insufficiently understood by foreigners. Ironically, dominant opinions among foreign economists and officials tend to be exactly the reverse of those of their Japanese counterparts. Most foreign emissaries, negotiators and politicians commenting on Japan, have been

* This paper was written for a colloquium on "The Growing importance of the Far East in a Nervous World: Challenges to the West" organized by the John F. Kennedy Institute (University of Tilburg) and held in the Netherlands in May 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taking it to task for not reciprocating the hospitality it has enjoyed in the markets of the international free-trade system. On the other hand, Western academic economists, especially those of the conventional neo-classical persuasion, appear horrified at the suggestion that Japan, although formally classified as a member of the club of "capitalist free-market" nations, does not in fact belong in that club. While Japanese officials have interests to protect, and Western politicians have discovered a way to make political hay out of the issue, many of these Western economists have stuck their heads into the sand faced with this peculiar Japanese threat to a a set of theories already heavily undermined by factual evidence from the real world.

IF Japan cannot without reservation be included in the category of Western capitalism, does it then belong to a category of its own, as quite a few commentators have implied? I think not. The quick rise of South Korea and Taiwan as industrial states enables us to look at the Japanese "economic miracle" afresh and to discover that even when shorn of its cultural and psychological specifics it constitutes a model that can be pursued by (at least some) others. The South Korean and Taiwanese economies appear to be driven by a phenomenal force similar to that of Japan, even in the absence of exceptional "harmony," lifetime employment, and other aspects often cited as reasons for the Japanese success.

A perceptive commentator on the political economy of East Asia, Professor Chalmers Johnson of Berkeley, has isolated this category of industrial nations and labelled it Capitalist Developmental States (CDSs). Because of the undeniable successes of the East Asian CDSs, Marxist–Leninist theory has become distinctly less plausible a guide for economic development to politicians and intellectuals in the less developed nations of non-communist Asia. The examples of South Korea and Taiwan most probably also help stimulate the revisionism of the Chinese pragmatists. The Asian examples of Soviet-style centralism have, just like its examples elsewhere, shown that you do not achieve improvement of the standard of living with class struggle and centralization of economic power.

The most eloquent theoretical objection to government interference in the economy which I know of is by Friedrich von Hayek. Reduced to its essentials, Hayek's explanation holds that the planners at the centre can never know enough about the circumstances in the many ramifications of the economy to make judicious decisions. Centrally planned economies must therefore always fail in establishing prosperity according to Hayek. How have Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, whose governments also consider manufacturing and trade as very much their business, improved the living standard of their peoples? First of all, they have never considered private entrepreneurism as antagonistic to their goals. Contrary to the communist approach which equates entrepreneurism with original sin, or the socialist approach of the European welfare state

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whose regulations obstruct the entrepreneur, the CDS greatly encourages and stimulates the private sector.

The manner in which Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have found a way around the Hayekian obstacle is crucial to understanding the CDS. The central bureaucrats never attempt to gain absolute power over the non-governmental corporations. They guide the economy while using the entrepreneurs as their antennae. In the CDS the centre knows what is happening at the periphery through constant monitoring of the experiences of capitalists trying to find new ways of making money. The economy prospers because areas of industry that show promise are stimulated by central policies favouring investment. Those areas which appear to have reached a dead end are more easily abandoned by policies forcing reorganization.

The model of the CDS is a model for rapid industrial development. Whether the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial partnership will flourish after the industry faces market saturation at home and inhospitable export markets has not yet been demonstrated. The question in the sub-title of this article coincides, to my mind, in large measure with the question as to whether the CDS model has a future once a certain level of development has been reached. A related question concerns the survival of the international free-trade system as it struggles to accommodate the CDS.

As for Japan, it is very difficult to imagine that its partnership between the state and private enterprise will ever break up. Japan pioneered the CDS model a century or so ago by transferring state industries into private hands during the Meiji period, after state entrepreneurism had brought a lot of governmental corporations to the verge of collapse. Kim Jae Ik, who (before his death in Rangoon) was the chief economic adviser of South Korean presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Do Hwan, told me once that Park Chung Hee had the Japanese Meiji period in mind when instructing the "architect" of the South Korean economic miracle, Nam Duck Woo, to design the mechanism for rapid growth.

A comparison with the current stage of CDS development in South Korea is, I think, helpful for viewing the Japanese political economy in perspective. Whereas in South Korea there can be no doubt as to where one can find the government and who the entrepreneurs are, in Japan it is not possible to locate a centre, an ultimate organ where "the buck stops." Japanese society is best imagined as a system of mutually balancing components (incorporating mutually balancing sub-components), each with a remarkable, in Western experience often inconceivable, degree of autonomy. We may call this the Japanese "System." It is impossible to extricate the State from the System for purposes of analysis.

The government line, also adopted by the top business organizations in Japan, is that today the various forms of governmental guidance (if acknowledged at all) carry much less weight with the private sector than in the past. Even though this contention is habitually accompanied by a demonstration that current tariff regulations make Japan about the freest

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

market in the world, this does not add up to a sudden transfer by Japan into the category of Western free-market economies. What is true on paper is, in Japan, quite often and rather more frequently than in the West, not true in practice. What has given the Japanese CDS set-up durability is the erasing of dividing lines between private and public sectors. The power relationships which are likely to remain very significant for the further developments in the Japanese economy have evolved into something far more intricate than the term "bureaucrats–businessmen partnership" suggests.

The bureaucrats, the politicians and the top businessmen are sometimes the same people, generally highly dependent on each other, and they belong for all intents and purposes to the same club. The ubiquitous antagonism at the top rarely, if ever, separates the formal organs of state and the industrial organizations, but exists rather between overlapping groups cutting across institutional boundaries with the politicians functioning as go-betweens.

WHEREAS South Korean companies are to a large extent still in the hands of the entrepreneurs that founded them, management in the large Japanese corporations tends to be highly bureaucratized. The obvious question is whether under these circumstances the Japanese CDS is not gradually losing its vitality. In order not to lose the entrepreneurial spirit of their companies the South Korean technocrats have, under the tutelage of the late Kim Jae Ik, begun to carry out a programme for liberalization. South Korea's top economic planners tend to speak passionately about a lessening of bureaucratic control. But when persisting in discussions, it is difficult to escape the impression that they view a free market not as a final goal, but as a means to confront weaknesses in the economic system. In Japan there have been uncountable instances demonstrating that market pressures of competition function as instruments of policy. Without disparaging the real effects of past Japanese liberalization efforts in various fields, it has not led to a dismantling of the actual CDS apparatus.

Loss of vitality is an openly stated concern of Japan's bureaucrats and the groups of experts they hire for writing reports on future prospects of the economy. There are other problems which raise the question whether the Japanese CDS apparatus, while advantageous for a fast growing economy, will be able to deal efficiently with future contingencies. The mechanisms necessary for the rapid industrial expansion in the 1950s and '60s are still largely in place. But domestic and international circumstances would seem to demand a reformulation of national priorities. The System has so far shown to be incapable of effectively addressing this issue.

FOR roughly another decade and a half the Japanese economy is likely to enjoy moderate growth, somewhat higher than the average for the other industrially advanced nations. That appears to be the general

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opinion among informed observers. The productive population ratio will for some time remain relatively high. The decline in the savings rate is expected to remain slow. Due to investments in labour and energy-saving facilities, the machinery and service industries are likely to be growth sectors. A continuing shift to smaller machinery will contribute to the further decline in importance of the steel industry. Much is expected from the new industrial sectors utilizing advanced technology currently enjoying much attention. Japan pours much effort into development of semi-conductors, optical fibres, ceramics and other new materials, biochemistry, and the so-called fifth generation computer. There have been, over the past five or so years, few ceremonial speeches by top businessmen and few white papers and reports by the bureaucrats which have left out a reference to the "new information age" or the "knowledge intensive" future.

Expectations of economic growth generated by these hi-tech areas follow from the often demonstrated Japanese ability to apply and commercialize state-of-the-art technology to assembling and processing industry. Many are the inventions made in Europe and the United States which only Japanese firms transformed into commercially viable products.

An acute concern that Japan may be left behind, noticeable in discussions about the newer sectors, provides extra driving force. Bureaucratic stimulus for research in the above-mentioned areas has helped re-introduce the old fashioned catch-up fever. Investments in these fields are being justified as necessary for competition with the US. Entrepreneurism is certainly not dead in Japan. It has always survived in the small workshops of the subcontractors and sub-subcontractors, which have served as shock absorbers underneath the giant conglomerates, cushioning the effects of recessions. It is now visible in a number of adventurous small firms making products or parts which are becoming indispensible, but are unlikely ever to be mass-produced. These are dubbed venture businesses, although they are not backed up as broadly by venture capital as are American venture businesses. A number of talented engineers, tired with the social restrictions associated with the seniority system in the large firms, have struck out on their own.

A structural change is currently under way about which the planners are not undividedly optimistic. Companies left behind by hi-tech are going bankrupt. Whether the hi-tech areas can repeat what earlier the textile, heavy, and chemical industries have done for the rapid growth of the economy remains a question. At the moment the hi-tech industry appears too fragmented to arrange communal priorities. And whereas much publicity abroad gives the impression that Japan is ahead or almost ahead in most of the new areas, there is in fact much that is being left undone.

If there is wide agreement on anything, it is that further growth of the Japanese economy will depend on the introduction of new products. A Japanese consumer market highly sensitive to fads and fashion, eagerly

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absorbing novelties and gadgets has in the past played a decisive role in the evolution of successful products fit for export. Consumer spending seems to have reached a plateau, however. It constitutes roughly half of the GNP, as compared with 75 per cent in the US. The Japanese business world does not yet consider higher salaries as an investment for maintaining a consumer market highly conducive to the development of new products.

SOME characteristics of the Japanese political economy which in the past were lauded as partly responsible for the "economic miracle" could, in the long run, turn out to be draw-backs, as well. The very weak and mostly ceremonial union movement is an example. Guaranteeing a disciplined, relatively undemanding workforce, it was an obvious advantage for companies expanding their market share with borrowed money and only the slightest (if any) profits. A stronger labour movement today would most probably turn employees of highly profitable enterprises into stronger consumers.

The financial structure as a whole may turn out to have become anachronistic. Japanese households save roughly one-fifth of their disposable income. Tax incentives and underdeveloped social security provisions will help encourage continuation of this highest ratio in the world. It has facilitated the large capital formation necessary for rapid expansion. Japanese corporations with their notoriously low equity ratios used to be heavy borrowers. Since the late 1970s, however, a capital market has begun to function and high profits over the past few years have rendered the successful segments of the manufacturing sector awash with surplus funds.

This money could be invested in badly needed projects for improvement of the Japanese infrastructure, which has lagged far behind as the industry expanded. Instead of tackling that challenge, however, Japan has become the world's biggest exporter of capital. Japanese with a long-term perspective consider this risky and not economically justifiable, as the exported capital is largely invested in American government bonds rather than in production facilities.

Artificially low interest rates are one reason for the flight of capital out of Japan. Interest rates which are considerably lower than they would be if fixed by the monetary supply and demand mechanism, have played a major role in the Japanese CDS during its days of glory. They naturally led to excessive demand for funds, and this in turn resulted in the need for credit rationing by which the bureaucrats could select the industries to be supplied with funds. This influence on the direction of lending and industrial investment, completely divorced from the market, has sometimes led to misallocations. The problem today is that during the years of expansion an elite class of borrowers has been created, represented by the large companies belonging to the conglomerates. These continue to be favoured over other potential winners in industry.

Countering the negative effects of this tendency, the planners of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

System wage campaigns to popularize new industrial pursuits. The above-mentioned slogans about "information age" and "knowledge intensive" industry are good examples. The dedication with which these slogans are inserted in talks and writings, even when there is no clear reason why they should be mentioned at all, is reminiscent of the campaigns with which the lumbering apparatus of Chinese Communist Party cadres used to be informed of the direction in which it was supposed to move. The Japanese System needs to be imbued with a sense of urgent necessity before its components make way for any new measures that are out of the ordinary.

THE protectionism inherent in the CDS has created some areas in the Japanese economy which are in bad shape. Agriculture is a notorious example. Rationalization is for political reasons bound to be extremely slow. Other old-fashioned industries run by old-fashioned companies which have never had to be effective because of protection for political reasons are drag-anchors as well. Attention has recently been fixed on one example which the Reagan Administration has singled out for American competition: the plywood industry. The entire retail sector is a drag on the economy. Japan has a much larger number of shops and small stores than has become "rational" in modern economies. The distribution system is vast and highly parasitic. But streamlining it would do away with Japan's largest haven for the otherwise unemployed, as well as with an important instrument with which large corporations maintain control over smaller ones.

The most important aspect of the situation, to my mind, is that there is hardly any serious discussion in Japan about any of the above-mentioned problems. The System lacks conceptual agility. Contrary to what many outsiders imagine, Japan has very few professional economists, and among those there are perhaps but a handful capable of formulating original perspectives helpful to speculations about the future.

The perspective used by the bureaucrats as background to their numerous pronouncements on economic matters has changed surprisingly little since it was formed in the early '60s. Essentially based on their experiences with the business-cycle of the '50s it has had some correctives added to it in response to obviously deviating developments. But the Japanese CDS is in many respects still on the "high growth" course set out for it in the '50s. A decade ago the slogans spoke of a switch to "stable growth," but in retrospect these seem to have been launched as part of an adjustment to unstoppable external conditions. Japan had not planned for a slow-down in economic growth in order to attend to new national priorities.

Today, economic thinking among the bureaucrats, business representatives, and politicians with official responsibility for it, tends to be a mixture of the obvious and the above-mentioned sloganizing. The greatest problem, so we are told, by about everyone who says anything at all about the future, is Japan's ageing population. Stuck with the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conventional set of assumptions about what is and is not desirable, this problem is mostly thought of in terms of extra costs for companies under pressure to raise their retirement ages to 60 or even older.

BACK to positive factors which spell further growth: Japan has demonstrated a very striking capacity to adjust fairly rapidly to such altered conditions as are perceived by the bulk of the entire System. The oil crisis was a good example of a dramatic change the System could not but respond to. It did this with fuel-conservation technology innovations and modified patterns of usage to bring consumption down from a rate which grew faster than the growth of the GNP, to one which has remained below it ever since.

Japan will also retain a degree of flexibility which in the West was lost some time ago. Its workforce will probably accept sacrifices and put up with considerable discomfort if it is made to understand that new economic policies make these necessary. This readiness is due to an underdeveloped welfare system and a highly restricted labour market. Japan still belongs to those countries in which the struggle for existence has not yet been separated from the economic process.

THE main obstacles to relatively high growth over the long term appear to be not so much purely economic factors, but political ones. Efficient management of national resources requires the formulation of new priorities. The internally divided bureaucracy appears to be incapable of doing this. Some recent cases in which strategically placed big-name politicians have been called in to effect armistices in territorial wars between various ministries (caused by promising new industries), indicate the need for more input from the side of the politicians. When Yasuhiro Nakasone formed a commission for Administrative Reforms (Rincho), he gave as reasons for the need for a drastic revision of government institutions the revolutionary possibilities of information technology and the fact that the urge to catch up with the West no longer stimulates Japan. Since then Nakasone has been, by becoming Prime Minister, given an opportunity to add other organizations to the Rincho, as part of an attempt to increase political influence over the bureaucrats.

The effect of Nakasone's efforts has been marginal, as would surprise no one acquainted with the power relationships of the Japanese System. In the 1950s a major political decision was made to make industrial expansion the national goal. Since then politicians have not interfered with the bureaucratic elite assigned to carry out that policy. The *de facto* one-party system of Japan guaranteed that there would be no disturbing confusion from messy parliamentary democratic processes. But it also meant that the politicians abdicated responsibilities which in the Western democracies are crucial for major policy adjustments. Japan's political world is an anachronism when viewed against the apparent needs of the System today. Parliamentary representatives are largely chosen for their pork-barrelling skills, and leave the introduction of bills and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arguments on the budget almost entirely to the bureaucrats, except if one or another affects their own constituency.

The area in which political mediation is most needed and where it is most glaringly falling far short of being effective is in Japan's international relations. In its dealings with the outside world the Japanese Capitalist Development State faces probably its biggest future challenge. Most discussions about the future of the Japanese economy with intelligent observers of the current situation end up with the major question as to whether there will be continued acceptance of Japanese exports.

THE lion's share of Japanese economic growth since the second oil crisis has come from exports. The friction with trading partners this has caused is generally known. By far the most important relationship is with the United States. There the idea has recently been gaining ground that the Japanese economy is growing only because of an upturn in the American economy and that the relationship has become parasitic as, notwithstanding its achievement of economic development, Japan appears systematically to block American products from its markets.

Many categories of Japanese exports are already under some form of curtailment, and further arrangements to protect threatened industries in the West can be negotiated relatively easily. Cartelization is, after all, a familiar method of the Japanese CDS. But rather than work out a more systematic arrangement for a division of labour, the American side appears determined to gain improved access to the Japanese market. As this is bound to fail in any but a marginal sense, there is likely to be a great deal more friction. The term friction has by now become a euphemism for sentiments which in certain American quarters have become very hostile towards Japan.

Japanese authorities and their unofficial spokesmen in the academic and business communities contend that whereas the primary and tertiary sectors require further deregulation, the secondary sector of manufactures is as open as can be. Again, what is true on paper is, in this case, not true in fact, as the System erects non-tariff barriers about as fast as it removes others. Rhetoric about further efforts to open the market to foreign manufactures implicitly contradicts the official contention that the market could not be more open, and at the same time continues to give rise to expectations which are not fulfilled.

Frustration with Japan on the part of its trading partners is exacerbated by a growing awareness that no office-holder, from the Prime Minister down, is able to hold the System to any agreements one has reached with him. The System will grudgingly respond, but always with little and very late, if it is subjected to simultaneous pressure on many of its parts. It reacts only if imbued with the certainty that the status quo will lead to damage.

It would seem that a new set of political decisions is needed for adjustment to a world that finds it increasingly difficult to live with

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan. Prospects for such political decisions to be made are not encouraging. In the meantime Japan has become an easy scapegoat for economic problems in the US and elsewhere in the West, problems which are quite unrelated to the inaccessibility of its market. In the late 1970s the trade dispute with the Western countries was transformed from an economic into a political problem, without the Japanese System being sufficiently aware of the change. Even though Western countries have for their manufacturing capacity become partly dependent on Japanese equipment, the emotions involved may well outweigh sensible economic reasoning. Recent political rhetoric, especially from the US, begins to carry the suggestion that Japan is somehow morally deficient.

Thus far the post-war Japanese CDS has met severe challenges with an effectiveness that has repeatedly surprised the pessimists. The most relevant question today is, in my opinion, whether the Japanese System will by its actions be able to defuse the gathering anger of the American Congress. Possible American legislation directed against Japanese economic practices is likely to have a snowballing effect resulting in the contraction of world trade. The answer to the question whether in the long term the Japanese economy will move further ahead will therefore probably depend on whether the Western world will risk the collapse of the international free-trade system, by attempting to slow it down.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two Soviet Encyclopaedias

O. L. Smaryl

THE two encyclopaedias* cover essentially the same ground: the first few years of Soviet power, the events, and the *dramatis personae* participating in them. In most respects the two volumes represent identical viewpoints. For example, neither of them has entries under the names of Bukharin, Kamenev, Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Radek, Ryazanov, Rykov, Shlyapnikov, Smilga, Sokolnikov, Tomsky, Trotsky, Yezhov, Zinoviev. There are, however, minor variations, e.g. Tukhachevsky does not exist in the former edition (hereinafter, to be referred to as A) whereas all his titles are enumerated in the latter one (to be referred to as B), and he is also acknowledged as the general who led the first attack on the Kronstadt rebels. Molotov, on the other hand, is well reported in A but, for some mysterious reason, is removed from B.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the two volumes is under the entry "Central Committee." There are lists of Central Committee members in A which include not only those who have been tacitly rehabilitated, e.g. Berzin, Krestinsky, Lomov, Milyutin, Petrovsky, Schmidt, but also those who have become unpersons and have no entries. There is no such inconsistency in B. Under "Central Committee" there are numerous decrees given but no names, other than that of Lenin.

Furthermore, it is worth calling attention to the fact that neither encyclopaedias are very informative about causes of death. For example, neither the suicide of Yoffe nor of Mayakovsky is mentioned. Even worse, the editors no longer use the once fashionable phrase, "became a victim of the cult of personality." Thus, looked at through the eyes of a young Soviet reader, there is no way at all of learning about Stalin's crimes—unless he or she is willing to delve into a bit of statistics. It is possible to compile such statistics because the year of death, if not the reason, is recorded in both encyclopaedias. There are probably a few attempts to shift some of the deaths out of the critical period, e.g. Artuzov's death is given as 1943 whereas according to A. Antonov-Ovseyenko (in *The Time of Stalin*, Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1980) it is 1939, but on the whole most of the dates can be regarded as reliable.

In Tables 1 and 2 the number of deaths in each year is shown of all the people who have entries. Quite obviously, the years of the Civil War took a heavy toll. In A the number of deaths between 1917 and 1920 amount to 160 or 23·9 per cent of 670, the total number recorded. A further 129 (an average of about eight a year) died in the 16 years up to 1936. But then there was a sudden change. The next four years preceding the German

* "Velikaya Oktyabrskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Revolyutsiya," *Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Moskva, 1977), pp. 1–712, and "Grazhdanskaya Voina i Voennaya Interventsiya v SSSR," *Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Moskva, 1983), pp. 1–702.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attack were unusually bad for the health of those listed. Not less than 193, i.e. 50·6 per cent of those still alive at the beginning of 1937, died between 1937 and 1940.

The picture emerging from B is not very different, although the number of entries there, 1021, is considerably higher. Of these, 179 died in the period 1918–1920, and, on average, 13 for every year between 1921 and 1936. Two hundred and fifty-two, or 39·7 per cent of those still alive at the beginning of 1937 died in the period 1937–1940.

Taking the data from either encyclopaedia the number of deaths between 1937 and 1940 (years of peace!) is exceedingly high. It would be interesting to know how many of the young men and women in the Soviet Union ever ask their elders about such statistical freaks.

TABLE 1 (based on encyclopaedia A)

Year (1917–1976)	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	'22	'23	'24	'25
No. of deaths	11	74	49	26	11	9	3	8	13

'26	'27	'28	'29	'30	'31	'32	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38
9	9	12	2	4	4	8	10	7	7	13	76	72

'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	'47	'48	'49	'50	'51
29	16	18	14	14	7	8	5	6	7	3	6	4

'52	'53	'54	'55	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64
6	6	3	5	3	4	3	8	5	4	2	3	5

'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76
6	2	1	1	7	4	4	2	2	5	1	4

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2 (based on encyclopaedia B)

Year (1918–1982)	'18	'19	'20	'21	'22	'23	'24	'25	'26
No. of deaths	57	74	48	22	15	9	9	25	11

'27	'28	'29	'30	'31	'32	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39
11	13	9	4	9	14	14	9	14	19	95	99	42

'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	'47	'48	'49	'50	'51	'52
16	34	30	25	9	23	14	6	9	9	7	8	9

'53	'54	'55	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65
14	6	5	13	6	4	11	7	10	9	8	9	9

'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78
6	13	9	7	12	9	7	5	5	1	2	3	2

'79	'80	'81	'82
1	2	2	2

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Life and Fate of Vasily Grossman and his Novel*

Vladimir Voinovich

STUDENTS of Soviet literature know that the flood of books by Soviet writers published each year occasionally includes something that deserves attention. These are books whose authors have managed to slip something worth saying past the ruthless Soviet censorship, and a number of them are really quite good. But personally I prefer those works—and they can be counted on the fingers of one hand—that did not get through the censorship at all, to even the best books put out by Soviet publishing houses.

One of these very rare books is Vasily Grossman's *Life and Fate*. Had it been published at the time it was completed, in 1960, I have no doubt that this novel would have been a worldwide literary sensation. But there was no sensation. Instead, Vadim Kozhevnikov, the chief editor of the journal *Znamya*, to which the author offered his novel, read the manuscript and immediately ran off to the CPSU Central Committee or, perhaps, to the KGB—it does not really matter which. What is important is that, wherever Kozhevnikov did take it, they read it and, unlike some publishers, editors and literary critics, straightaway evaluated its true worth. The reaction was immediate. KGB officials turned up at Grossman's home and confiscated manuscript, drafts, notes, and everything in any way related to the novel. Another copy of the manuscript was spirited out of the safe of the chief editor of *Novyi mir*, Aleksandr Tvardovsky, to whom Grossman had given it to read. From the typists who had retyped the manuscript they confiscated not only all copies but also the carbon paper used to make them and, it was rumoured, even the typewriter ribbons. Everything was packed into a canvas bag, sealed, and disappeared, it seemed at the time, for ever.

It was an absolutely unique event even in the history of long-suffering Soviet literature. In the past, an author would be arrested, and all his papers would be carted off selectively or indiscriminately, but on this occasion it was not the author but his novel that they arrested. Not removed, not confiscated, but arrested, just like a living person.

Such a thing had never happened before. Boris Pasternak, for example, made no attempt to conceal from anyone the existence of his novel *Doctor Zhivago*. He gave it to his friends to read, he sent it to editors of journals, and sent it through the mail, but the idea never occurred to anybody to arrest it. The row broke out only after it was published abroad.

For many years, the most contradictory rumours circulated about

* An address delivered at the Frankfurt Book Fair on 3 October 1984, to mark the publication of the German translation of Vasily Grossman's novel *Life and Fate*. Grossman's novel is to be published in England by Collins/Harvill in autumn 1985.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Grossman's arrested novel. Nobody, or almost nobody, knew what kind of novel it was or why it had suffered such a fate. Only now that it has re-emerged from oblivion and we have been able to read it is it possible to say why this novel was arrested.

THE novel is written in the classic tradition of realism that may be called critical but can manage without any epithet. At all events, it has nothing in common with Socialist pseudo-Realism, differing from classic samples of that genre as a living body does from a tailor's dummy.

When reading this novel, one cannot help comparing it with Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. Indeed, like Tolstoy's novel, Grossman's *Life and Fate* is an epic, a vast historical canvas. As in Tolstoy's novel, the scenes of war and the scenes of peace play equally important roles. The action takes place in Moscow and in the depths of the countryside, behind the lines and at the front, at Stalin's headquarters and at the headquarters of Hitler. One of the heroines of the novel perishes in a German gas chamber; one of the heroes is broken by inhuman torture in the Lubyanka.

I would like to cite the famous Russian critic Strakhov, who wrote so enthusiastically of Tolstoy's novel:

> What vastness and what harmony! A thousand faces, a thousand scenes, all possible spheres of public and private life, history, war, all the horrors that exist on earth, all the passions, all the moments of human life—from the cry of a newborn child to the last outburst of a dying old man's feelings, all the joys and sorrows that man is heir to. All possible states of mind—from the emotions of a thief who has stolen money from his friend to the greatest illuminations experienced by the human soul—it is all to be found in this picture.

It is amazing, but all this could also be said of Grossman's novel.

It was not Grossman but our humane twentieth century that supplemented " all the horrors that exist on earth " with Stalin's and Hitler's concentration camps and the gas chambers of the last war. Grossman is merely a chronicler of his time.

But for all that, one may speak of the extraordinary humanism of this novel, of the unshakeable and indestructible faith of the writer in the good, in all the best that exists in man. It is striking how deeply the writer penetrates into the characters of his heroes: people are portrayed in all their pettiness and greatness. A husband suspects his wife of denouncing him to the NKVD. The wife suspects her lover of the same thing. The commander of a tank corps risks his life by delaying implementation of Stalin's orders in order to avoid unnecessary casualties. One and the same man displays extraordinary moral courage in the face of death but acts despicably for fear of losing some minor privileges.

No, this book is nothing like those in which the author has managed to say a little about something and still get it past the censors. Here, it was impossible to get a single sheet past the censors because the truth cries out from every page.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the basis of a comparison of all the best works written in this epic novel tradition during the Soviet period, I would say that Grossman's *Life and Fate* is the greatest and most important of them.

Soviet literature is administered by people who are incompetent and sometimes basically illiterate, but they do possess an animal instinct that enables them to distinguish unerringly the living from the dead, the truth from the untruth. It is therefore in no way surprising that, after reading this novel, they realized that it could not be smoothed out and rectified by cutting certain passages, making additions, or contriving a happy ending. They were able to judge the novel on its merits and could find no better solution than to seize it and hide it away.

In an attempt to retrieve his manuscript, Grossman made the rounds of numerous official bodies and was eventually granted an audience by the then chief Party ideologist, Mikhail Suslov. Suslov told Grossman that his ideologically harmful novel would be published in 200 years time at the earliest.

Boris Yampolsky, a friend of Grossman, characterized Suslov's statement as a manifestation of the monstrous arrogance of a palace favourite who thinks he is the arbiter of time. What I find of interest in Suslov's words, however, is that, guided by animal instinct, he did not doubt that the novel would live on.

Party ideologists very often make fools of themselves by forecasting dates. Nikita Khrushchev promised to build communism in 20 years, but now it is quite clear that it will not be built even in 200 years. In the case of Grossman's novel, Suslov was exactly 180 years out, so he was only 90 per cent wrong. The novel has regained its freedom and appeared in print not after 200 years but after only 20. Suslov had to acknowledge, if only when facing death, that time was not subject to his whims, but Grossman did not live to see his novel in print. Succumbing to this blow, he contracted cancer and died four years later on 14 September 1964, shortly before his sixtieth birthday. Nevertheless, he went on working to the end. When he was already on his deathbed, he completed *Forever Flowing*, an excellent short novel that, in my view, has been underestimated by many critics.

IT was not only physical torment that Grossman experienced as death drew near. For a genuine writer there is nothing more terrible than to die not only without seeing his major work in print but also with no assurance that it will ever reach the reader. In this sense, the fate of Boris Pasternak, who was also ultimately destroyed by his own novel, was a far happier one. Despite being persecuted and reviled, he did at least see *Doctor Zhivago* published and learned of its great success. Grossman, on the other hand, like Mikhail Bulgakov long before him, died in virtual obscurity. His tragedy was overshadowed by other events, some of them, such as Solzhenitsyn's emergence on the literary scene, important, others quite insignificant. I remember, for example, what a commotion there was in the West when one fashionable poet was refused a visa to travel abroad by the Soviet authorities. (The poet in question had been abroad

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

before and has been abroad since; indeed, he is still to be seen more often in this part of the world than in the aspen groves of his homeland.) But the arrest of a great novel and the death of its creator passed practically unnoticed. " I was strangled at the gate, " Grossman said before his death.

The title of the novel, *Life and Fate*, may not, at first glance, sound particularly attractive or effective but, the more I think about it, the more prophetic and apt it seems. For life and fate are not at all the same thing, and it is by no means easy to remain true to one's destiny in the life that Grossman is describing. The life of the author was reflected in the fate of his novel, and the fate of the novel was tragically reflected in the life of its author.

Yet I can no longer call the fate of the novel tragic because the story has a happy ending—perhaps, not an ending but a beginning. The novel's adventures have ended, its life has begun. It has been published and its popularity is growing. In French too it has been a great success. Now it has been translated into German and is in the process of being translated into English and other languages. The appearance of a book of such calibre, even in translation, is always a tremendous event. I am sure that Grossman's *Life and Fate* will be such an event for many readers. Its fate will be a happy one, and its life a long one.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Leopold Tyrmand 1920–1985

LEOPOLD Tyrmand was a Polish writer who died as the editor of an American magazine. His life and work were an extraordinary reflection of our time.

He was born into an assimilated Polish Jewish family. In 1927 he started his secondary education in a Warsaw *gymnasium* (which we attended together for nine years). Before the war he was interested not in politics, but in literature, girls and the opera; after the war he became a writer, which had been his childhood ambition. He gave up opera for jazz, and after his experience of Nazism and communism he became passionate about politics (his interest in girls remained with him). After settling in the United States he married his third wife, Mary Ellen (with whom he lived happily and had, late in life, twins).

During the war he was continually in the shadow of death. He was arrested by the Soviets in Wilno (where he had escaped from Nazi-occupied Warsaw). He then escaped back to Warsaw, but decided that the best chance of survival was in the lion's den, and he went to Frankfurt as a "guest worker" (with false documents). He worked as a waiter in a hotel and when he became an object of suspicion, he escaped to Norway where he joined the Norwegian underground resistance. He described his war adventures in several books and reminiscences. A few years ago when I was attending a conference which he organized in Frankfurt, he showed me the hotel where he had worked and from which he escaped just as the Gestapo were about to arrest him.

After the war he returned to Poland, but he never collaborated with the new regime. On the contrary, he became its active opponent, joining the Catholic *milieu* of *Tygodnik Powszechny*. He became very popular both as a writer and as the father of jazz in Poland (its promotion made him the idol of Polish youth at a time when jazz was condemned by the guardians of orthodoxy). His book *Zly* had extraordinary success as the first challenge to Socialist Realism in literature in the early period of the "thaw" after Stalin's death. It is a realistic description of Warsaw life—social and criminal. But gradually, under Gomulka's "normalization," conditions deteriorated to such a point that Tyrmand could no longer publish his books. At that time he was occasionally able to travel abroad and we resumed our friendship during his visits to London.

In the mid-1960s he still had hopes that his latest book would pass through the censors. He told me then that if this was not possible he would emigrate to America, which indeed he did when his manuscript

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was finally rejected (it was published abroad). His *Diary 1954* is the most vivid description of Polish society after Stalin.

Another period of difficult adjustment followed, but with his energy, vitality and talent he overcame the linguistic (and other) obstacles and began to publish in the United States. The *New Yorker* printed a series of his articles, but dropped him because of his anti-communism. He taught for a while at Columbia University and was then offered the opportunity of publishing a magazine in Rockford, Illinois. He called it *Chronicles of Culture*. His experiences of brown and red totalitarianism led him to take up a neo-conservative position. He was rooted in Western civilization, wanted it to survive, and was repelled, soon after his arrival in the USA, by what he saw as the attack on it in the 1960s by the "revolutionary" students, reverse-racists and "radical chic" socialites of the New Left. Unlike many exiles he found the American backdrop congenial, but he could not swallow the "progressive" stance of the American "liberals."

Tyrmand published an article in *Survey* about the metamorphoses of the present Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, and this is a fine example of his sharp style, powers of observation and understanding, as well as his characteristic blend of irony and moral indignation. He died suddenly in Florida on 18 March 1985. He was my longest surviving friend.

L. L.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Edward Crankshaw 1909–1984

THE death of Edward Crankshaw deprives us of a fine historian, skilful stylist and a decent and kind man. He was always very friendly to *Survey* (and to me personally). I must confess that I was surprised to learn in personal conversations and correspondence how many opinions we shared. I think that he gradually abandoned some of his earlier romantic notions about Russia. It was indeed his love of the Russian people which occasionally clouded his judgment of Soviet developments. But he had no illusions left about the system, and if one compares his earlier with his later writings, one is struck by the difference in emphasis and even of attitude. He was intellectually absolutely honest. That he felt more at home in Imperial Austria than in Imperial Russia is no criticism of him. His integrity was appreciated by people of various political persuasions and this in itself is a tribute to him as a man.

His books on Austria and *The Shadow of the Winter Palace* are likely to survive him. He was a very generous critic and all who knew him will remember the nobility of his spirit.

L. L.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our Contributors

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY is a Russian writer and scientist. He worked at the Moscow Centre of Cybernetics. He was arrested for possessing banned literature in 1963 and was confined to a Leningrad Psychiatric Prison Hospital for 15 months. In 1965 he was arrested for a demonstration on behalf of Soviet writers and was confined for eight months in psychiatric institutions. In 1971 he was arrested for delivering information on psychiatric abuse to the West and was sentenced to two years in prison, five in a labour camp and five in exile. After a worldwide campaign for his release, he was exchanged for Chilean Communist Party leader Luis Corvalan in Zurich in 1976. Since 1982 he has been engaged in research at Stanford University, California. His publications include *A Manual on Psychiatry for Dissenters* (with Semyon Gluzman), 1974, *To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter*, 1978, and *The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union*, 1982.

MICHAEL CHECINSKI received his PhD from the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw. He served for 20 years in the Polish Army of which 10 years were spent as senior lecturer of war economics at the Military-Political Academy in Warsaw. He left Poland in 1969, spent five years at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and is at present Senior Research Fellow at the Soviet and East European Research Centre and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He is author of books and articles published in Poland and the West, most recently: *Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism*, New York, 1982, and articles in *Problems of Communism*, *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft* and *Osteuropa*.

IAIN ELLIOT is Senior Lecturer in Russian Studies at Brighton Polytechnic. He is editor of the fortnightly commentary *Soviet Analyst* and a foreign leader writer for *The Times*.

MICHEL HELLER is Maitre-Assistant at the Sorbonne in Paris. He is author of *Le Monde Concentrationnaire et la Littérature Soviétique*, *L'Utopie au Pouvoir*, *Histoire de L'URSS de 1917 à nos jours* (with A. Nekrich), *Sous le regard de Moscou: Pologne 1980–82*, *Andrej Platonov en quête de bonheur*, and *A Cog and the Wheel. The development of Homo Sovieticus* (*A historical study*).

RICHARD PERLE is the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. He was for many years the advisor of the late Democratic Senator Henry Jackson.

J. L. PORKET is an independent scholar of Czech origin. He specializes in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industrial relations, manpower problems, and social policy in the Soviet-bloc countries. His articles have appeared in *The British Journal of Industrial Relations*, *Social Policy and Administration*, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft* and *Ageing and Society*, amongst others.

PEDRO RAMET is an Assistant Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. He is the author of *Sadat and the Kremlin* (1980) and of *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (forthcoming). His articles have appeared in *Orbis*, *Religion in Communist Lands*, and, previously, in *Survey*.

LEIF ROSENBERGER is a senior Soviet foreign affairs specialist at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He frequently writes articles on International Communism. In 1979 and 1980 he was a Special Lecturer on International Relations at Providence College, Providence, Rhode Island. His article "The Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance and Kampuchea" appeared in *Survey*, Vol. 27, Autumn-Winter 1983.

O. L. SMARYL is an engineer and a freelance journalist. He has taught in various universities in the West.

REBECCA V. STRODE is Senior Research Analyst of Soviet foreign and defence policy at the National Institute for Public Policy, a non-profit research corporation in Fairfax, Virginia.

JOHN R. THOMAS is a Soviet affairs specialist with the US State Department, with extensive research and analysis experience with US Government and research institutes. He has edited a volume on Soviet science and technology, contributed to other books, and written articles on Soviet foreign policy, military strategy and science policy. He has also had extensive experience in the USSR.

VLADIMIR VOINOVICH came into literary prominence with the publication of a comic novel about Soviet life during the Second World War, *The Life and Extraordinary Adventures of Private Ivan Chonkin*, (1970). In 1975 he wrote an open letter to Yuri Andropov (then head of the KGB) in which he complained that KGB agents had tried to poison him. Subsequently he published abroad *The Ivankiad*, a book which tells the story of his struggle with Soviet bureaucracy to protect his flat in the Moscow writers' cooperative from annexation by a KGB official who wanted the extra space. He emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1982 and now lives in Germany.

KAREL VAN WOLFEREN is the Far East correspondent for the Dutch paper *Handelsbladet*. He is based in Tokyo.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Slavic Review

American Quarterly of Soviet and East European Studies

The ***Slavic Review*** is an interdisciplinary scholarly journal devoted to the study of the history, literature, politics, sociology, and economics of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

• • •

The ***Slavic Review*** publishes the best manuscripts available. Each manuscript has been judged by recognized specialists to be intellectually significant and stimulating.

• • •

The ***Slavic Review*** offers a comparative approach that is fresh, instructive, and accessible to a broad, educated public.

• • •

The ***Slavic Review*** is published four times a year by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

• • •

The ***Slavic Review*** receives over 500 books a year for review on Russia, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe.

• • •

The ***Slavic Review*** is available with membership in the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies from:

American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
128 Encina Commons
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crossroads

An International Socio-Political Journal

Edited by Ilya Zemtsov

Published for the International Research Center on Contemporary Society (IRCCS), *Crossroads* is a socio-political journal concerned with Communist affairs, Middle East politics, and international affairs. The journal publishes articles on contemporary social, economic, and political issues representing divergent ideas and opinions.

Selected articles from forthcoming issues:

Soviet Expansion in the Mediterranean Region
William R. Kintner

START, Stops, and Nuclear Strategy
Louisa S. Hulett

America and the Chinese: The Need for Continuing Ambiguity
George H. Quester

Defense Against Permanent Soviet Propaganda Aggression in Europe
Michael Garder

Menachem Begin and the NKVD: The Soviet Union's Attitude toward the Struggle for a Jewish State
Michael Heifitz

Issued Quarterly/$40.00

Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.
3 East 44th Street, New York, New York 10017

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY,

a quarterly journal, brings its readers the best in current scholarship across the wide range of topics that interest students of American diplomacy and foreign relations. Now in its ninth year, ***Diplomatic History*** *publishes works by established and rising historians worldwide. The contents of a representative issue (Fall 1984) include:*

Michael J. Hogan

Revival and Reform: America's Twentieth-Century Search for a New Economic Order Abroad

Reginald C. Stuart

Special Interests and National Authority in Foreign Policy: American-British Provincial Links During the Embargo and the War of 1812

William E. Gibbs

James Weldon Johnson: A Black Perspective on "Big Stick" Diplomacy

William Leary & William Stueck

The Chennault Plan to Save China: US Containment in Asia and the Origins of the CIA's Aerial Empire, 1949-50

Lucien S. Vandenbroucke

The "Confessions" of Allen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Response to Lucien S. Vandenbroucke

A one-year subscription to ***Diplomatic History*** *and membership in its sponsoring body, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, is only $16.50, or $6.00 for students. To begin your subscription, please send your check made out to "SHAFR" for the appropriate amount in U.S. dollars to:*

SHAFR Business Office · Department of History
P.O. Box 13735 · North Texas Station
North Texas State University · Denton, TX 76203

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE

N° 2. ÉTÉ 1985. 50e ANNÉE

sommaire

Editorial

Pour en finir avec l'europessimisme
Roland Dumas

1981–1985:
UN PREMIER BILAN DE LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DE LA FRANCE

L'épreuve de la réalité
Dominique Moïsi

Est-Ouest: contre vents et marées
Denis Delbourg

La France et le Tiers-Monde ou comment gagner le Sud sans perdre le Nord
Marie-Claude Smouts

« . . . J'ai fait un rêve . . . »
Le président Mitterrand, artisan de l'union européenne
Philippe Moreau Defarges

Défense et sécurité extérieure: le changement dans la continuité
François Heisbourg

1981–1985: Le recentrage de la politique française au Liban
Bassma Kodmani-Darwish

La France et la crise du Tchad d'août 1983: un rendez-vous manqué avec l'Afrique
J.-P. Elce et P.-H. Hesse

Perspectives de la France outre-mer
Jean-Pierre Gomane

Quatre ans de politique étrangère socialiste. Le mirage évanoui
Jean François-Poncet

Chronologie, bibliographie, extraits de discours
François Daguet

DOCUMENTS

L'Europe face à ses défis: sécurité, intégration, technologie
Geoffrey Howe

La politique de sécurité de la Suède dans une perspective nordique
Anders Thunborg

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AT LAST, A JOURNAL OF OPINION THAT'S DECIDEDLY NON-LIBERAL

"IT HAS BEEN A PLEASURE TO WATCH LEOPOLD TYRMAND AND THE CHRONICLES OF CULTURE CONFRONT—A LA ORWELL—THE SMELLY LITTLE ORTHODOXIES OF OUR TIME" —TOM WOLFE

Here's your opportunity to read a copy—free!



Imagine! A journal of opinion that begins with that fresh perspective, and then goes about the business of reviewing, criticizing, essaying each month—in little danger of fraternizing with other magazines.

In each issue of **Chronicles**, we invite our readers **to think along with us** as we puncture the pompous ideas—and old-idea repeaters—of our time.

Everywhere one turns, liberal writers, playwrights, reviewers, editors and such are gushing over the most mediocre of themes—and each other.

Flaming liberals, doused monthly.

Alas, liberalism's leading product is the gaseous re-oxygenation of old, trite, tried-and-compromised ideas.

To stand aside virtually guarantees that the most noxious of dull material will be revived by an adoring Liberal Media Establishment.

Thus, our mission is clear. Every month, we shall drench these disseminators of fiery nonsense with unrelenting observations and critique.

Too many "hurrahs" for average performances.

In an era when the standing ovation is frequently offered for the most desultory performances—on stage, on film or on paper—we feel bound to cast a somewhat more critical eye than the mass media critics.

The Liberal Follies, exposed.

Another theme that delights our readers in every issue:

Our examination of what passes today for **Liberal Culture**.

We lace each issue of **Chronicles** with vignettes culled from the self-important follies-creators of our time. And our editors take some satisfaction in commenting on the absurdities and ironies of liberal attitudes.

At last, there exists a magazine **worth** reading for its originality, its zest, its willingness to examine books, film, jazz, theater, politics, the press and other institutions with no concern for Consensus or Conventional Wisdom.

We invite you to read the next issue of **Chronicles of Culture** free. If you like what you read, we welcome you as one of our regular subscribers. But you deserve a free sampling before your final decision.

Simply forward the enclosed Subscription Request and Free Issue Offer coupon. But do it today, so we may send you our freshest issue immediately.

If you are **decidedly non-liberal** in outlook, we believe you will find what we have to say—and how we have to say it in the pages of **Chronicles of Culture**—exactly what you have been looking for!

Chronicles of Culture
934 North Main Street • Rockford, Illinois 61103

I wish to judge **Chronicles of Culture** for myself. Enroll me as a potential subscriber and send me your current issue free.

☐ Bill me for $18.00 (12 monthly issues). If I'm not satisfied with my first issue I'll write "cancel" on the invoice and return it unpaid. No further obligation on my part.

☐ Check for $18.00 is enclosed. Please start my subscription now.

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ STATE_____ ZIP_____

Chronicles of Culture T8316
NON-LIBERAL CRITICISM AT ITS BEST.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Law & Government

A Quarterly Journal of Translations

Editor: Nils H. Wessell, Foreign Policy Research Institute and Lafayette College

Studies from a wide variety of Soviet sources on the interactions of law, government, and society in the USSR.

"The journal is among the most useful for scholars and general readers interested in Soviet-American relations."—*Walter LaFeber, Cornell University*

Sample Issue Contents

Islam and Processes of Social Development of Foreign Countries in the East
Theoretical Problems of the Development and Convergence of Nations
Social-Psychological Aspects of Popular Sovereignty in the USSR
Membership in the Party: Elevating the Designation of Communist
Unfounded Accusations Refuted
The Multiparty System under the Conditions of the Building of Socialism
The Foreign-Exchange Monopoly of the Socialist State

Quarterly
First Issue: Summer 1962
Institutions: $144
Individuals: $37

M.E. Sharpe Inc.
80 Business Park Drive,
Armonk, New York 10504

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The American Spectator is nervy with impudent opinions about politics, culture, and ideology.



Literate in its writing, independent in its thinking, **The American Spectator** is predictable in one respect only: It appeals to your intelligence and your sense of humor.

While **The American Spectator** takes delight in being irreverently funny, it can also be deadly serious. Not only does it take on the liberal media's sacred cows—Betty Friedan, Ralph Nader, Tip O'Neill, Bob Dole, Environmentalism, The New Industrial Policy—but it presents thoughtful analyses of ideas and people the media denigrate—Supply-Side Economics, Deregulation, the new Civil Rights Commission, Marva Collins, Thomas Sowell, Arthur Koestler, and Ronald Reagan.

Join the growing roster of subscribers to **The American Spectator**. The coupon contains an offer that will save you a heap of money. Mail it today.

" . . . nothing else quite like it on the American Scene."
—Irving Kristol

U.S. Election Year Special

THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR
P.O. Box 1969, Bloomington, Indiana 47402, U.S.A.

Open my trial subscription (8 giant, tabloid-sized issues) at your special money-saving price.

☐ Check for $11.95 enclosed ($15.95 outside U.S.A.). In return for my prepayment send me an additional issue. Full refund guaranteed if I don't like the first issue.

☐ Bill me (sorry, no additional issue). If I don't like my first issue I'll write cancel across the invoice, return it to you and owe nothing.

Name _____
(please print)

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Airmail rate outside U.S.A.: $37.95.

4PAA

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POTOMAC REVIEW

Why Read the Potomac Review? ***Because Potomac Review believes good graduate student research deserves wider recognition, and you deserve to read the best.***

Each year thousands of graduate students across the nation produce quality research on a myriad of topics which would be of great interest to many readers. Unfortunately, most of these papers go unpublished and unnoticed, generally read by one professor and filed in a drawer. A Nationally circulated and fully indexed journal, the Potomac Review, recognizes the work of promising young scholars in the social sciences and history and makes the best of it available to others.

Graduate students are invited to submit essays and book reviews. Manuscripts should be twenty to thirty typed double spaced pages and should be submitted in triplicate. Book reviews should be current (no more than two years old) and should also be submitted in triplicate. The Potomac Review cannot guarantee the return of manuscripts and book reviews submitted for consideration unless they are accompanied by a stamped self-addressed envelope. Send materials to: Editorial Board, the Potomac Review, Box 378, Dunn Loring, VA 22027.

The Potomac Review is indexed by the Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS), The World List of Social Sciences Periodicals, ABC: POL SCI and Historical Abstracts. *Single copy reprints are available from ACB: Clio Press (Santa Barbara, CA); complete volume reprints in microfilm are available from University Microfilms (Ann Arbor, MI).*

THE POTOMAC REVIEW • Box 378 • Dunn Loring, Virginia 22027

I would like to subscribe to the Potomac Review.

☐ *New* ☐ *1 year, $12.50* ☐ *Advanced Payment Enclosed*

☐ *Renew* ☐ *2 years, $25.00* ☐ *Please Invoice*

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ *State* _____ *Zip* _____

Date _____ *Please Sign* _____

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Studies in Soviet Thought

A Review Published by the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), the Center for East Europe, Russia and Asia at Boston College, and the Seminar for Political Theory and Philosophy at the University of Munich.

Editors: THOMAS J. BLAKELEY, GUIDO KÜNG, and NIKOLAUS LOBKOWICZ

Founded in 1961 by Joseph M. Bocheński, the journal serves as an international medium for the publication of research papers, short notes, comments, reports, critical reviews, discussions, and other writings on Soviet philosophy.
Although the main interest is in modern and recent Soviet thought, the journal does not confine itself to this field and publishes articles dealing with pre-Revolutionary developments. In addition, the journal is useful to philosophers who do not specialize in Soviet studies but wish to be kept informed of philosophical developments inside the Soviet Union and Marxist movements. Book reviews are an important feature.

A Representative Selection of Some Recent Articles
Jonathan Bushnell Bakker: Deborin's Materialist Interpretation of Spinoza. D. J. Bakhurst: Action, Epistemology and 'The Riddle of the Self'. Tom Rockmore: Husserlian Phenomenology, Soviet Marxism, and Philosophical Dialogue. Thomas J. Blakeley: Sartre Viewed from East and West. Jiri Marek: The Role of Practice in Marxism-Leninism: The Idea of Limits as Impetus in the Development of 17th-Century Physics. Irving H. Anellis: Science and Diamat.

Subscription Information ISSN 0039-3797
1984, Volumes 27 and 28 (8 issues)
Institutional rate: Dfl. 185,– / US $ 74.00 per volume incl. postage/handling
Private rate: Dfl. 75,– / US $ 30.00 per volume incl. postage/handling
Private subscriptions should be sent direct to the publishers.

D. Reidel Publishing Company

P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, the Netherlands
190 Old Derby St., Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minerva

A REVIEW OF SCIENCE, LEARNING AND POLICY

Editor: EDWARD SHILS

Minerva, now in its twentieth year, deals with the fundamental social, economic, political and administrative problems of higher education and scientific research in their contemporary relevance and in an historical perspective. Since its inception, **Minerva** has come to be regarded as the leading international journal in the field of higher educational and science policy.

In addition to four long articles in each issue, **Minerva** also reprints reports and documents which are otherwise difficult of access, as well as review articles on important books and editorial comments on pressing current problems.

Contents of Volume XXI Numbers 2–3 (Double issue)

ARTICLES

Thoughts on the State and Prospects of the Academic Ethic in the Universities of the Federal Republic of Germany *Ernst Nolte*

Neutrality in Science Policy: The Promotion of Sophisticated Industrial Technology in Israel *Morris Teubal*

Entrepreneurial Scientists and Entrepreneurial Universities in American Academic Science *Henry Etzkowitz*

Science, Technology and Political Responsibility *Gerard Radnitzky*

Some Thoughts on the Academic Ethic *David Riesman*

COMMENT

The Academic Ethic

I Partisanship, Judgement and the Academic Ethic *James Q. Wilson*

II The Dangers lie within the Universities Themselves *Adam Ulam*

REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

The Constitution, Academic Self-government and Academic Trade Unions in American State Universities and Colleges: A Decision of the United States Supreme Court

BOOK REVIEWS

Reviews by *Sanford Lakoff, Alvin M. Weinberg, Michael Zoller, Martin Bulmer*

Annual subscription: £18.00/$45.00 Single copy £5.00/$12.00

Minerva, 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LINGS 1/09/1983 32061EOPAD D03 [00]

ECONOMICS OF PLANNING

Published by the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.

BOARD OF MANAGEMENT
Mario Nuti (Chairman), Ron Amann, Julian Cooper, Robert W. Davies, Christopher Davis, John Dunstan, Philip Hanson, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, U.K., Henry Scott, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, U.K.

INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL ADVISORS
Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Erkki Laatto Gunnar Myrdal, Reino Rossi, Jan Serck-Hanssen, Knud Erik Svendsen.

ASSISTANT EDITORS
Peter Pruzan (Denmark), Thrainn Eggertsson (Iceland), Ilmari Susiluoto (Finland), Olav Bjerkholt (Norway), Jan Ake Dellenbrandt (Sweden), Gusztav Bager (Hungary), Wojciech Maciejewski (Poland), Tigran Sergeevich Khachaturov (USSR), Ljubisa Adamovic (Yugoslavia).

CONTENTS OF VOLUME 17 (1981)

No. 1: Paul Hare, The Organization of Information Flows in Systems of Economic Planning. A. Ghosh and P. K. Bugumbe, Computation of an Optimal Ordering for an Input–Output Matrix by an Application of Dynamic Programming. Ewart A. C. Thomas, Effort and Optimality in the New Soviet Incentive Model. J. Cieslik and R. Rapacki, Restrictive Contract Clauses in East–West Trade of Licences: Case Study of Poland. Book Review: Siegfried G. Schoppe—Die sowjetische Westhandelsstruktur—ein aussenhandels—theoretisches Paradoxon?, M. McCauley.

Nos. 2/3: R. Rapacki, Poland's Exports of Licences. Z. Sadowski, J. Kotowicz and K. Cwalina, An Experimental Model of Growth Proportions in the National Economy: The MODO Model. R. Gaiha and N. A. Kazmi, Aspects of Poverty in Rural India. V. Snowberger, Firm Response to Planner Initiative in a Centrally Planned Economy.

SUBSCRIPTION

£16 (US$32) per year. Three issues per year. Payment should be made to the UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM and sent to The Economics of Planning Office, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363, Birmingham B15 2TT, England (Tel: 021-472 1301, ext 3022).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If you are interested in the study of politics
and government, you are invited to join

THE SOUTHERN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

MEMBERSHIP INCLUDES

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS is a quarterly devoted to enriching and advancing the knowledge of politics. Inside its pages all methods, positions, conceptualizations, and techniques are expounded by authors who know their subjects and who back their ideas with careful research and positive scholarship. There is no bias in THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS—toward theory, American politics, or anything else. It is an open journal. Missing it is missing an adventure into the character of political variety.

.....

Upon receipt of this form you will begin a one-year membership in The Southern Political Science Association, including a subscription to THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS.

_____ Individual ..... $ 17.00
_____ Student or Retired ..... $ 10.00
_____ Institution ..... $ 25.00
_____ Foreign Postage (additional) ..... $ 5.50

Name_____

Address _____

_____

_____

Zip Code

Please make check or money order payable to THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS. Send to:

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL, USA 32611

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No one ever said ORBIS was easy reading.



Orbis, a quarterly journal of world affairs, seeks to educate, not pontificate. Orbis explains; it does not simplify. No wonder policymakers and analysts read it—not only in Washington, but in capitals around the world. No wonder scholars study it and assign it to their students. No wonder serious people everywhere turn to Orbis for accurate information and sophisticated analysis.

Orbis treats in depth a wide range of contemporary international issues, illuminating the links between diplomacy and military force, foreign policy and domestic politics, security and economics, strategy and culture. Orbis is known for its diverse subject matter. It covers everything from Argentina to Zimbabwe, from conventional warfare to star wars, from crisis forecasting to crisis management.

Please begin my ORBIS subscription immediately!

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____ Country _____

Yearly rates:

Individuals	$20.00
Institutions	$50.00
Students	$16.00
Outside USA add	$ 4.00

Enclosed is $_____

☐ Renewal

☐ Bill me later

MAIL TO:
ORBIS
Circulation Manager
3508 Market Street
Suite 350
Philadelphia, PA 19104

ORBIS A Journal of World Affairs

Published quarterly by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLAND WATCH

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION IN POLAND

POLAND WATCH monitors the activities of the human-rights movement, together with government policy and legislation relating to human rights. Each issue contains analyses, reports, and translations of selected documents. **POLAND WATCH** is the only journal of its kind in English—a unique source of information on human-rights issues in Poland.

■ ■ ■

"No one concerned about the internal strains in and the future of the Soviet bloc can afford to miss **POLAND WATCH."** ***—Zbigniew Brzezinski***

"**POLAND WATCH** *brings together a mass of information from a wide range of sources. An excellent journal, indispensable to anyone who wants to follow developments in Poland."* ***—Stanislaw Baranczak***

"**POLAND WATCH** *provides the best chronicle and analysis of developments in Poland since the coup of December 1981."* ***—Martin Malia, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS***

"**POLAND WATCH** *provides its readers with thoughtful, in-depth analysis and a clear vision of current developments in Poland."* ***—Lawrence Weschler, staff reporter, THE NEW YORKER***

"**POLAND WATCH** *is serious, eminently readable, filled with valuable insights, and impeccably documented."* ***—THE NEW REPUBLIC***.

In recent issues of **POLAND WATCH:** Poland under martial law; political trials; internment camps; mass media and official propaganda; cultural policy and underground culture; protest and resistance; the banning of Solidarity; Church activities; the suspension of martial law; the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR); interviews with Solidarity activists; documents and analyses from Poland.

Single issue:	US & Canada - $7	Elsewhere - $8
Annual subscription:	US & Canada - individual - $25	Elsewhere - individual - $35
	institutions - $35	institutions - $45

ISSN: 0736-0061

All payments in US dollar checks or money order.

Available from: Poland Watch Center, 1775 T Street NW, Washington, D.C., 20009.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED